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Abstract
Globalization has radically changed the world we live in; it has enabled the easy movement 
of people, goods and money across borders, and has facilitated improved communication. In 
a sense it has made our lives easier, however the same facets that have improved the lives of 
citizens across the globe now threatens them. Terrorist organizations now make use of these 
same facets of globalization in order to facilitate terrorist activity. This thesis set out to 
examine the extent to which globalization has contributed to the creation of a permissive 
environment in which terrorism has flourished in Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively, 
and how it has done so. In order to determine this Mittelman’s theory of hyperconflict and 
Zimmermann’s heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization and international 
terrorism were applied to the case studies of Al Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in 
Nigeria. The main finding of this thesis is that globalization has contributed to the creation of 
a permissive environment in which terrorism has flourished in Somalia and northern Nigeria, 
albeit to different extents. In Somalia, globalization has facilitated the terrorist activities of Al 
Shabaab by means of technology (especially information communications technology (ICT)), 
migration channels, and channels of business and commerce. Additionally, the threat of 
corrupt culture, as spread by globalization, has served as an incentive when selecting targets.
Moreover, it was found that globalization played a part in radicalizing Al Shabaab as well as 
ordinary Somalis. Similarly, globalization has facilitated terrorism perpetrated by Boko 
Haram in northern Nigeria; it has done so by means of technology, migration channels to a 
lesser extent, and politico-criminal network as well as support by external states and groups. 
The threat of a corrupt foreign culture has played a particular role in driving Boko Haram’s 
campaign of terror. Additionally, it was found that globalization played some part, albeit a 
small part, in Boko Haram’s rise to prominence. This thesis proved that in certain states and 
under specific conditions globalization has led to the creation of a permissive environment in 
which national/international terrorism can flourish.
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Opsomming
Globalisering het die wêreld drasties verander. Dit het teweeg gebring dat mense, goedere en 
geld vrylik oor internasionale en nasionale grense kan beweeg. Alhoewel die proses van 
globalisering die lewens van ‘n groot gedeelte van die wêreldbevolking vergemaklik het, hou 
dit egter gevare in. Hedendaags maak terreurgroepe gebruik van die verskillende fasette van 
globalisering as ‘n middel om terreuraanvalle uit te voer. Die doel van hierdie tesis is om te 
bepaal tot watter mate globalisering ‘n milieu geskep het, afsonderlik in Somalië en Nigerië 
waarin terrorisme kan floreer en hoe dit so ‘n milieu bewerkstellig het. Ten einde hierdie doel 
te bereik het hierdie navorsingsstudie Mittelman se teorië van “hyperconflict” en 
Zimmermann se “heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization and international 
terrorism” aangewend tot die volgende gevallestudies, naamlik: Al Sjabaab in Somalië en 
Boko Haram in Nigerië. In hieridie tesis is daar tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat daar ‘n 
verbintenis is tussen globalisering en terrorisme, met ander woorde, globalisering is 
verantwoordelik vir die skepping van ‘n milieu waarin terrorisme kan floreer. In die geval 
van Al Sjabaab in Somalië is daar bevind dat tegnologie (veral inligting en 
kommunikasietegnologie (IKT)), internasionale netwerke van besigheid en handel, asook 
migrasie kanale die terreuraktiwiteite van Al Sjabaab ondersteun en fasiliteer het. Verder is 
daar bevind dat “korrupte” buitelandse kulture gesien word as ‘n bedreiging en hierdie 
siening het die seleksie van teikens beïnvloed. Boonop is daar bevind dat globalisering ‘n
groot rol gespeel het in die radikalisering van Al Sjabaab asook Somaliese landsburgers. Net 
so, het globalisering die terreuraktiwiteite van Boko Haram gefasiliteer. Boko Haram het 
gebruik gemaak van tegnologie, migrasie kanale (tot ‘n mindere mate), “politico-criminal” 
netwerke asook die ondersteuning van eksterne state en groepe. Die 
verspreiding/deurdringing van “korrupte” buitelandse kultuur het veral ‘n rol gespeel in Boko 
Haram se terreur-veldtog. Verder is daar bevind dat globalisering ‘n matige rol gespeel het in 
Boko Haram se opkoms. Hierdie studie het dus bewys dat in sekere lande en onder sekere 
omstandighede globalisering ‘n milieu kan bewerkstellig waarin nasionale/internasionale 
terrorisme kan floreer.
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1Chapter 1: Introduction
1. 1 Introduction 
The introductory chapter serves to provide an overview of this study. In order to place the 
study in context, a brief background will be given as well as the rationale for choosing the 
particular field of research. There will then be a brief discussion of the problem statement and 
focus of the study. The section that follows will elaborate on the research design and 
methodology used, which will include the aspects of time dimension and units of analysis. 
The goals, variables, theoretical point of departure, research questions and hypothesis will 
then be discussed, followed by a contextualization of key concepts used in this study. In 
addition, the limitations of this study will be mentioned as well as possible means of 
overcoming these limitations. Lastly, the main aims of each chapter in this study will be 
briefly discussed. 
1.2 Background and Rationale
The last decade has seen terrorism gaining an increasingly international façade (United States 
Institute of Peace, 2004:1). International terrorism has become a prominent research topic in 
the field of international and regional security studies, especially in the wake of the 2001 
September 11th (9/11) attacks launched against the United Sates (US). The 9/11 attacks 
sparked a serious interest in finding the root causes of international terrorism, as well as a 
solution to terrorism; this has become known as the “War on Terror.” Even though acts of 
terrorism were perpetrated in previous decades, the focus of researchers and scholars was 
elsewhere. One could possibly regard 9/11 as a trigger for a renewed interest in international 
terrorism as a specific field of study.
Since 9/11, scholars in economics, political science, and other disciplines have devoted much 
effort to the study of terrorism and its impact on the economy and society. Some studies have 
investigated the reverse impact – in other words, the influence of the economy and social 
grievances on terrorism (Sandler, 2011:279). This topic has promoted further interest since 
there seems to be a correlation between the world becoming increasingly “smaller” and 
interconnected as a result of globalization, and the occurrences of both national and 
international terrorism (Cronin, 2003:30; Abrahamsen, 2004:678). 
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2This research study aims to explore the extent to which globalization has fuelled insecurity 
and has contributed to the creation of a permissive environment in which acts of 
national/international terrorism flourish. It will then focus on two vastly different regional 
contexts, namely Somalia in the Horn of Africa and Nigeria in West Africa. Within these 
regions two terrorist organizations will be focused on, namely Al Shabaab in Somalia and 
Boko Haram in Nigeria. The topic of this study falls under the larger study area of 
international as well as African security and the narrower study area of terrorism. 
The rationale behind choosing this area of study is that national/international terrorism 
seriously affects peace, security and stability, not only in the areas in which it occurs, but 
across the globe. The rationale for choosing the Horn of Africa and more specifically Somalia 
as one the case studies is that it is seen as an area that is vulnerable to national/international 
terrorism and has been considered to be a breeding ground for national/international terrorism 
(Abrahamsen, 2004:678–679). Furthermore, factors such as porous borders, weak 
governments and abject poverty are further exacerbated by globalization and could possibly 
contribute towards acts of terrorism (Carter, 2012:66). Moreover, the majority of literature 
that examines the link between globalization and international terrorism focuses on the 
Middle East and North Africa. Extensive research is therefore needed in order to fill the 
existing gap in the literature on terrorism and globalization in the Horn of Africa and West 
Africa, respectively. This study will seek to provide insight on how globalization has affected 
and aided acts of national/international terrorism within and originating in the Horn of Africa. 
The rationale behind the choice of Nigeria and Boko Haram as a second case study is the 
increasing insecurity that northern Nigeria has experienced over the last six years as a result 
of the activities of Boko Haram (Brigaglia, 2012:35). In addition, globalization, especially 
those facets equated with Westernization, can be seen as contributing to Boko Haram’s rise in 
prominence. The group has lashed out against targets that it perceives to have fallen prey to 
the decadence and corruption that it associates with Westernization/globalization (Walker, 
2012:7). Furthermore, since these are vastly different regional contexts, the study can provide 
insight on how globalization has affected and aided terrorism in different areas and to what 
extent it has done so. 
1.3 Problem Statement and Focus
Globalization has drastically changed the world we live in, making it increasingly 
interdependent, and facilitating improved communications as well as the easy movement of 
people, goods and money across borders. However, these effects of globalization have also 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3created heightened insecurity as well as permissive environments for terrorist acts. There has 
been an increasing focus on certain states in Africa, as these states are seen as being 
vulnerable to terrorism. Furthermore, states such as Nigeria and Somalia have seen an 
upsurge in violence perpetrated by terrorist organizations. This has become a matter of 
increased concern not only for the aforementioned and neighbouring states, but also for the 
entire global community.
1.4 Goals, variables, theoretical point of departure, research questions and 
hypothesis
The goal of this study is to develop a better understanding of the link that exists between 
globalization, security and national/international terrorism. In addition, this study aims to 
determine why and how globalization has affected national/international terrorism in, and 
emanating from Somalia as a result of the actions of Al Shabaab and in, and emanating from 
northern Nigeria as a result of the actions of Boko Haram.
1.4.1 Variables
This study will utilize one independent variable namely globalization and one dependent 
variable namely terrorism/terrorist groups. In addition, this study will examine two cases 
namely Al Shabaab, focusing on the acts and operational procedures of Al Shabaab from 
January 2008 to June 2015; and Boko Haram, focusing on the acts and operational 
procedures of Boko Haram from July 2009, when Boko Haram rose to prominence, to June 
2015.  Thus, by looking at the independent and dependent variables as well as the two cases it 
is clear that this study supports the opinion that globalization influenced and possibly 
exacerbated national/international terrorism in Somalia from January 2008 to June 2015 and 
in Nigeria from July 2009 to June 2015. 
1.4.2 Theoretical Point of Departure
In his book, Hyperconflict: Globalization and Insecurity, James H. Mittelman (2010:1) 
argues that there is undoubtedly a relationship between globalization and security/insecurity. 
He further argues that globalization has set in motion the phenomenon of hyperconflict as 
insecurity has become an increasing problem. This research study will employ as a theoretical 
point of departure Mittelman’s argument that globalization has brought about a situation of 
hyperconflict. In addition to employing Mittelman’s argument of hyperconflict, this study 
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4will also make use of Zimmermann’s (2011) work, specifically his heuristic causal model of 
linkages between globalization and terrorism. 
1.4.3 Research Question and Sub-research Questions
The main research question that this study aims to address and elaborate on is: How and to 
what extent has globalization contributed to the creation of a permissive environment in 
which terrorism has thrived in Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively? A number of sub-
questions will be used to facilitate the answering of the main research question. 
The sub-questions are as follows: 
1. Has globalization acted as a facilitator or a deterrent of national/international 
terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively?
2. How has globalization aided and facilitated national/international terrorism in,
and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria?
3. How has globalization served as an incentive for national/international terrorism 
in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria?
4. Which other factors have aided globalization in facilitating national/international 
terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively?
By finding and investigating the answers to the above questions, this study aims to fill the 
knowledge gap pertaining to the link between globalization and terrorism in the regions of 
West and East Africa respectively. 
1.4.4 Hypothesis
In current research there are two leading and contrasting arguments with regard to the effect 
of globalization on terrorism. The first argues that globalization has led to and facilitated 
national/international terrorism. A prominent proponent of this argument is Audrey Cronin 
(2003); her views will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapter. In contrast, the 
second argues that globalization has in fact deterred acts of both national and international 
terror. A study conducted by Li and Schaub (2004), found that the economic development of 
countries and their trading partners reduces the number of terrorist incidences in a country, 
which essentially promotes the idea that economic globalization promotes development 
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5which deters terrorism.1 Furthermore, existing literature also argues that other factors such as 
failed states and porous borders are to blame for the acts of terror that the world has 
witnessed and is currently witnessing. This research study hypothesizes that (1) in certain 
countries, and under specific circumstances globalization has led to and/or provided a 
permissive environment in which national/international terrorism has thrived. Furthermore, it 
hypothesizes that globalization leads to and/or facilitates national/international terrorism in, 
and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively.
1.5 Research Design and Methodology 
Following the theoretical framework based on the work of Mittelman (2010) and 
Zimmermann (2011) this comparative study will seek to determine the link that exists 
between globalization and terrorism. Thus, the question of whether or not globalization is 
responsible for facilitating and encouraging terrorist activity will be explored through the 
comparison of Boko Haram in Nigeria with that of Al Shabaab in Somalia, specifically with 
regards to their activities. The study will examine the terrorist activities of both groups 
through the examination and analysis of secondary material, including scholarly articles, 
news reports and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (open-source database that logs and 
includes information on terrorist attacks around the world, dating from 1970 to 2014) 
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 
2015a). Furthermore, it will examine how the different facets of globalization impacted the 
activities of the respective terrorist groups. It will do so by looking at the motivations behind 
their actions as well as the specific targets of attack. 
This research study utilizes a comparative case study design. This design examines in rich 
detail the context and features of two or more instances of specific phenomena, in the case of 
this research study instances of globalization and terrorism in the areas of Somalia and 
Nigeria respectively. The goal of this design is to discover contrasts, similarities, or patterns 
across the cases (Campbell, 2009:174). Thus, this research study aims to discover whether the 
same facets of globalization has facilitated/encouraged terrorism or whether completely 
different facets played a part in facilitating/encouraging terrorist activities in the cases of Al 
Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Furthermore, these discoveries may in turn 
contribute to the confirmation of theory, namely Mittelman’s theory of hyperconflict and 
                                               
1 It is however important to note that this study only considers economic globalization and that its dataset 
precedes the upsurge in terrorism.
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6Zimmermann’s heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization and international 
terrorism in this research study. 
This study contains elements that are characteristic of descriptive, explanatory and 
exploratory studies. The purpose of the study is primarily descriptive and explanatory. The 
elements of a descriptive study are evident, as this study will present details with regard to 
the link that exists between globalization and terrorism by indicating how globalization has 
facilitated national/international terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern 
Nigeria respectively; in other words, determining which aspects of globalization have played 
a role in facilitating/encouraging terrorist activities in, and emanating from the 
aforementioned regions. In addition, elements of explanatory research are present in this 
study, as it also seeks to determine why globalization has specifically aided 
national/international terrorism within and emanating from the aforementioned regions. 
Finally, this study contains some elements of an exploratory study. This is realized within the 
study through its attempt to establish whether other factors have assisted globalization in 
“aiding” national/international terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern 
Nigeria, respectively. 
Sufficient data relating to the terrorist activities of both Boko Haram and Al Shabaab can be 
found in the GTD. When searching for incidents perpetrated by the aforementioned one is 
able to apply a further filter where one can look at the attacks according to a specific target
type, for example educational institutions, police, government and military amongst others. 
The data obtained from these searches in addition to scholarly articles and news reports will 
assist in determining whether or not globalization has played and attributing role in 
encouraging terrorism because the choice of target can inform about the “feelings” of these 
two terrorist groups towards for example educational institutions. This will be covered in 
sections 4.4.1 Threat of Corrupt Culture and 5.4.1 Threat of Corrupt Culture. As will be seen 
in these sections globalization did not necessarily encourage a terrorist attack, but its 
symbolism or relation to globalization informed the choice of target.
This research study will employ a distinctly qualitative method since it involves the 
collection and analysis of information from a relatively small number of cases (Burnham, 
Gilland Lutz, Grant & Layton-Henry, 2008:40).  It will also rely on secondary material, using 
the material as a point of departure, and analysing it to gain a better understanding of the 
subject matter so as to determine areas in which new literature can be developed. 
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71.5.1 Time Dimension
In terms of time dimension, this study will utilize a longitudinal case study design. The 
reasoning behind the selection of this particular design is that it enables one to focus the 
research of the study and to study the topic area in depth (Burnham et al., 2008:63). This 
research study will examine the effect that globalization has had on national/international 
terrorism in, and emanating from northern Nigeria within the time period of July 2009 to June 
2015. This is due to the fact that Boko Haram rose to prominence during July 2009. In 
addition, this research study will also examine the effect that globalization has had on 
national/international terrorism in, and emanating from the Horn of Africa, specifically 
Somalia, from January 2008 to June 2015. The rationale behind choosing this time frame is,
that since early 2008, Al Shabaab has transformed itself into a movement that has embraced 
international terrorism and has endeavoured to portray itself as part of Al Qaeda’s global war 
against the West (Wise, 2011:1).
1.5.2 Units of Analysis 
There are numerous units of analysis that will be employed in this research study. The first 
unit of analysis that will be employed is Somalia (Horn of Africa) as a region. The second 
unit of analysis that will be employed is northern Nigeria (West Africa) as a region. The third 
unit of analysis that will be utilized is terrorist organizations involved in acts of terror in, and 
emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria, respectively. These organizations can be 
identified as Al Shabaab and Boko Haram respectively. The last unit of analysis relates to the 
period of time, July 2009 to June 2015 in the case of Boko Haram and northern Nigeria, and 
2008 to June 2015 in the case of Al Shabaab and Somalia. 
1.6 Key Concepts2
Globalization:
There are varying definitions of the concept of globalization. It is often seen as the 
phenomenon responsible for “shrinking” the world, while it simultaneously results in an 
increased amount of interaction between the different actors that are at play in the world 
(Ervin & Smith, 2008:5). Zimmermann (2011:S152) argues that globalization can be defined 
as a process, which leads to the extension and intensification of the exchange of goods, 
                                               
2 The concepts of globalization, terrorism, domestic terrorism and international terrorism will be discussed in 
greater depth in Chapter 2: Literature Review.
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8persons and ideas. Some scholars have also argued that globalization has often been seen to 
encompass the Westernization, as well as the Americanization of the world (Nassar, 2005:7; 
Steger, 2013:1). According to Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann (2006:5), “[g]lobalization is a 
process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and 
transcultural integration of human and non-human activities.” Baylis, Smith and Owen 
(2014:9) agree that globalization can be seen as a process that results in increasing 
interconnectedness (integration) between societies. However, they add that the increasing 
interconnectedness between societies causes “events in one part of the world [to] increasingly 
have effects on people and societies far away” (Baylis, Smith & Owen, 2014:9). Even though 
the aforementioned definitions are “different,” the majority of the definitions agree that 
globalization leads to increasing contact/integration/connectivity among people. 
Terrorism:
This is a politically loaded and widely contested concept, which still lacks a universally 
agreed upon definition. As a result, hundreds of often diverging definitions of terrorism exist 
(Schmid, 2011a:694). Terrorism can be seen to constitute illegitimate acts or threats of 
violence perpetrated against targets, individuals or property, in order to coerce government or 
societies for political objectives (Cilliers, 2003:91). The targets of terrorism are often seen to 
carry a symbolic meaning (Rasmussen, 2002:324). It is in most cases used as a tactic by a 
minority grouping (either in power or trying to attain power) that is lacking patience, 
willingness, public support and/or the ability to employ more morally acceptable instruments 
to exert political influence (Schmid, 2011a:694). 
Domestic Terrorism:
Domestic terrorism3 takes place when illegitimate acts or threats of violence are perpetrated 
within the confines of a state’s national boundaries, and does not include targets or agents 
from abroad (Sandler, 2011:280).  
International Terrorism:
International terrorism occurs when two or more states, either through target or perpetrator, 
are involved in illegitimate acts or threats of violence (Aubrey, 2004:13). These acts or 
threats of violence include incidents where terrorists cross national borders to strike foreign 
targets, and select victims or targets because of their connections to a foreign country (for 
                                               
3 Domestic and national terrorism are used interchangeably.
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attack targets for it to constitute an act of international terrorism; for example, if the target is 
a consulate or embassy it can be considered as an act of international terrorism (Schmid, 
2011a:646).
Terrorist:
An individual (in most cases a young male, but rarely a female) who uses (or threatens to use), 
as an individual or as part of a group, interpersonal violence, in most cases against civilians, 
in an attempt to intimidate or coerce third parties (for example a government, section of 
society, or international organization) as part of a strategy to achieve political objectives. 
These individuals prefer to refer to themselves in positive terms such as jihadists, and 
mudjahedeen, amongst others (Schmid, 2011a:694).
Terrorist Organization: 
Any group that practises national or international terrorism. 
Al Qaeda:
Al Qaeda is a global militant Islamist organization that is responsible for terrorist attacks 
across the globe; it was founded in 1989 as an organization devoted to fighting Soviets in 
Afghanistan (Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005:4). Al Qaeda has been described as being “a rather 
loose association of radical Salafist4 Islamist groups operating in many countries around the 
world that revere founding members such as Saudi-born Osama Bin Laden, Egyptian-born 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the late Jordanian/Palestinian figure Abdullah Azzam, and is led by 
a transnational coterie of veterans of Islamist struggles around the world” (Piazza, 2009:66). 
Their most notable act of terrorism occurred on September 11th 2001 when their operatives 
flew two planes into the World Trade Centre in New York and another plane into the 
Pentagon, the US Department of Defence (Byman, 2015:31;34).  
Al Shabaab:
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, commonly known as Al Shabaab, is an Al Qaeda affiliated 
organization that has rapidly risen to prominence especially in the wake of the 2006 
                                               
4 Those Sunni Muslims who are interested in returning to the beliefs and practices of the original Islamic 
community founded by the Prophet Mohammed in the 7th Century (Caryl, 2012). In addition, Salafist Islam 
strongly rejects the West and Western culture, whilst also believing in the use of direct action to purify Islam of 
false believers as well as reinstating Islam across the world Islamic community (Thomson, 2012:51).
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Ethiopian invasion of Somalia (Wise, 2011:1). It developed as an offshoot of the Islamic 
Courts Union in Somalia. The organization operates in the Horn of Africa region, most 
prominently in Somalia and Kenya. Its principal objective is to establish a Somali Caliphate 
in Somali inhabited areas in the Horn of Africa (Ali, 2008:3). 
Boko Haram:
A Sunni Islamic sect/terrorist group operating in the area of Northern Nigeria, they are 
mostly based in the north-eastern states of Yobe and Borno. The name of the group has been 
contested, as the group’s full, formal name is ‘Jama ̄ ’atu Ahlis Sunnah La ̄dda’awatih wal-
Jihad’, translated to ‘People Committed to the Propogation of the Prophet’s Teachings and 
Jihad’ (Elden, 2014:414). The group has been given a variety of names such as the Nigerian 
Taliban; however the name that has stuck is Boko Haram, a name that was allegedly given to 
the group by their neighbours in Maiduguri. When translated from Hausa it roughly means 
“Western education is forbidden” (Walker, 2012:3). However, the group has contested this 
meaning, as they contended that it actually means, “Western Civilization is forbidden” 
(Onuoha, 2012:136). Their ultimate goal is to rid the Nigerian state of any traces of Western 
values and to establish a socio-political system based on a traditional Islamic model, which 
implements strict Sharia law (Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012:28). 
Horn of Africa5: 
A region in Africa that comprises Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan 
and Sudan (International Crisis Group, 2015a). Many, especially the US, have considered the 
region to be a major source of terrorism (United States Institute for Peace, 2004). 
West Africa6:
A region in Africa that comprises Nigeria, Niger, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Benin, Cabo Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone and Togo (ECOWAS, 2015). 
1.7 Limitations of the Study 
One limitation of this study pertains to the conceptualisation of a key term, namely terrorism. 
There is a wide variety of definitions for the term, as will be seen in the following chapter. 
Zimmermann (2011:S153) states that national and international acts of terror are often not 
                                               
5 See map of the Horn of Africa in Appendix B.
6 See map of West Africa in Appendix D.
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sufficiently distinguished, and ethnocentric definitions are often applied. For example, the 
Counterterrorism Center “fails” to report a large number of incidents of terrorism, which 
involve non-state groups in Africa and elsewhere, since citizens of the US are not involved. 
The fact that many definitions of international terrorism have an ethnocentric or geographical 
bias can be seen as a significant limitation/shortcoming. Since these definitions are applied 
when measuring and reporting on acts of international terrorism, a number of acts of 
terrorism that do not fit the definition/description are not measured or taken into account. 
Thus, the data recorded/measured does not give us an accurate presentation of the number of 
incidents of international terrorism and in turn makes it difficult to determine whether 
terrorism has increased. It is thus important to develop an inclusive definition of international 
terrorism to ensure that measurement is more accurate. Furthermore, in order to overcome 
this limitation, this study will make an effort to consult data which makes use of the most 
inclusive definition of terrorism. 
Another limitation pertains to gaining primary data. The nature and subject area of this study 
makes it almost impossible to conduct interviews with the individuals and groups involved in 
terrorism. First, safety may be considered a concern as these groups are known to take 
hostages, especially female hostages. Furthermore, these groups might not be willing to speak 
to a “Westerner” given their belief that everything pertaining to the West is corrupt. In 
addition, the cost of travel to and accommodation in these two areas may also be considered 
not feasible. This limitation can be remedied to an extent by using the material of some 
scholars who have been able to conduct interviews with former members of these terrorist 
organizations. 
The accuracy of reporting in northern Nigeria also presents a limitation. Since former 
President Goodluck Jonathan instituted a state of emergency, communication, including that 
of mobile phone networks has been limited. To further complicate matters, large areas in the 
north are out of bounds to Nigerian and Western media (Elden, 2014:419). This will be 
remedied by ensuring the use of a reliable news agency, and cross-checking reports with 
other news agencies. 
1.8 Outline of the study 
This research study will consist of six different chapters. Chapter 1: Introduction has been 
dealt with above and mainly serves the purpose of introducing the reader to the topic of this 
research study by providing a brief background. It also informs the reader of the significance 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
12
that this study holds. Furthermore, it outlines the goals of this study, the questions it will 
attempt to answer, and the methods used. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review aims to inform the reader of the research that has been done on 
the topics of security, terrorism and globalization. It also serves the purpose of familiarizing 
the reader with key terminology that will be employed in this research study. In addition, it 
will indicate how these phenomena are connected and how they influence one another. 
Chapter 3: The Age of Hyperconflict and the Globalization-Terrorism Nexus. This chapter 
seeks to determine how the phenomena of globalization and terrorism are connected and how 
they have become increasingly interdependent. This chapter will, amongst others, make use 
of the Mittelman’s Hyperconflict: Globalization and Insecurity to further develop the 
argument that globalization and terrorism are inextricably linked and that the former leads to 
a situation of hyperconflict. It will also examine Zimmermann’s causal model for links 
between globalization and terrorism.
Chapter 4: Al Shabaab: Proof of the Dark Side of Globalization. This chapter will focus 
specifically on how globalization has impacted the security environment and created a 
permissive environment in which acts of terror can take place within Somalia. It will seek to 
determine how the different effects of globalization have enabled Al Shabaab to commit acts 
of terror more easily. Furthermore, it will examine whether globalization and its effects have 
encouraged the organization to commit acts of terror. It will also explore how globalization 
itself has served as a motivating factor in the rise of Al Shabaab, specifically relating to its 
anti-Western stance.
Chapter 5: Boko Haram: The Scourge of Globalization. This chapter will focus specifically 
on how globalization has exacerbated insecurity in Nigeria, especially northern Nigeria where 
Boko Haram operates. It will seek to determine how the different facets of globalization have 
enabled Boko Haram to commit acts of terrorism more easily. Furthermore, it will look at 
how increasing Westernization, which is often equated to globalization, has influenced the 
terror campaign of Boko Haram, specifically as an incentive for acts of terrorism.
Chapter 6: Comparison and Analysis. This chapter will compare the two case studies 
addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. The purpose of this comparison will be to determine in which 
ways globalization has affected the two regions and groups; in other words, whether the same 
or different facets of globalization facilitated and/or encouraged terrorism in these two 
regions. 
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Chapter 7: Evaluation and Conclusion. The last chapter will serve as a conclusion to this 
research study. It will revisit the questions that were set out in the first chapter and determine 
whether these questions have been answered satisfactorily. Furthermore, it will provide 
recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to lay the foundation for the rest of the study. Furthermore, it 
aims to provide the reader with a background for this specific area of study. It will do so by 
providing an overview and appraisal of existing scholarship on the various topics relating to 
this area of study, namely security. By appraising published literature, it will be possible to 
identify strengths and weaknesses, in other words determine which areas have been well 
researched and documented, and which have not. This will assist in pinpointing the gaps in 
existing literature. The topics that will be examined include: security, globalization, terrorism, 
and the link between globalization and security. Furthermore, there will be an appraisal of 
literature examining the different ways in which globalization has facilitated and possibly 
encouraged the occurrence of terrorism, both domestically and internationally. Thereafter, a 
brief overview of terrorism in the regions of the Horn of Africa and northern Nigeria will 
follow. 
2.2 Security
The following section will briefly review existing scholarship on security, focusing 
particularly on the difficulty of finding an agreed upon definition, the key features of security 
and how the scope of security has broadened. According to Rudolph (2003:4) security has 
been the cornerstone in the study of international relations, essentially its raison d’être. 
However, like many other concepts in Political Science, it has been and continues to be 
notoriously difficult to define/conceptualize. Security is a social construction, thus the term 
security has no meaning in itself; rather it is given a specific meaning by people within the 
emergence of an intersubjective consensus. As a result, over the course of time the term 
comes to have a particular meaning, although it may change over time (Sheehan, 2005:5).  In 
spite of the efforts by scholars to conceptualize the notion of security in a coherent manner, 
no one generally acceptable definition of security has yet been produced. In addition to the 
term being highly contested, some scholars have argued that the term is underdeveloped, so 
much so that it is inadequate for use. One of the reasons for this situation is attributed to the 
fact that the term is simply too complex to garner attention and has thus been neglected in 
favour of other concepts (Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law, 2007:15). A 
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further problem that Sheehan (2005:5) identifies is that the meaning of security has often 
been treated as being obvious and nonsensical. 
There is much debate and controversy surrounding the conceptualization of security; the 
debate exists between those who wish to widen the scope of security and those who wish to 
keep the scope narrower. The “wide” versus “narrow” debate developed from an increasing 
dissatisfaction with the extreme narrowing of the field of security studies, which was forced 
onto the field by the Cold War’s military and nuclear obsessions (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 
1998:2). The traditional realist approach (narrow) was viewed as being increasingly 
unsatisfactory in its own terms and as a result of it ignoring important aspects of an 
international policy agenda (Sheehan, 2005:2). The argument for widening the field was soon 
followed by a plea from traditionalists (those wishing to keep the scope of security narrow 
and focused on military security) to confine security studies to issues that were centered on 
the threat or use of force. Their key argument was that a progressive widening of security 
could lead to the endangerment of the intellectual coherence of security, loading it to the 
extent that the essential meaning of security would become void. Traditionalists feared that if 
non-military issues were to achieve security status, there would be undesirable and 
counterproductive effects on the entirety of social and international relations (Buzan, Wæver 
& De Wilde, 1998:2). By destroying the intellectual coherence of security, it would be even 
more difficult to find solutions to any of the problems “listed” in a wider conception of 
security. Traditionalists continue to argue for the primacy of military security; however, they 
have accepted the need to look at, and address, non-military causes of conflict in the 
international system and have not made much of an attempt to defend the centrality of the 
state in security studies, this is probably due to so many non-state actors playing a part in the 
“military game” (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998:3). Buzan, a widener, has argued for 
retaining a “distinctively military subfield of strategic studies within a wider security studies” 
Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998:2).
Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde  (1998:5) argue that there is a need to “construct a 
conceptualization of security that means something much more specific than just any threat 
or problem.” Threats and vulnerabilities can arise from various areas; however, in order to be 
classified as a security issue they must adhere to strictly defined criteria that distinguish them 
from those which are merely political. These threats/vulnerabilities have to be presented as 
existential threats to a referent object (the particular individual, group etcetera that is the 
target of the threat) “by a securitizing actor [such as the United Nations Security Council] 
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who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would 
otherwise bind” (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998:5; Williams, 2008:6). 
The realist tradition has exercised an enormous amount of influence in the field of security 
studies, which in a sense has provided a baseline for other traditions (Elman, 2008:15). 
Realists harbour a narrow conception of security where security is defined in terms of states, 
militaries and the use of threat and force (McDonald 2008:59). 
The constructivist tradition argues that security is a social construction, in other words it 
means different things in different contexts. Two opposing actors will view security 
differently.  It can also be seen as a site of negotiation and contestation, where actors will 
compete to portray the identity and values of a specific group in such way that it provides a 
foundation for political action (McDonald, 2008:67). Constructivists view identity and norms 
as central to the study of security, as the two together provide “the limits for feasible and 
legitimate political action. Finally, agents and structures are mutually constituted, and 
because the world is one of our own making, even structural change is always possible even 
if difficult” (McDonald, 2008:67). 
Even though security is an essentially contested and highly politicized concept, it is 
something that is desired by everyone (Williams, 2008:5; Eckersley, 2009:85). Security is 
said to imply an absence of threat (Robinson, 2008:1). Williams (2008:5) adds that security is 
also associated with the alleviation of threats to particular values, especially if those threats, if 
left unchecked, threaten the survival of a particular referent object. Security also gives 
individuals/groups the ability to pursue their cherished political and social ambitions 
(Williams, 2008:6). It is stated that a threat can be seen as “a combination of the capability 
and intent to do harm or enact violence” (Anderson, 2012:34). He adds that both of these 
components are required to constitute a threat. Thus, security implies that an individual/group 
is safe from harm or violent actions. Anderson (2012:33) further states that the scope of 
security is broadened when looking at security at an international level. The threats now have 
international, transnational and multinational implications. Thus, threats can constitute the 
harm of individuals across the globe, even if the threat is only “directly” present in one area.
According to Anderson (2012:33–34), it is also important to determine the agent and target 
(the referent object) of the particular threat.  The agent of terrorism, as a security issue, can be 
defined as the terrorist or terrorist organization and the target (referent object) as 
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individuals/groups/property (whichever the group believes will accomplish their specific 
goal).  
2.2.1 National vs International Security
According to Haftendorn (1991:3) there is no one concept of security; she argues that 
“national security,” “international security,” and “global security” refer to different sets of 
issues. The purpose of this section is then to determine what it is exactly that national and 
international security respectively entail. 
The expression “national security” was coined in the immediate aftermath of World War II; it 
came to describe the area of public policy concerned with the preservation of state 
independence and autonomy. Thus, national security was directly related to the maintenance 
of a state’s political independence and freedom of national decision-making (Sheehan, 
2005:6). According to Richard Ullman (1983:123) “defining national security [only] (or even 
[mainly]) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality.” He proposes a 
broader definition: 
A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens 
drastically and over a relatively [short] span of time to degrade the quality of life for the 
inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices 
available to the government of a state, or to private non-governmental entities (persons, 
groups, corporations) within the state (Ullman, 1983:135). 
In comparison to national security, international security implies that the security of one state 
is closely linked to the security of other states, or at the least that of one other state. The 
security affairs of states are interdependent, so much so that the security of one is strongly 
affected by the actions of the other(s), and vice versa. Keohane and Nye (1977/1989) cited in 
Haftendorn, 1991:9) defined this structure as complex interdependence. They make the 
assumption “that the realization of mutual vulnerability leads to the formation of regular 
patterns and to the evolution of regimes,” namely security regimes (Keohane & Nye, 
1977/1989 in Haftendorn, 1991:9). Security regimes are characterized by regular cooperative 
behaviour on issues relating to the national security of two or more states, which are 
governed either explicitly or implicitly by norms and rules, which in turn causes states to
restrain their actions based on the belief that others will respond (Keohane, 1980:33).
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According to Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law (2007:19), 
global/international security is said to represent a program of ‘collective security’ for the 
global populace. Thus, international security also relates to ensuring that when one state 
enhances its security, it does not threaten to reduce the security of a potential adversary; this 
ensures the maintenance of the overall stability of the international system (Sheehan, 2005:2). 
International security is more firmly rooted in the traditions of power politics, compared to 
something like social security. In the context of the traditional-military understanding of 
security, security is said to be about survival. Thus, it is when an issue is seen to pose an 
existential threat to a particular referent object “usually, but not necessarily, the state, 
incorporating government, territory and society” (Buzan, Wæver & De Wilde, 1998:21). 
Furthermore, it is stated that international security can be defined as a situation in which 
"things which happen in one part of the world do not threaten people who live in another 
part" (Robinson, 2008:1). In other words, the threat does not spread across borders. This 
includes safety from a variety of issues including economic, social, ecological and 
demographic. Thus, international security is no longer defined just by the traditional safety 
from the threat of war between states; it now includes non-traditional security issues such as 
terrorism (Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule of Law, 2007:19; Robinson, 2008:2). 
Mittelman (2011:27) goes further in stating that issues of global/international security go 
beyond the territorial borders of nation states and these issues function according to a more 
fluid framework. The context of this framework is characterized by transnational flows, 
which facilitates policies of deregulation and liberalization that lower barriers to trade 
(associated with Western capitalism), “and speeded by new technologies.” These 
“increasingly penetrate the jurisdiction of sovereign states” (Mittelman, 2011:27). 
Thus, national security relates to the absence of threat to the inhabitants of one state as well 
as its government, whereas international security relates to the absence of threat to more than 
one state and to prohibiting the spread of the threat from one state to other states.
2.3 Globalization 
The following section will provide a brief overview of the extensive scholarship that has been 
produced on the topic of globalization. This extensive scholarship could possibly be 
attributed to different notions regarding the phenomenon and the fact that globalization is 
something that affects the lives of the global citizenry. The purpose of this section is to 
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introduce the reader to the phenomenon of globalization, the varying conceptualizations of 
the phenomenon and the key features associated with it. 
The process of globalization is somewhat contested, with scholars disagreeing about whether 
it is a truly new phenomenon or if it is merely the continuation of a process which has been 
“underway for centuries” (Rudolph, 2003:1). However, even those who are sceptical concede 
that even though the world has been globalizing for centuries, the speed and degree to which 
the world has been globalizing has increased dramatically in the last couple of decades 
(Rudolph, 2003:1). Furthermore, the exact definition of what globalization constitutes is also 
contested as scholars have very different conceptions of the term.
Cha (2000:392) argues that one can best understand the phenomenon of globalization as a 
spatial one. Thus, globalization is not an event, but rather a steady and continuous expansion 
of processes of interaction and forms of organization, as well as forms of cooperation outside 
of the traditional boundaries defined by sovereignty (Cha, 2000:392). Some scholars liken 
globalization to interdependence, others to liberalization, whilst others even liken it to 
universalization, Westernization and imperialism (Nassar, 2005:3). Many scholars argue that 
globalization can be identified as the leader in the spread of Western culture and practices
around the globe (Nassar, 2005:6). Additionally, as the “modern” practices of the West are 
spreading, they are replacing the older and more traditional ways of doing things. 
Furthermore, it is argued that the process of modernization (Westernization) that is associated 
with globalization can be seen as equivalent to the Americanization of the world (Nassar, 
2005:7). Steger (2013:1) agrees with Nassar in stating that globalization encompasses the 
Westernization and therefore the Americanization of the world.
There are a number of different facets to globalization; Heine and Thakur (2011:2) state that 
the primary aspect of globalization is concerned with the expansion of economic activities 
across the boundaries of nation states. This expansion has led to an increasing level of 
interdependence amongst nations and its citizens, through the “widespread diffusion of 
technology,” as well as an increasing volume of cross-border flows of goods, services, 
investment and finance. Other aspects of the globalization process include the movement of 
information, ideas and people as well as cultural exchanges across international boundaries 
(Heine & Thakur, 2011:2). 
According to Ervin and Smith (2008:5) globalization can be seen as the “shrinking” of the 
globe whilst there is an increasing amount of interaction between the different actors that are 
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at play in the world. Another scholar adds that globalization can be defined as “an extension 
and intensification in the exchange of goods, persons, and ideas” (Zimmermann, 2011:S152).  
Globalization is also said to refer to the diffusion of technology and culture (Li & Schaub, 
2004:231). Nassar (2005:2) adds that globalization integrates markets, values, environmental 
concerns and politics across the globe. Furthermore, Cha (2000:392) argues that globalization 
can be seen as a spatial reorganization of industry, production, and finance amongst others, 
which causes local decisions to have a global impact. According to Kay (2004:10), the 
phenomenon of globalization can be best described as the “creation of a variety of 
transboundary mechanisms for interaction that affect and reflect the acceleration of economic, 
political and security interdependence.” Thus, decisions made in one state affect the lives of 
citizens across the globe.
2.4 Globalization and Security 
This section will briefly examine and review the available literature on international security 
and globalization, specifically the impact of globalization on international security. The 
purpose of this section is to determine whether a link exists between globalization and an 
increasing decline in both national and international security. It will then be much easier to 
discuss the potential link between globalization and national/international terrorism, 
particularly the possible role of globalization in facilitating terrorism by providing permissive 
conditions and a breeding ground for the emergence and proliferation of 
national/international terrorism. This section will first examine the views on the link between 
globalization and international security in the period before 9/11 and then briefly in the 
period after to determine whether views have altered. 
Some scholars are of the opinion that globalization improves security; whilst many others 
contend that it has created instances of declining international security. Many proponents of 
globalization view it as a facilitator of economic openness, global culture and political 
transparency. In addition, it channels common human standards and equality across the globe. 
This leads to an increasing sense of global proximity, which supposedly leads to cooperation, 
and increases security worldwide (Kay, 2004:10). In contrast, globalization is often viewed as 
a tool that large hegemonic states use to implement their economic “primacy” whilst other 
states lag behind. Thus, globalization is seen as threat (by those that lag behind and are 
disadvantaged), which must be fought against. States might seek to defend against the so-
called threat that globalization poses, as groups or individuals organize to fight against the
perceived dangers of globalization (Kay, 2004:10). 
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The first literature produced on globalization pre-9/11 has almost solely focused on the 
economic rather than the security implications of globalization. In addition, at the time little 
literature was produced that interlinked globalization and international security. Cha 
(2000:393) argues that the reason for the strong focus on the economic effects of 
globalization is the fact that its effects are easily visible and can be measured by looking at 
things such as capital flow and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). On the other hand, when 
looking at security, the implications and effects of globalization are much more difficult to 
define and measure. In addition, Rasmussen (2002:332) and Weber, Barma, Kroenig and 
Ratner (2007:50) argue that one of the major reasons that the literature had not focussed on 
the security implications was the fact that the post-Cold War world was a unipolar one and no 
one state was strong enough to challenge the US. Thus, the West did not think it possible for 
globalization to have any serious security implications, as no one could effectively challenge 
it. 
This belief would however change. Already in 1999, the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair 
asserted that “globalization [was] not just economic, it [was] also a political and security 
phenomenon” (Rasmussen, 2002:331). In addition, Cha (2000:394) argues that globalization 
had significantly altered and widened the scope of international security, as instant 
communication and transportation, the flow of capital and the exchange of information 
through advancing technology was now possible. These could be responsible for catalysing 
dangerous phenomena or empowering certain groups (possibly terrorists). This observation of 
Cha was spot on, as would be seen on 9/11. Furthermore, with globalization there has been a 
move away from traditional international security, relating to interstate war (although still 
prevalent and important), to a fight between substate units such as religious organizations, 
organized crime and terrorists (Cha, 2000: 393–394).  This reflects the fact that non-state 
groups have been granted increasing power and opportunities to achieve their aims as a result 
of globalization. Thus, international security no longer relates only to states as it did in the 
past. 
The 9/11 attacks can be seen as a watershed moment, as it realized the fears of what 
globalization might mean for security and it significantly altered the scope of international 
security to include non-traditional security concerns (Rasmusssen, 2002:334; Cronin, 
2003:30). In addition, these terrorist attacks required policy makers to re-examine the 
“existing analytical frameworks for understanding the relationship between globalization and 
security if adequate international responses are to be achieved” (Kay, 2004:10). 
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It was only after 9/11 that states, scholars and policy makers were truly aware of the “darker 
side of globalization” and the implications of globalization for security. In the wake of these 
attacks, there has been an increasing focus on the implications that globalization has for 
international security. Kay (2004:21) argues that globalization has acted as a rallying cry for 
terrorists and has provided them with a means to more easily and effectively carry out their 
actions. International terrorism now features prominently on the global security agenda, 
especially that of the US. 
2.5 Terrorism
Kill one, frighten ten thousand. – Anonymous (Year Unknown)7
Finding a definition for terrorism is not always considered easy, as there are a number of 
different definitions for the term. According to Schmid (2011b:39) a legal definition for 
terrorism is still elusive even after being proposed by the League of Nations in 1937. No 
single definition of terrorism has received the international stamp of approval. Thus, it is not 
surprising that terrorism is a politically loaded and contested concept for which hundreds of 
often diverging definitions exist (Schmid, 2011a:694). Schmid (2011b:99) and Easson and 
Schmid (2011:148) provide over 250 different academic, governmental and 
intergovernmental definitions of terrorism in The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism 
Research, the definitions range from as early as 1794 – where Robespierre defines terror – to 
as recently as 2010. The extensive range of definitions provided allows one to see how 
definitions of terrorism have evolved and developed over time. Furthermore, it allows one to 
see that an agreed upon definition of terrorism has been elusive for some time and is not 
merely a contemporary problem. One of the major problems the United Nations has 
experienced in developing an internationally agreed upon conceptualization of terrorism, is 
the reservations of Arab and Muslim countries (Schmid, 2011a:694).  Hoffman (2006:3) 
attributes the difficulty in defining terrorism to the fact that the meaning of term has changed 
so frequently throughout history. The meaning and usage of the term have changed over the 
course of history in order to accommodate the political discourse of each successive era. 
Furthermore, the term has become increasingly elusive with the passage of time (Hoffman, 
2006:20). 
According to Cilliers (2003:91) terrorism can be described as the illegitimate use or threat of 
violence against individuals or property to coerce governments or societies for the purposes 
                                               
7 Old Chinese saying (Easson & Schmid, 2011:99).
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of political objectives. Rogers (2008:173) adds that terrorism also makes use of this fear 
borne out of the threat of violence to gain public attention. According to Cilliers (2003:91) 
terrorism is different from other forms of organized criminal behaviour in that its proponents 
do not act to gain financially or economically. Thus, terrorists act to gain politically or to 
make a point. In addition, terrorism can be regarded as a premeditated act or actions. It is 
planned before the terrorist actions are carried out.  It does not just occur randomly. 
Cronin (2003:33) states that terrorism is characterized by a political nature and objectives, the 
unexpected use of violence (suicide bombings are very popular) against random targets and 
innocent non-state actors (civilians). This research study however, does not agree with the 
notion that targets are seemingly random; the targets against which violence is perpetrated 
usually have some symbolic meaning. For example the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon is not 
seen as random by the US. It could possibly be seen as attacking the very core of the US 
government since the Department of Defence plays such a major role in US politics and 
foreign policy. Rasmussen (2002:324) also agrees that the targets of terrorism carry symbolic 
meaning. He argues that Al Qaeda specifically chose to attack the World Trade Center 
because of its perceived symbolic significance to globalization.
Even though the UN has thus far failed to develop a comprehensive agreed upon definition of 
terrorism, it has made some progress in combatting terrorism. For example, the Security 
Council resolution 1566 (2004) includes several measures that will strengthen the role of the 
UN in its efforts to combat terrorism (United Nations, 2015). The UN has emphasized that 
achieving a consensus definition within the General Assembly will hold enormous value 
given the General Assembly’s unique legitimacy in normative terms. It is thus important that 
the General Assembly complete negotiations on a comprehensive convention on terrorism, as 
soon as possible (United Nations, 2015). This definition of terrorism should include a number 
of elements, namely: a “[r]ecognition, in the preamble, that State use of force against 
civilians is regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, and, if of sufficient 
scale, constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against humanity”; a 
restatement that acts falling under the previous 12 anti-terrorism conventions are regarded as 
terrorism, and a declaration that these acts are deemed a crime under international law; 
furthermore there should be a restatement that terrorism in time of armed conflict is 
prohibited under Geneva Conventions and Protocols; and reference must also be made to the 
definitions contained in the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the 
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Financing of Terrorism and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004) (United Nations, 2015). 
Lastly, terrorism is described as: 
any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects 
of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that 
is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when 
the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
act (United Nations, 2015). 
However, Adegbulu (2013:262) raises an important point regarding the limitations of the 
proposed UN definition of terrorism. The UN definition places much emphasis on the threat 
of harm to civilians and non-combatants. Thus, this emphasis seems to suggest that certain 
attacks, such as those perpetrated against peacekeeping forces, police or armed forces, or 
assassinations of heads of state or government, do not constitute terrorism (Adegbulu, 
2013:262). This is a very valid point: if one were to use the UN definition of terrorism one 
would exclude a major portion of terrorist attacks, for example 42 percent of Boko Haram 
attacks from 2009 – 2013 were perpetrated against military, police and government (Pate, 
2015:18). 
In comparison to the UN, the African Union (AU) has developed a definition of terrorism that 
has been ratified by the majority of member states. According to the then Organization for 
African Unity (OAU, 1999), as set out in the OAU Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism, a terrorist act can be defined as:
(a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may 
endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, 
any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or 
private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or 
intended to:
(i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, 
institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing 
any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to 
certain principles; or 
(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or 
to create a public emergency; or 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
25
(iii) create general insurrection in a State. 
(b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, 
encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, 
with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to(iii).
The 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism came into force 
in December 2002 and to date, 40 Member States have ratified it (African Union, 2012). The 
AU definition of terrorism is also more comprehensive when compared to the UN definition, 
as it does not specify persons to be civilians and/or non-combatants. Thus, it includes a wider 
array of attacks. 
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of 
illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015b). This definition is also important, as 
GTD data will be used in some of the subsequent chapters of this thesis.
Even though there is no universally accepted definition for terrorism, the majority of existing 
definitions agree that the aim of terrorism is to create an atmosphere of fear, to inspire fear 
and that it is generally done to achieve some political end. 
2.5.1 Domestic Terrorism
Sandler (2011:280) states that domestic terrorism is characterized by perpetrators, targets, 
victims, venues and audience within the boundaries of the same state. Thus, incidents of 
domestic terrorism have direct consequences for only the state, its institutions, citizens, 
property and policies (Enders, Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2011:320). Incidents of domestic 
terrorism can however have indirect consequences for other states and citizens. Sandler 
(2011:280) cites the example of a domestic terrorist group kidnapping a local politician in 
order to encourage political change. Even though the majority of terrorism literature has 
focused on international terrorism, domestic terrorism also poses a major threat. As a matter 
of fact, incidents of domestic terrorism far outnumber those of international terrorism (Enders, 
Sandler & Gaibulloev, 2011:320). Thus, one can conclude that domestic terrorism is clearly a 
security concern. It is interesting to note that since fairly recently there has not been much 
coverage of domestic terrorist incidents. According to Enders, Sandler and Gaibulloev 
(2011:323) incidents of domestic terrorism are more frequent, since they are motivated by 
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issues that are specific to a country, for example ending an unpopular war. Domestic 
terrorism is meant to redress specific domestic grievances (Agbiboa, 2013:432). 
2.5.2 International Terrorism 
According to Schmid (2011a:646), ‘international terrorism’ is a definitional construct that 
was developed by B.M. Jenkins and his US colleagues. Jenkins (1974:2) defines the term as 
“acts of violence or campaigns of violence waged outside the accepted rules and procedures 
of international diplomacy or war.” This definitional construct was later elaborated on and 
defined as, “those acts in which the terrorists crossed national frontiers to carry out attacks, or 
attacked foreign targets at home such as embassies or international line of commerce as in 
airline hijackings” (Schmid, 2011a:646). 
The concept of international terrorism had competed with ‘transnational terrorism’ (in 
analogy with transnational organised crime), however it has since become dominant, “and is 
often considered a synonym of terrorism, despite the fact that 90 per cent of terrorist acts are 
confined to the territory of one state” (Schmid, 2011a:646).
Its relationship to ‘transnational terrorism’ and ‘global terrorism’ is not always clear. 
Terrorist groups operating outside their countries are often termed international terrorists. 
Acts of international terrorism cover attacks against foreign governments or international 
organisations, or representatives thereof, as well as attacks against any national of a foreign 
country (Schmid, 2011a:646). 
Aubrey (2004:13) argues that international terrorism can be defined as terrorism that involves 
the citizens or territory of more than one state.  Zimmermann (2011:S153) states that national 
and international acts of terror are often not sufficiently distinguished and ethnocentric 
definitions are often applied. For example, the Counterterrorism Center “fails” to report a 
large number of incidents of terrorism, which involve non-state groups in Africa and 
elsewhere, since citizens of the US are not involved. The fact that many definitions of 
international terrorism have an ethnocentric or geographical bias can be seen as a significant 
weakness/shortcoming. Since these definitions are applied when measuring and reporting on 
acts of international terrorism, a number of acts of terrorism that do not fit the 
definition/description are not measured or taken into account. Thus, the data 
recorded/measured does not give us an accurate presentation of the number of incidents of 
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international terrorism and in turn makes it difficult to determine whether terrorism has 
increased. It is thus important to develop an inclusive definition of international terrorism, to 
ensure that measurement is more accurate.
2.6 Globalization as Facilitator of Domestic/International Terrorism 
There are a vast number of scholars and policy makers who are of the opinion, especially post 
9/11, that globalization has had serious implications for international security and has led to 
an increasing number of incidents of terrorism, including domestic and 
transnational/international acts of terrorism (Li & Schaub, 2004:235). According to Cronin 
(2003:30) the current outbreak of national/international terrorism is not only a reaction to the 
effects of globalization, but it is also aided by it. She also mentions that acts of terrorism are 
no longer enacted by state actors, but rather by non-state actors. Cronin (2003:46) argues that 
globalization comprises a number of penetrating mechanisms that have been exploited by 
terrorist networks. These mechanisms include the Internet and the media as well as the 
increased flow of people and goods. 
The following subsections will examine the literature available on the different mechanisms 
associated with globalization and will discuss how each mechanism has facilitated and/or 
encouraged acts of international terrorism. The subsections include a discussion of 
technology as an aid to terrorism, terrorists’ use of channels of business and commerce, 
migration and the increasing “irrelevance” of boundaries and how it has acted as a facilitator, 
the reason behind poverty and inequality acting as contributors of terrorism, and finally the 
threat of “corrupt” culture and how it has encouraged terrorism.
2.6.1 Technology as Aid 
Globalization brings with it an increased availability of and access to information 
communications technology (ICT). As time progresses, availability of and access to 
cheap/affordable ICT and other Internet services increases. The following subsection will 
focus specifically on the way in which technology, mainly ICT, has aided/facilitated acts of 
international terrorism. According to Heine and Thakur (2011:4) the forces of globalization 
have unleashed “the infrastructure of uncivil society and accelerated the transnational flows 
of terrorism.” Since globalization is effectively driven by communication technologies, it 
allows for the establishment and maintenance of elaborate networks across the globe, but it 
does not allow for one clear leader (Heine & Thakur, 2011:7). 
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The use of information technologies such as cellular phones and unofficial or official 
websites in English has enabled terrorist groups to reach further than ever before and has also 
led to greater efficiency in their activities. Thus, terrorists now find it much easier to 
coordinate attacks, recruit potential members and communicate with their “members” 
(Cronin, 2003:47–48). Terrorists have excelled at using information and telecoms technology 
to promote their cause and foster their objectives – from websites to satellite phones (Heine 
& Thakur, 2011:11). 
Goodman, Kirk and Kirk (2007:196) state that there are a number of characteristics of the 
Internet, or cyberspace as they refer to it, that creates an environment conducive to the 
promotion of the ideas and ideals of terrorist organizations. These include anonymity, 
confidentiality, accessibility, low costs, intelligent interfaces, ease of use and the “force 
multiplier” (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 2007:196). The Internet provides users with an 
uncensored and essentially anonymous forum, which they can use as a means of conducting 
research, gathering intelligence and creating communication networks (Goodman, Kirk & 
Kirk, 2007:196). Recent studies on terrorist communication have revealed a concern for the 
protection of anonymity, for example a number of posts on terrorist websites inform “users” 
of ways in which they can avoid spyware and surveillance (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 
2007:197). 
Furthermore, the free availability of encryption programmes has also provided terrorist 
organizations with the ability to communicate with one another via secure conduits without 
“detection.” In addition, it is also extremely difficult to effectively track terrorist 
communications when they are utilising emails, as account information is usually anonymous, 
or the email messages are encrypted (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 2007:197). The increased 
availability of and access to technology has given individuals/groups (including terrorists) 
increased access to the outside world. It has made communicating with others across the 
globe very easy and has effectively “flattened” the world (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 2007:197). 
Since one can communicate through the Internet on a 24-hour basis, it is much easier to 
communicate plans with individuals elsewhere in the world.  
Goodman, Kirk and Kirk (2007:197) argue that in the same way as the Internet and the 
diffusion of ICT has allowed for increased communication for the purposes of government, 
industrial and private relations, it has enabled terrorist organizations to enhance 
communications capabilities and productivity. For example, Al Qaeda made extensive use of 
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the internet prior to the September 11 attacks in order to recruit new members, coordinate 
plans, communicate with members and to make online reservations (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 
2007:198).  Zimmermann (2011:S155) adds that the Internet’s ability to reach a mass 
audience has been vital and beneficial to the spread of terrorist propaganda. A number of 
terrorist organizations produce videos, which are placed on Internet sites, for the purposes of 
indoctrination and probably recruitment. In 2013, social media, such as Twitter8 was also 
exploited by a terrorist organization to make known its aims/reasons. Al Shabaab (Al 
Qaeda’s proxy in Somalia) used Twitter to announce that they were responsible for the attack 
on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. They also tweeted, “Kenyans were relatively safe in 
their cities before they invaded us & killed Muslims #Westgate” (Karimi, Almasy & Leposo, 
2013). This tweet gives a clue to the reason behind the attack. The group also tweeted updates 
of the attack (the account was suspended shortly after) (Karimi, Almasy & Leposo, 2013). 
Strange (1998:25) adds that technology such as computers; chips and satellites have 
significantly altered the structure of international finance. It has significantly reduced the 
risks that have been associated with illegal international financial transactions. In addition, 
the costs associated with financial transactions have been reduced significantly, which has 
facilitated coordination and has made travel and immigration arrangements easier and 
cheaper (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). Furthermore, the digitization of money that has come 
about has allowed for the immediate transfer of money across international borders and has 
led to a significant decrease in the likelihood of being caught in the transportation and use of 
illegally obtained funds (Strange, 1998:25).  Zimmermann (2011:S155) further argues that 
the ease of travel and money transfers, amongst others, has made a significant contribution to 
international terrorist groups being persistent and able to replenish their resources.     
In addition, cyberspace has also created an avenue for a new type of terrorism to emerge, 
namely cyberterrorism. Cyberterrorism is defined as the use of computers as weapons, or in 
some cases, as targets, by individuals/groups whose aim is to threaten or cause violence and 
create fear for the purpose of influencing a specific audience (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 
2007:195). These attacks come in various forms, for example: DDOS (distributed denial of 
service) attacks, which shut down parts of information infrastructure; and the use of
                                               
8 Twitter is a type of microblogging, in which users may post tweets of up to one hundred and forty characters. 
These tweets are displayed on the user’s profile and can be viewed by either followers or any member of 
Twitter, depending on the privacy settings. These followers can then retweet the message to their followers and 
so on. This enables the messages to spread across the globe. Twitter makes use of hashtags (#) and users use 
hashtags to denote what the tweet is about, for example, the topic. Other Twitter users can then do a search 
based on a specific hashtag and all the tweets with that specific hashtag appear on the search results. 
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cyberspace as a means compromising information infrastructure to generate disaster, for 
example interfering with air traffic control. Although these attacks have not been as 
devastating as traditional terrorist attacks, they are on the rise. It is also noted that the use of 
cyber-attacks in conjunction with traditional terrorist attacks could have a more devastating 
impact (Goodman, Kirk & Kirk, 2007:201–202). For example, if terrorists were to detonate a 
bomb and interfere with or shut down the communications infrastructure of emergency 
services, there would possibly be a larger number of casualties as emergency services would 
not be reached and would be unable to respond. 
The increased availability of and access to ICT, specifically the Internet, has made it much 
easier for terrorist organizations to communicate, plan and coordinate attacks. Thus, 
globalization has essentially aided terrorists in their aims and could be said to have facilitated 
international terrorism. Furthermore, the mere existence and evolution of cyberspace has 
created a new type of terrorism that could possibly be used in conjunction with traditional 
terrorist attacks. It is however important to note that technology has not encouraged 
international terrorism, but that it has only aided/facilitated it. 
2.6.2 Using Channels of Business and Commerce
It is argued that globalization has also allowed terrorist organizations to move and reach 
across international borders in the same way that business and commerce do. In addition, 
terrorist organizations often make use of the same channels as business and commerce. For 
example, the dropping of barriers has enabled terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda to 
move without prohibition across borders and establish terrorist cells in states around the 
globe (Cronin, 2003:48). This subsection will very briefly discuss the ways in which terrorist 
organizations take advantage of these channels and how these channels have facilitated their 
plans for terrorist attacks. 
Li and Schaub (2004:235) state that international terrorists frequently make use of the 
international trade network in order to market goods and services in an attempt to gather 
resources which will assist them in carrying out acts of terror. Furthermore, many terrorist 
organizations make use of and rely on the network of international trade to trade 
illegal/smuggled goods in order to finance terrorist operations. In addition, the nature of 
international investment and distribution networks, which has become more fluid, makes the 
trading of illegal goods less risky and thus more likely (Matthew & Shambaugh, 1998 cited in 
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Li & Schaub, 2004:235). Thus, these channels aid terrorist organizations in building up their 
resources and funds.
The literature on this aspect of globalization is limited and needs further examination and 
proof to determine to what extent terrorist organizations make use of the channels of business 
and commerce in advancing their agenda. Furthermore, it could also be beneficial to 
determine how exactly they make use of these channels.
2.6.3 Migration and the “Irrelevance” of Boundaries 
Abrahamsen (2004:678) also agrees with the notion that the process of globalization has 
aided international terrorism. She states that terrorist attacks have shown that globalization 
presents many dangers, as the world is “shrinking” and boundaries are becoming increasingly 
irrelevant since globalization has allowed for the easy flow of people and goods across 
borders (Abrahamsen, 2004:678). This subsection will discuss migration as a mechanism of 
globalization and how it has facilitated/encouraged international terrorism. The ease of 
migration is inextricably linked to the growing “irrelevance” of boundaries. 
Adamson (2006:165) argues that since globalization has allowed for the “free” and easy flow 
of people across borders, migration flows can be seen as a channel for international terrorism. 
This is highlighted in the example of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon. The “migration channel” allowed 19 terrorists to travel to, live and train in the US
in preparation for the attacks. Even though some scholars showed interest in the relationship 
between globalization, migration and security; one could argue that in the period before 9/11 
the link between migration across borders (facilitated by globalization) and international 
terrorism was not much of a concern (Adamson, 2006:165). 
The link between these components was further reinforced by the terrorist bombings of trains 
in Madrid in 2004 and the transport network in London in 2005 respectively (Adamson, 
2006:166). It is argued that the “migration channel” can interact with other factors in a 
number of ways that exacerbate the conditions responsible for generating violence, including 
terrorism. One of the most prominent is the fact that it allows for opportunities for networks 
of organized crime, including terrorist networks to develop. Furthermore, it also acts as a 
conduit for international terrorism (Adamson, 2006:191). In the post-9/11 era the lens of 
international terrorism is increasingly used when answering questions related to migration 
and security. Adamson (2006:195) argues that immigration and terrorism undoubtedly shares 
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a link, not because all immigrants are considered terrorists, but because the majority of 
terrorists in the West have been immigrants. She also further states that migration networks 
and policies provide terrorist organizations with opportunities to pursue their aims/goals. 
Adamson is correct in stating that migration flows/channels act as facilitators of international 
terrorism and greatly “simplify” the process of movement across international boundaries. 
However, since governments, policy makers and scholars are aware of the links that exist 
between migration and international terrorism they introduced mechanisms to prevent entry 
of possible terrorists into their borders. For example, the cost of applying for a visa to certain 
countries is relatively expensive, background checks are done on visa applicants (especially 
males above the age of 16), and “random” (strong focus on individuals of Middle Eastern 
descent) searches are conducted at airport checkpoints as well as scans of luggage. One could 
then also argue that these mechanisms will not discourage terrorists, but could possibly act as 
obstacles and could result in detection. 
In addition, Kagwanja (2006:75) argues that the geographical proximity to the Middle East of 
regions such as the Horn of Africa, have exacerbated the influx of undetected terrorists. This 
proximity, in addition to the “irrelevance” of boundaries, aids in the movement of terrorist 
agents and “goods” within and across the region as well as between states. Furthermore, 
many states in the Horn of Africa region suffer from porous borders, which facilitate the 
migration of people from one state to another. A recent example, which relates to porous 
borders, migration and terrorism, was the Westgate Mall attack, which was mentioned 
previously. The Al Shabaab militants responsible consist of a number of nationalities 
(American, Canadian, Finnish, Somalian and Kenyan) and were trained in Somalia, where the 
terrorist cell is situated (Karimi, Almasy & Leposo, 2013). The fact that the militants came 
from countries across the world showcases the ease with which individuals can “migrate” 
across international borders. Furthermore, one can cite porous borders as possibly facilitating 
these militants in moving from Somalia into Kenya. 
It is clear that migration flows, facilitated by globalization, have played a major part in 
aiding/facilitating the movement of terrorists/terrorist organizations across borders. These 
migration flows have enabled terrorists to travel to the destinations they wish to attack. Other 
factors such as proximity and porous borders have further facilitated the process of migration 
and have in turn facilitated terrorism. It is important to note that migration flows have not 
necessarily encouraged terrorism; they have simply made travel easier for the perpetrators.  
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2.6.4 Increased Inequality and Poverty 
Nassar (2005:103) states that the 21st century directed the world through the "gates" of 
globalization, after which it felt the "flames" of terrorism flaring beyond it. He argues that 
globalization acts as a breeder of terrorism by leaving people behind. Heine & Thakur 
(2011:3) argue that the growing economic interdependence is highly asymmetrical, in other 
words the benefits/advantages of globalization are not equally distributed amongst all states 
in the world. Thus, it creates winners and losers and it entails risks as well as providing 
opportunities. This section will examine the existing scholarship dealing with the issue of 
how increased inequality and poverty caused by globalization has resulted in increased 
feelings of dissatisfaction and a tendency towards terrorism. 
Globalization has led to increasing inequality and has widened the gap between rich and poor. 
Not only has globalization created a large number of poor and disinherited people, it has also 
informed these people of their abject poverty and dispossession (Nassar, 2005:103). 
Zimmermann (2011:S154) adds that globalization often exacerbates the degree of economic 
and social inequality and polarization within certain states. Thus, there now comes into 
existence a group of “losers” who are unable to keep up with the rest of the populace who 
benefit from globalization, since they have stagnating/declining incomes. Nassar (2005:104) 
further argues that the combination of globalization with poverty and dispossession has led to 
frustration and violence, as these people are unable to achieve the dreams associated with 
globalization. Other scholars also argue that the roots of terrorism can be found in poverty 
and inequality (economic deprivation). It is argued that poor economic conditions generate 
frustration, which increases the potential for violence. Furthermore, economic deprivation in 
the source countries of terrorism is important because terrorist organizations should find it 
much easier to recruit members, if they are frustrated with their economic circumstances. 
Economic deprivation can also lower the opportunity costs of violence, as perpetrators have 
less to lose. On the other hand, economic success might attract terrorism when comparing 
wealth and poverty globally (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011:6). 
Furthermore, the areas that have been marginalized by globalization have attracted terrorist 
organizations, as these areas are perceived as weak, easily accessible and susceptible to 
extremist dogma. Kagwanja (2006:75) states that the abject poverty and deep sense of 
marginalization that is present in the region of the Horn of Africa has been exploited by 
terrorist organizations and has allowed them to find fertile ground to spread their extremism 
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amongst the Muslim minorities. Al Qaeda has also been able to find sanctuary and garner 
support in a number of areas that have not been “blessed” with the political and economic 
benefits of globalization (Cronin, 2003:38). These areas have essentially been left behind. Li 
and Schaub (2004:236) also agree that a primary cause of terrorism, including international 
terrorism, is underdevelopment and poverty. They argue that these conditions create breeding 
grounds for terrorists, as dissatisfied peoples turn to terrorist activities as a means of showing 
dissatisfaction and attempting to find a solution to their problems. Furthermore, they agree 
with Cronin that states plagued by poverty, underdevelopment and instability attract terrorist 
organizations, and often provide a safe haven or are unable to expel terrorists from their 
borders (Li & Schaub, 2004:237). 
In addition, Cronin (2003:52) argues that international terrorism originates mostly from the 
disenfranchised areas of the Arab world. This is not only as a result of religious extremism, 
but also as a result of feeling left behind by globalization’s promises of greater freedom and 
prosperity. Even though this is true, she fails to mention that large numbers of Africans have 
also been denied the promises of globalization and have been left behind. It is important to 
mention Africa, especially West Africa and the Horn of Africa, when discussing international 
terrorism and the implications of globalization, since these areas have become terrorist 
hotspots. 
2.6.5 Threat of Corrupt Culture
As stated earlier, globalization is often associated with Westernization and Americanization, 
thus globalization allows for the entry of a foreign and perceived “corrupt” culture. This can
alienate certain individuals who do not share in the beliefs associated with this new culture 
(Zimmermann, 2011:S154). In addition, globalization also includes secularization, 
consumerism and the growth of market capitalism, which is seen as an assault on the less 
privileged populations of conservative cultures, the reason being that they are repelled by the 
major changes that are brought about by the forces of globalization or are dissatisfied by the 
unequal distribution of benefits (Cronin, 2003:45). 
Many individuals/groups perceive globalization as a force that corrupts indigenous customs, 
languages and religions. They believe that it causes distortions in their local communities. As 
a result they are apprehensive of globalization and try to fight and ward it off through 
expressive violence towards objects/people that they perceive as being proponents of 
globalization (usually Western targets) (Cronin, 2003:45). In 2013, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the 
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Al Qaeda leader, published a message that “showcased” the template that terrorists use when 
planning and implanting operations. One of the key requirements was that the target had to be 
Western (Cruickshank & Lister, 2013). This can be seen as supporting the argument that 
terrorist organizations see Westernization as corrupt and something that needs to be fought 
against. 
2.7 Terrorism in the Horn of Africa
The following section will provide a brief overview of existing scholarship on terrorism in 
the Horn of Africa, specifically Somalia. The purpose of this section is to determine the areas 
that researchers and scholars have focused on. This will facilitate the identification of gaps in 
the literature, with specific reference to the influence of globalization on terrorism within 
Somalia. The first section will briefly examine the historical and regional context, then it will 
move on to an overview of scholarship’s opinion with regards to Somalia being a terrorist 
hotspot. The last subsection will be an appraisal of existing literature on Al Shabaab.  
2.7.1 Historical and Regional Context 
The majority of literature available on terrorism in the Horn of Africa/Somalia starts off with 
an overview and often an in-depth discussion of the historical and regional 
context/background (Ibrahim, 2010; Møller, 2009). Ibrahim (2010) provides a brief overview 
of the historical and regional context of the rise of radical Islam in Somalia. He argues that 
the historical and regional contexts, namely the numerous failed attempts at national 
reconciliation have created a vacuum which has led to the rise of Islamists, which has most 
often been negative (Ibrahim, 2010:284) In addition, Møller (2009:2–5) sketches a brief 
picture of how different external powers have shaped the region throughout the periods of 
colonial rule, the First World War and the Cold War. The impact that US “rule” has had on 
Somalia is especially focussed on. Furthermore, he also examines Somali Nationalism as well 
as clans and identities so as to better understand the current situation (Møller, 2009:12). 
In addition, existing scholarship has also dedicated much attention to the so-called War on 
Terror, especially the American War on Terror, in the Horn of Africa (Møller, 2009). The 
vast number of articles produced on this topic can undoubtedly be attributed to the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on the US. 
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2.7.2 A Hotbed and Safe Haven for Terrorists?
Many scholars ask whether one should actually consider the Horn of Africa, especially 
Somalia, as a hotbed/safe haven for terrorists (Møller, 2009; Ibrahim, 2010; Falola &
Oyebede, 2010). After the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing War on Terror there was much 
concern over Somalia becoming a safe haven for terrorists given the lack of a central 
government and a failed state (Menkhaus, 2004:49). There was especially concern that Al 
Qaeda would exploit the weak political environment of Somalia (collapsed state) and that 
they would possibly reconstitute an operational base in Sub-Saharan Africa (Falola & 
Oyebade, 2010:157; Stevenson, 2010; Møller, 2009; Davis, 2007:6). This fear was rightly 
justified as Somalia has acted as a safe haven for fundamentalist Islamic groups since the late 
1980s (Falola & Oyebade, 2010:157). According to a leading commentator, Somalia is like a 
potential melting pot of recruitment and extremism, that if left unchecked, it will present an 
increasing danger not only to the region, but also to the US and the West (Murphy, 2011:150).  
Møller (2009:8) has however observed that the fear of Somalia becoming a terrorist hotspot is 
grossly exaggerated. The situation is not nearly as alarming as it is made out to be; in the fact 
the number of incidents per year is not very high (an average of eleven). He thus argues that 
the threat from terrorism, specifically Islamic terrorism (where terrorist incidents are largely
politically motivated) is overstated and blown out of proportion (Møller, 2009:11).  However, 
the situation seems to have changed. Møller (2009:11) rightly argued that even though the 
region was not a terrorist hotbed it had the potential to become one. 2013-2015 has delivered 
terrorist incidents in the region almost weekly and in some cases daily. One could thus argue 
that the region has in fact “flourished” into a terrorist hotspot. Examples include the 2013 
Westgate Mall Attack and the 2015 attack on the Garissa University College (Onuoha, 2013a; 
Al Jazeera, 2015a).9
2.7.3 Al Shabaab
One cannot study terrorism in Somalia, or even the greater Horn of Africa without examining 
the Al Qaeda affiliated group, Al Shabaab. The majority, if not all, of contemporary literature 
studying the phenomenon of terrorism in the Horn of Africa examines Al Shabaab. The 
reason why only the more contemporary scholarship examines Al Shabaab is that the group 
                                               
9 These attacks will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4: Al Shabaab: Proof of the Dark Side of 
Globalization. 
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rose to prominence only fairly recently (late 2000s). The main aspects of Al Shabaab that 
scholars have focused on are: their origin; the evolution and transformation of the group; their 
motivation and goals; and their future trajectory. Scholars have also mentioned how certain 
facets of globalization have facilitated the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab. The purpose of 
this subsection is to determine what literature has said about Al Shabaab. 
2.7.3.1 Origin and Emergence
The first aspect that scholars tend to focus on relates to the origin of the terrorist group. 
Marchal (2009:381) delves into the phenomenon of radical Islam within Somalia in order to 
develop an understanding of the dynamics that led to the creation of Al Shabaab. This sets the 
stage for the origin of the group. According to Roque (2009:2) there is no consensus 
regarding their exact date of origin. It is however known that the group sprouted as the 
militant remnant of al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI),  a Somali Islamist Organization, in the early 
2000s (Wise, 2011:3). Two different scholars trace Al Shabaab’s origin to 2004 (Marchal, 
2009; Mwangi, 2012:518). The group was formally incorporated at an AIAI conference in 
2003, but the name “Al Shabaab” only came into use in 2007 (Shinn, 2011:206). 
Wise (2011:2) links Al Shabaab’s origin to Somalia’s tumultuous past, whilst he relates their 
radicalization and rise to prominence to the Ethiopian invasion in December of 2006. He 
further states that the period between the Ethiopian invasion on 24 Decemebr 2006 and early 
2008 can be marked as the true emergence of the group (Wise, 2011:4).  Murphy (2011:149) 
agrees with Wise in stating that the Islamist group fed off the resentment that Somalis felt 
towards the presence of the Ethiopian military. In addition, Roque (2009) and Hansen (2013) 
support their argument. They argue that the presence of the Ethiopian military forces, in 
addition to that of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces prepared the ground in 
which organized radical responses could flourish (Roque, 2009:2; Hansen, 2013:5). The 
creation of Al Shabaab was thus a radical response to the presence of the Ethiopian military. 
Mwangi (2012) also shares the sentiments of these scholars. The occupation by Ethiopian 
troops created “a complex cocktail of nationalist, Islamist, anti-Ethiopian, anti-American,
anti-Western [and] anti-foreigner sentiments” (Mwangi, 2012:521). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
38
2.7.3.2 Motivation and Goals 
Al Shabaab originally emerged as an Islamist-nationalist guerrilla movement dedicated to 
combatting the insurgence of Ethiopian troops as well as the TFG forces (Wise, 2011:6). This 
was one of its principal goals/rallying points, but they would have to seek a new means of 
staying “relevant” with the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in 2009 (Roque, 2009). The exact 
aims of the group are somewhat murky and unclearly expressed. However, Wise (2011:6), 
Mwangi (2012) and Ali (2008) argue that the group aims to establish a Somali Caliphate 
(Islamic State for Somalis of Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia). This would entail 
taking over Somalia and spreading their ideology throughout the Horn of Africa. In addition, 
they also wish to spread their ideological beliefs onwards to the areas of Central, South and 
Eastern Africa (Ali, 2008). Wise (2011:6) and Ali (2008) add that the group aims to wage 
jihad (holy war) against the enemies of Islam; this includes the removal of Western influence 
(something one can link to globalization), not only in Somalia or even the Horn of Africa, but 
also throughout the whole of Africa. Furthermore, they also wish to eliminate all other forms 
of Islam that are not in line with their Salafi-Wahhabist strand (Wise, 2011:6; Ali, 2008). 
In order to achieve these goals and to win favour amongst the populace, the group has 
provided the citizenry with essential services and welfare. They have cleared roadblocks, 
repaired roads, organized markets and re-established order and a justice system through 
employing Sharia courts (Roque, 2009:2). By continuously expanding their local community 
infrastructure and support, Al Shabaab is able to sustain its goal of jihad. 
2.7.3.3 Evolution, Transformation and Future Trajectory
A second area that scholarship has examined relates to the evolution and transformation of 
the Islamist group. According to Wise (2011) Al Shabaab underwent major changes starting 
from 2008.  Marchal (2009:399) adds that the Global War in Terror acted as a facilitator for 
Al Shabaab’s rapid development as well as their use of brutal tactics. He argues that if it were 
not for the War on Terrorism, Al Shabaab would have ended up as a group of radical 
militants isolated within their own society. The attitude of Western states and the recurrent 
weaknesses of other Islamist groups enabled Al Shabaab to grow dramatically (Marchal, 
2009:399). 
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Another change would come as the group evolved from a local movement into an Al Qaeda 
aligned movement designed to attack Western targets (Wise, 2011:6). Since early 2008 Al 
Shabaab had been working towards aligning its interests with the Al Qaeda core as well as 
strengthening ties with them (Wise, 2011:6). It formally joined ranks with Al Qaeda on 12 
February 2012 (Mwangi, 2012:519). 
Wise (2011:10) predicts that within the next decade the world will probably witness the 
splintering of Al Shabaab, which will lead to the dispersal of trained and radicalized fighters 
across the globe. 
2.7.3.4 Globalization as Facilitator of Terrorism in Somalia
Some of the literature indirectly links terrorism in Somalia to globalization in the sense that it 
has helped facilitate the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab. The specific mechanism of 
globalization that has enabled Al Shabaab to carry out its activities with greater ease is ICT 
technologies. The group has increasingly used these technologies to propagate their message, 
to communicate with the global jihadi movement and to recruit new followers (Mwangi 
2012:522; Wise, 2011:8, Menkhaus, 2014:324). Furthermore, some scholars have mentioned 
Al Shabaab’s anti-Western sentiments. However, they do not examine this facet in much 
depth. 
2.8 Terrorism in Northern Nigeria
The following section will briefly examine scholarship relating to the study of terrorism in 
northern Nigeria. The purpose of this section is to determine the areas on which researchers 
and scholars have focused. This will facilitate the identification of gaps in the literature, with 
specific reference to the influence of globalization on terrorism in northern Nigeria. 
2.8.1 Background/Historical Legacy
Bamidele (2012) and Forest (2012), like many others, link the upsurge in violence, especially 
terrorist activities, to Nigeria’s historical legacy. Bamidele (2012:35) argues that even after 
more than five decades of independence, the Nigerian population remains divided. The 
Nigerian state has experienced a number of military coups since independence and ethnic and 
religious tensions remain high – Nigeria is made up of multitudes of ethno linguistic groups 
and the state is split between the Christian and Islamic faiths (Forest, 2012:ix). However, the 
problem of division along religious lines goes further back than Nigerian independence. 
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According to Waldek and Jayasekara (2011:169) the roots of this division and tension lie in 
colonial Britain’s policy of non-intervention in northern Nigeria. During the colonial period, 
missionary schools were founded in the south but not the north, this created a separation 
between the provision and style of education available in these areas. The different types of 
schooling had and still have a major effect on access to employment wealth and social 
mobility. Furthermore, throughout northern Nigeria, Western education is most often 
associated with attempts to convert Muslims and is related to a fear of southern domination 
(Waldek & Jayasekara, 2011:169). It is thus not surprising that violence runs rampant 
throughout the Nigerian state. 
2.8.2 Factors Fanning the Flames of Terrorism
There are a number of factors that have contributed to the upsurge in violence and terrorism 
in Nigeria. The first of these factors relates to state failure. A number of scholars have argued 
that Nigeria is on its way to becoming a failed state like so many others in Africa including 
Somalia. There are however signs that Nigeria will become Africa’s first global superpower 
(Louw-Vaudran, 2015). Nonetheless, in order to do so it will have to overcome a number of 
challenges, the most prominent of which are corruption and Boko Haram. Onapajo and 
Uzodike (2012:31) argue that one can directly link Nigeria’s “state failure” to the high level 
of corruption. Forest (2012:60) argues that corruption is one of the most entrenched and 
endemic challenges faced by the Nigerian state today. Rampant corruption has significantly 
weakened citizens’ trust in the state and is even celebrated as a political culture. Political 
elites siphon state resources in order to enrich themselves, thereby oppressing the masses 
(Onapajo & Uzodike, 2012:31). Forest (2012:35) adds that another factor that has led to 
violence in the form of terrorist activity in the region is that of inequality with regard to 
income, employment and provision of basic services. 
2.8.3 Boko Haram
The Islamic sect popularly known as Boko Haram, officially “Jama’atul Alhul Sunnah 
Lidda’wati wal Jihad” (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and 
Jihad), has unleashed a wave of terror upon the populace of Northern Nigeria in the last few 
years (Agbiboa, 2013:432; Bamidele, 2012:32). This has become a nation-wide and even a 
global concern, especially with such events as the kidnapping of the Chibok girls. Bamidele 
(2012:32) mentions that on a daily basis websites, magazines and news channels run stories 
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as well as pictures of the acts of violence perpetrated by the group. The following subsections 
will provide a brief overview of the different areas of interest that scholars have focussed on 
with regard to Boko Haram. 
2.8.3.1 Origin and Emergence
Bamidele (2012:35) argues that the group emerged in 2002, even though it only became 
prominent in 2009. On the other hand, Connell (2012:88) argues that the group was founded 
much earlier, in 1995, under the original name of “Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra.” It is thus 
not surprising that the majority of scholars agree that the precise date relating to the 
emergence of Boko Haram is unclear (Maiangwa, Uzodike, Whetho, & Onapajo, 2012:45; 
Onuoha, 2012:135). This lack of clarity is as a result of the fact that very few 
journalists/scholars have been granted the opportunity to interview the group, which in effect 
makes it necessary to rely on unverified accounts. 
The majority of literature on Boko Haram is also somewhat inconclusive with regard to the 
real purpose behind its creation and existence (Bamidele, 2012:35). Some scholars argue that 
the group’s roots lie in the “Maitatsine” doctrine (a brand of fundamentalist Islam introduced 
to northern Nigeria in 1945). On the other hand others argue that Boko Haram emerged as a 
part of the resurgence of Islamic militant movements globally (Bamidele, 2012:35). However, 
Onapajo and Uzodike (2012:25) dispute the claim that Boko Haram’s roots can be found in 
the Maitatsine group and their uprisings of the 1980s. Hussein Solomon aptly describes the 
reasons behind the emergence of Boko Haram. He argues that the group emerged in response 
to local grievances in Nigeria, including: an increasing dissatisfaction with deteriorating 
living conditions, especially in the north, an unresponsive and corrupt political elite and a
Nigerian state that has reinforced religious divisions and has been unable to transcend the 
many divisions of ethnicity, language and religion (Oyeniyi, 2014:90; Aghedo & Osumah, 
2012:861; Cook, 2014:5). 
2.8.3.2 Motivations and Goals 
One can arguably link the group’s motivations to the meaning of their name. Boko Haram is 
a Hausa term that is loosely translated into “Western education is forbidden.” This translation 
has however been rejected by the group which prefers “Western culture is forbidden,” as it is 
broader and includes education (Agbiboa, 2013:432). As the name suggests, the group is 
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opposed to everything they believe to have been infiltrated by Western beliefs and values. 
Boko Haram believes that the infiltration of Western beliefs and values, including Western 
style education, poses a threat to the traditional beliefs, values and customs of the Muslim 
communities of northern Nigeria (Forest, 2012:1). According to Oyeniyi (2014:77), the 
group’s hatred of Western education stems partly from a longstanding negative attitude that 
Muslims of northern Nigeria have harboured against Western education. Thus, the group has 
vowed to rid the Nigerian state of the corrupt ruling elite (who have been perverted by the 
decadence of Western culture) and institute what it believes to be religious purity (Agbiboa, 
2013:432). Connel (2012:88) adds that the principle objective of the group has been the 
toppling of the secular Nigerian government and the implementation of a government based 
on anti-Western Sharia law. In addition, Onapajo and Uzodike (2012:28) argue that the group 
wants to establish an entire socio-political system based on the Islamic model. In 2014, the 
group declared the establishment of an Islamic State in northern Nigeria (BBC, 2014a). 
The group further expanded their aims following the execution of their leader, Mohammed 
Yusuf in 2009. Boko Haram now aimed to violently engage with the state security structure 
as a means of retaliation. The group also stated that they were aiming to convert former 
President Goodluck Jonathan from Christianity to Islam and evict non-Muslims from 
northern Nigeria (Oyeniyi, 2014:83). The death of Yusuf arguably led to the further 
radicalization of the group (Onuoha, 2012:142). The Islamic militant group has been seen to 
target individuals/objects that it has perceived as being corrupted by Westernization. 
Although most of its targets are not overtly Western, many of their targets have embraced the 
“decadence” associated with globalization/Westernization and have turned away from true 
Islam (Walker, 2012:7). Their aim is thus to purify Islam in the Nigerian state. 
2.8.3.3 Other Areas of Focus
Other areas that scholarship has examined relate to the structure, funding and membership of 
Boko Haram (Connell, 2012; Forest, 2012; Onuoha, 2012, Pate, 2015:23–25). Not much is 
known about the group’s structure, but scholars have briefly discussed the changing 
leadership (Onuoha, 2012:136). They have argued that very little is publicly known about 
Boko Haram’s sources of finance (Forest, 2012:70; Connell, 2012:88; Stewart & Wroughton, 
2014). Connell (2012:88) and Onuoha (2012:137) mention that members had to pay a daily 
levy to their leaders and other funds came from donations. Forest (2012:71) agrees that much 
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of the group’s financing has come from the patronage of powerful and wealthy individuals in 
Nigeria. He adds that bank robbery has also provided much financing for the group. 
The literature also examined the membership of Boko Haram. According to the majority of 
accounts, the group draws its membership from the ranks of disaffected youths, unemployed 
graduates and former street children (Almajaris) (Onuoha, 2012:137; Waldek and Jayasekara, 
2011:171; Pate, 2015:17). This supports the argument that abject poverty creates a fertile 
breeding ground for violence and terrorism. 
2.9 Analysis of Literature
The purpose of the following section is to analyse the literature consulted and used in the 
chapter. In the examination and analysis of past and current scholarship on globalization and 
international terrorism a number of observations can be made. First, the 9/11 attacks altered 
the way in which governments, policy makers and scholars thought about international 
security. It revealed the negative implications of globalization and created concern for a new 
type of international insecurity, namely terrorism. International terrorism had become 
prominent on the global security agenda. In addition, it initiated an increasing focus by 
scholars on the link that exists between globalization and terrorism. The 9/11 attacks also 
brought about the argument suggesting that globalization contributes to increasing incidents 
of international terrorism. 
Furthermore, the existing literature is unclear on whether a link truly exists between 
globalization increasing international terrorism. There is no clear evidence that suggests that 
globalization results in either increasing or decreasing incidents of international terrorism. 
What is however clear, is that globalization definitely aids in the facilitation of international 
terrorism. Globalization makes it much easier for terrorists to plan, coordinate and initiate 
attacks. It is important to note that globalization does not necessarily cause terrorism, but that 
it facilitates it. Terrorism could still occur without the “help” of globalization, albeit with 
increased difficulty. The existing literature on international terrorism also attributes incidents 
of terrorism to the presence of failed states, fragile economies, poverty, and porous borders. 
These factors can be said to further facilitate/enhance acts of international terrorism and are 
exacerbated by globalization. The following two subsections will determine and discuss the 
strengths and shortcomings of the literature and will then identify the areas that warrant 
further exploration as well as the gaps that are present in the literature.
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2.9.1 Strengths of Literature 
The literature produced on the notions of security, globalization and terrorism is extensive. 
All of these topics have garnered much attention. Scholarship has showcased the difficulty 
that their predecessors have had in developing an agreed upon conceptualization of the 
aforementioned terms. They have showcased how the respective terms have developed and 
evolved with the changing times. This literature is extremely important, as one would not be 
able to do research on this specific topic if one did not have a solid base to build on. 
Furthermore, the literature focussed on globalization and terrorism has increased significantly 
in the post-9/11 era. The scholarship has increasingly examined the different implications of 
globalization and how it facilitates terrorism and has not only focused on the economic 
implications of globalization. The literature examines the implications of technology, 
migration flows, flows of goods and services as well as poverty and inequality. Furthermore, 
current research is able to show how and why globalization facilitates international terrorism. 
The literature on technology is especially strong, as it examines in great detail how different 
technologies have enabled individuals/groups to carry out terrorist plans. Furthermore, the 
data collected and reported is quite extensive and detailed. One is able to isolate incidents 
based on date, perpetrator and region, amongst others. 
In addition, the literature indicates that other factors (failed states, instability) play a role in 
further facilitating terrorism. Thus, these scholars make it clear that globalization is not the 
only factor that aids in the facilitation of international terrorism. This is made especially clear 
in the section on terrorism in The Horn of Africa (Somalia) and northern Nigeria. The 
literature highlights the fact that state failure has played a major contributing role in the 
upsurge of terrorist violence in both of these regions. Another major strength of the literature, 
in the cases of terrorism both in Somalia and northern Nigeria, is the examination of 
historical legacy/background and the influence that it continues to have on security in these 
two regions. The literature on historical background is vast and well researched. It provides a 
solid foundation on which future research can build. 
Furthermore, existing literature has done a good job of probing the motivation behind the 
actions of both Boko Haram and Al Shabaab, respectively. 
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2.9.2 Shortcomings of Literature 
The literature on globalization and its implications for international terrorism have a number 
of shortcomings. One of the biggest is possibly the fact that the literature does not provide a 
clear link between the two. In addition, some of the definitions used when measuring 
terrorism are ethnocentric, which means that all acts of terrorism/international terrorism are 
not necessarily recorded. 
Even though the literature arguing that globalization facilitates international terrorism 
examines many of globalization’s implications, some of these need to be supported with more 
and stronger evidence. The lack of evidence can make the argument and hypothesis seem 
weak. It could be beneficial if one was able to determine the percentage of terrorist attacks 
that occur as a result of being facilitated by the different mechanisms of globalization. This 
could however prove to be an extremely difficult, if not impossible task, as one would for 
example not have access to information pertaining to electronic communication (unless it is 
public). 
Another shortcoming of the literature is the “excessive” focus on international terrorism in 
and emanating from the Middle East. It is as if scholars completely ignore terrorist hubs in 
West Africa and the Horn of Africa, where Boko Haram and Al Shabaab operate, 
respectively.  Since little research has been conducted on the impact of globalization on 
national/international terrorism in and emanating from these two areas, this can be seen as a 
gap in the literature which warrants further investigation.  In addition, some of the scholars 
who argue that economic development will deter terrorism seem to forget that the primary 
cause of terrorism is not linked to economic circumstances, but is rather encouraged by the 
achievement of political goals. Furthermore, much of the data available on terrorism does not 
take into account the impact of globalization on incidents of terrorism. Some scholars like Li 
and Schaubs’ analysis focuses solely on the economic impact of globalization and is derived 
from data pre-9/11. It would be useful to design a study that examines the implications of 
globalization for terrorism in the post-9/11 period.
Even though the literature on the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab is quite extensive, there 
should be more focus on how globalization has effectively facilitated or even encouraged 
terrorist activity. As stated in the subsection “Globalization as Facilitator of Terrorism in 
Somalia,” the literature indirectly links globalization (the technological aspect) to the 
facilitation of Al Shabaab’s activities. However, this needs to be stated more directly and 
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overtly. Furthermore, there is not much focus on how the other facets of globalization have 
facilitated and/or encouraged the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab. This provides this study 
with the opportunity to exploit these gaps in the existing literature.
Like the literature on Al Shabaab, the scholarship focussing on Boko Haram is quite 
extensive. However, scholars do not actively link globalization to the terrorist activities of the 
group. Even though they mention that their opposition to Western culture and influence 
motivates the group’s activities, they do not clearly state that Westernization can be equated 
to globalization. In addition, although scholars attribute increasing inequality to Boko 
Haram’s violent upsurge, the inequality is not linked to the effects of globalization (at most it 
is indirectly stated). This warrants further investigation in determining how the different 
facets of globalization have contributed to facilitating and/or encouraging terrorism in 
northern Nigeria. 
2.10 Conclusion 
In the preceding pages, this chapter introduced the reader to key concepts relating to 
globalization and international terrorism. It showed the reader how the concepts have evolved 
and how the notions of security, globalization and terrorism are linked. It also examined the 
existing literature pertaining to the hypothesis that globalization has facilitated and 
encouraged terrorism. This chapter also provided the reader with an overview of published 
literature on the topics of terrorism in the Horn of Africa and northern Nigeria respectively. 
In doing so it has established the areas that scholars have focussed on and determined the 
areas that warrant further investigation. Furthermore, in the previous section, this chapter did 
an analysis of consulted literature pertaining to the link between globalization and 
international terrorism. It was abundantly clear that globalization served as a facilitator of 
terrorism. However, the existing literature has not been able to determine whether 
globalization actually encourages international terrorism. In the analysis, a number of 
shortcomings were identified which could be seen as possible gaps in the existing literature. 
These gaps need to be exploited and investigated. Furthermore, the section analysing 
published literature was also able to determine which areas, relating specifically to 
globalization as facilitator of terrorism in the Horn of Africa and northern Nigeria 
respectively, warrant further investigation. 
The main gap, that needs to be exploited further, pertains to the link between globalization 
and international terrorism in and emanating from the Horn of Africa as well as the northern 
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Nigerian region. Existing research does not examine the link between the two when looking 
at these regions specifically. Furthermore, an empirical study that analyses data pertaining to 
globalization and international terrorism in the Horn of Africa and northern Nigeria, 
respectively, also needs to be conducted. This will serve as an aid in determining whether 
globalization has facilitated/encouraged incidents of national/international terrorism in and 
emanating from these two regions. Further investigation in this area could prove fruitful to 
both international and African security studies.
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Chapter 3: The Age of Hyperconflict and the 
Globalization-Terrorism Nexus
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined how the phenomena of globalization and security have 
become increasingly interlinked with the passage of time. It also looked at how and why 
globalization has facilitated and/or encouraged incidents of terrorism. The purpose of the 
following chapter will be to further expand upon the argument that in certain countries and 
under certain circumstances the processes of globalization create a permissive environment in 
which national/international terrorism can thrive. The chapter will start with a brief 
discussion of the security-development nexus as terrorism can be seen as a security threat, 
whilst development is unarguably a component of globalization. It will then consult and make 
use of the theoretical framework developed by Mittelman in Hyperconflict: Globalization 
and Insecurity, in other words, the fact that globalization has created the perfect conditions 
for a situation of hyperconflict to develop. However, before going into too much depth on 
how and why this is the case, the term hyperconflict along with hypercompetition and 
hyperpower will be briefly discussed. Thereafter, an overview of the characteristics of 
hyperconflict will follow. In addition, this chapter will also make use of Zimmermann’s 
(2011:S158) heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization and international 
terrorism to elaborate on the argument that globalization facilitates and encourages terrorism, 
especially on the international front. Additional sources will be consulted in order to further 
elaborate on and support the aforementioned arguments. This chapter will serve as a 
foundation for the two case studies that will follow in Chapters 4 and 5. It will also provide 
an outline for Chapters 4 and 5 to follow in order to ensure that it meets the requirements of a 
comparative research study. In addition, this chapter will serve to lay the groundwork for 
Chapter 6 which will be dedicated to examining and comparing which factors of 
globalization have played a role in facilitating or encouraging terrorism in the Horn of Africa 
and northern Nigeria respectively.  
3.2 Security-Development Nexus 
In 2004 former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, stated that 
“[d]evelopment and security are inextricably linked” (Stern & Öjendal, 2010:5). Other 
scholars have also come to the conclusion that development and security are interlinked and 
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that their interrelationship is growing in significance given the evolving global political-
economic landscape (Hettne, 2010:312; Stern & Öjendal, 2010:5). The so-called 
development-security nexus has garnered much attention, as the security policies of many 
states have made explicit references to development and poverty reduction in the fight against 
global terrorism. According to Stern & Öjendal (2010:13), many regard “global development” 
(effectively globalization) as a process that undermines the authority of the state, along with 
its capacity to govern and improve the lives of its citizens; one could argue that it weakens 
the state. ‘Development’ also arguably fuels change, which is environmentally unsustainable, 
mobility, and the restructuring of (g)local power structures. This in turn exacerbates the 
vulnerabilities, such as poverty, of those who are most at risk, which could then trigger 
conflict (Stern & Öjendal, 2010:13–14). Thus, one could argue that development can lead to 
a situation of insecurity. This argument will be further elaborated and supported in the 
subsequent sections. 
3.3 Mittelman’s Hyperconflict – Globalization and Security/Insecurity Nexus
Mittelman’s (2010:1) major focus is the relationship that exists between globalization and 
security or insecurity. He examines how these phenomena are connected, as well as the 
implications that they hold for world order. In developing the single concept of hyperconflict 
Mittelman maps the debate amongst policymakers and scholars with regards to the 
aforementioned. The conception of hyperconflict does not disregard the findings of empirical 
studies, which claim that the frequency of armed conflict has indeed decreased, or remained 
steady in recent decades. He rather argues that a distinct pattern is forming (Mittelman, 
2010:1). His argument is that insecurity is being globalized in an “emergent configuration of 
hyperconflict, a galaxy of conflicts in historical motion” (Mittelman, 2010:1). Thus, 
globalization is driving a unique convergence of forces that foreshadows a situation of 
hyperconflict. The following section will focus its attention on Mittelman’s argument that the 
contemporary world order has entered an era of hyperconflict. It will begin by briefly 
discussing the key concepts of hyperconflict, hypercompetition and hyperpower that he 
employs in his argument. A discussion of the most distinct characteristics of hyperconflict 
will then follow. 
3.3.1 Hyperconflict
Hyperconflict effectively amounts to: a reorganization of political violence; prevailing 
uncertainty characterized by a rising climate of fear; a change in the structures of armed and 
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other forms of conflict that are not necessarily in the hands of governments or their agents, 
but rather that of non-state actors such as terrorist organizations; and mounting instability at a 
global level (Mittelman, 2010:1). In addition, it is argued that globalizing processes are the 
driving forces of hyperconflict, which in turn points to a disturbance in world order. Conflict 
is propelled by the changing dynamics of control and transformative action. Hyperconflict, 
which entails insecurity, is propelled by the polarities and vulnerabilities that are brought 
about by globalization. Furthermore, hyperconflict arguably emerges as a result of the 
tensions that exist between the logics of state-centric and polycentric worlds (Mittelman, 
2010:22). It can also be seen to come about from a decline in legitimacy and a restructuring 
of hegemony. Legitimacy is vital, as power cannot be exercised effectively without it. In 
order to ensure that people obey rules or orders, power holders must strive for legitimacy. A 
lack of legitimacy arises from an unequal distribution of surplus or even when there is an 
absence in shared norms, values and institutions for public decision-making (Mittelman, 
2010:23). As has been emphasized, hyperconflict is underpinned by a confluence of shifts in 
security, legitimacy and hegemony (Mittelman, 2010:24). 
Hyperconflict should not be viewed as a totalizing phenomenon, as it only pertains to those 
entities, individuals and corporations that interact with global structures. There are a myriad 
clashes, especially on a domestic level, that intermingle with hyperconflict. These clashes are 
filtered through multiple global pressures (Mittelman. 2010:16). In addition, Mittelman’s 
analysis suggests that in the era of globalization the balance in a different direction from the 
thoughts of classical liberal thinkers such as Adam Smith, who underscored “the harmony of 
motives” and the constant need of assistance required by humans from their fellow man, and 
contemporary institutionalists such as Robert Keohane, “who seek to trace international 
regimes that ensure stability” (Mittelman, 2010:17). Furthermore, the term hyperconflict is 
useful as it provides the academic community, who are despairing about the current direction 
of world order, with a language that recognizes this direction and which asks questions about 
strategic alternatives to the present direction. In addition, hyperconflict provides a lens 
through which one can see the ways in which globalization brings about “multiple changes in 
scale” (Mittelman, 2010:17). Hyperconflict also holds the potential to constitute a historical 
turning point, in other words a watershed moment “that does not merely exacerbate 
transnational security, but rather may transform world order as we know it” (Mittelman, 
2010:17). 
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3.3.2 Hypercompetition
Contemporary globalization is marked by a compression of time and space, which brings 
about more direct competition amongst capitalists. These so-called head-on encounters, or 
even collisions, can be characterized as hypercompetition. Hypercompetition includes the 
practices of “aggressive market disruption” as well as “smart bombing” to outmanoeuvre 
competition; “counter-revolutionary strategies to buy time,” as well as manoeuvres which 
help build corporate spheres of influence (Mittelman, 2010:4). Hypercompetition is 
profoundly, but not completely American in a number of its facets, for example: the long 
reach of American markets, the organizational technologies that were developed or adapted 
in the US, the American predominance in spending on research and development (R&D); and 
the US’s ongoing capacity for cultural innovation and the spread of these cultural practices, 
amongst others. These are essentially what Joseph Nye refers to as “soft power”, which is the 
means to get others to do what you want (Mittelman, 2010:4).
3.3.3 Hyperpower
Another term that is employed in Mittelman’s argument is that of “hyperpower.” The term 
hyperpuissance or “hyperpower” was coined in 1998 by former French foreign minister 
Hubert Védrine in order to replace the term superpower, which related to the bipolarity of the 
Cold War era, and was now out-dated. According to Védrine, hyperpower describes “a 
country that is dominant or predominant in all categories” (The New York Times, 1999). 
Amy Chua (2007 cited in Mittelman, 2010:7) equates hyperpower with world dominance. 
Mittelman’s (2010:7) usage of hyperpower like that of Védrine is distinct from “superpowers,”
and is singular, there can be only one hyperpower, which is currently the US, thus the notion 
of rival or regional hyperpowers is non-existent.  Hyperpower does not only constitute state 
power, as it is diffuse and includes a chain of military bases in overseas territories as well as a 
collection of allies. Furthermore, hyperpower also integrates the ideological components of 
hegemony (Mittelman, 2010:7). 
The US can clearly be identified as the incumbent hyperpower, as it boasts the world’s largest 
national economy, unmatched technological expertise and a defence budget that exceeds that 
of the next twenty-five states. Its power is unparalleled and it plays a major role in the 
security of the world. It is often a determinant of whether insecurity or security prevails. It is 
however important to note that hyperpower constitutes neither unipolarity nor omnipotence. 
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Unlike polarity, which centres on the nation state without capturing globalizing processes, 
hyperpower signifies a relationship with distinctive mechanisms (Mittelman, 2010:9). In 
addition, the construct of hyperpower is advantageous as it joins both relational and structural 
forms of power. This concept has more fluidity and flexibility compared to imperialism or 
empire. This is because it allows for ways in which political and economic forces seek to 
expand networks of coercion, and opens interaction with hypercompetition. This in turn 
makes the production and transportation of weapons cheaper (Mittelman, 2010:150).  
Hypercompetition, marked by a vast dislocation and a highly skewed distribution of benefits 
and losses, can be seen to coincide with hyperpower, “which seeks to secure its enabling 
conditions” (Mittelman, 2010:13). During this era of globalizing, hypercompetition and 
hyperpower have grown together. These two phenomena entail coercion and the application 
of coercive measures, which in turn, triggers a “spiral of resistance to dominant structures.” 
Mittelman (2010:13) hypothesizes that when hypercompetition and hyperpower “encounter” 
one another they produce a situation of hyperconflict.
3.3.4 Characteristics of Hyperconflict
According to Mittelman, hyperconflict has seven distinct characteristics and these traits form 
a complex that sets hyperconflict apart from other familiar forms of conflict (Mittelman, 
2010:13; 16). The first is that hyperconflict is at the present time in a nascent phase, in other 
words it is just beginning to come into existence and display signs of future “potential.” Thus, 
one could possibly argue that it has the potential to engulf the entire global populace, or at 
least a large section of the global populace in a situation of hyperconflict. Second, as 
globalization develops, hyperconflict is a shift rather than a total break from prior patterns as 
this shift is not merely the familiar turn from interstate to domestic violence as the major 
source of conflict. Furthermore, during this era of globalization, hyperconflict is boiling over 
with the potential for spillovers. It is important to note that hyperconflict does not erupt 
automatically; in all instances where it does erupt it “merges with the complexity of history.”
In other words, the conflicts that we see erupting in contemporary times rest on prior 
occurrences throughout the history of that region, for example its colonial legacy and 
historical accidents such as natural disasters. The world has undoubtedly entered an epoch in 
which security threats and the efforts to circumvent them are globalized (Mittelman, 2010:14). 
Some scholars are of the opinion that the number of armed conflicts worldwide have declined 
or at least remained level. Although the time lines utilized by scholars differ, this statistical 
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observation is supported by a number of different studies conducted by Marshall and Gurr 
(2005), Gleditsch (2007) and Mack (2006) amongst others (Mittleman, 2010:14). As 
mentioned before Mittelman does not disregard the statistics. However, in this era of 
hyperconflict, a decrease in armed conflicts, albeit domestic or international, does not 
necessarily mean less violence or even more security from the threat of political terror 
(Mittelman, 2010:14). In fact, conflicts have become more violent and have arguably caused 
a greater feeling of insecurity in the current period of time. This is made especially clear 
when looking at the way in which ISIS (ad-Dawlah al-ʾIslāmiyyah/Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria) has carried out its activities, for example the beheading and crucifixion of not only 
Christians, but also of other individuals who stand in the way of their establishing an Islamic 
Caliphate. Their acts of violence seem to grow every day and along with that, a major feeling 
of insecurity, not only in Syria and Iraq but also in neighbouring states (McCoy, 2014). 
Every single episode of hyperconflict has a different hypercompetition to hyperpower ratio; 
this is directly dependent on the specific setting (region, the groups involved, economic 
circumstances etcetera). Thus, hyperconflict is not a one-size-fits-all mould, but is rather the 
product of a set of systemic drivers. These forces/drivers are contingent, in other words they 
are subject to “proximate” causes under a variety of conditions. The immediate cause often 
becomes “submerged” or “lost in an escalating conflict and engulfed in political violence” 
(Mittelman, 2010:15). The incidents of hyperconflict differ in intensity, they range from 
manifest to latent and in addition there are numerous types of catalysing moments. Thus, 
there is not one specific catalyser that sparks hyperconflict.  
Furthermore, Mittelman (2010:15) states that hypercompetition within geo-economics 10
interacts intensively with hyperpower in geopolitics11 . Even though the aforementioned 
realms do not cleave together neatly, the correspondence between the two is becoming more 
apparent; it constitutes a sporadic shift from the old order to a new one characterized by the 
rise of hyperconflict.12
Lastly, although hyperconflict does not necessarily entail a sudden outbreak of war, it may 
nevertheless spread at “lightning speed.” Thus, if hyperconflict does not emerge as one big 
                                               
10 Geo-economics is the study of spatial, cultural, and strategic aspects of resources, with the aim of gaining a 
sustainable competitive advantage (Soilen, 2012:2). 
11 “[G]eopolitics refers to the theory and practice of politics at the global scale, with a specific emphasis on the 
geographies that both shape and result from that politics” (Dittmer & Sharp, 2014:3).
12 This characteristic will not be compared to the case studies in Chapters 4 and 5, only those that correspond to 
the case studies will be applied. 
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“blow-up,” it will take shape as “multiple forms” sped on by new technologies that enable its 
elements to spread swiftly from one state or region to another (Mittelman, 2010:15). The 
Arab Spring comes to mind as an example of hyperconflict spreading swiftly throughout the 
North African region. The revolution that started in Tunisia swiftly spread to Libya and 
Egypt, engulfing the entire region in conflict and strife. The “recent” spread of ISIS’ Islamic 
Caliphate throughout areas in Syria and Iraq could also be seen as an example of 
hyperconflict spreading from one area to another. According to Mittelman (2010:15) the spill 
over effects of this contagion may threaten to bring about mass destruction as well as some 
states’ capacity to maintain a monopoly on legitimate violence. Some aspects of globalization 
can be considered as volatile; these “volatile” aspects of globalization are driven by a 
combination of new weaponry systems, an economic policy that has lowered barriers to trade 
and across borders, and integrated financial markets (Mittelman, 2010:16). Transnationally, 
the chain reaction of hyperconflict consists of several links, that is, channels that vary.
3.4 Causal Model of Linkages between Globalization and Terrorism 
According to Ekkart Zimmermann (2011:S152) globalization alters the opportunity cost of 
market participants; in turn he proposes that this will have an effect on terrorism, at least in 
the long term. As such Zimmermann (2011:S152) constructed a list of factors that 
“potentially mediate the relationship between globalization and terrorism,” this list forms the 
foundation of the causal model of linkages between globalization and international terrorism. 
In order to develop his model, Zimmermann (2011) reviews existing literature on 
globalization and terrorism, specifically with regards to the influence that globalization has 
on terrorism, much like that presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis. What Zimmermann aims to 
do with this model is to specify the potential links that exist between globalization and 
terrorism. This causal model makes links between globalization and terrorism explicit and 
incorporates additional considerations. In the interest of making the model less complex and 
more readable, variables such as economic growth and counter-terrorist policies are left out, 
even though they do have a marked influence on the dependent variable, namely “the 
persistence of international terrorist strategies” (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). 
The following section will examine the causal model of linkages between globalization and 
international terrorism as developed by Zimmermann (2011). The dependant variable in the 
model, that is, “the persistence of international terrorist strategies,” is influenced by 
incentives for international terrorism (line 1) and opportunities for international terrorism (2). 
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The independent variable of this model, “globalization,” can be divided into economic and 
financial effects, and into political, cultural and social effects. 
Figure 3.1 A heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization and terrorism (Zimmerman, 2011:S158).
Globalization is a major contributor to the shifts in relative prices and market relations (3), 
which leads to constraints on national governments and to a weakening of the state (4). 
Globalization is directly responsible for an increase in economic and social inequality, in 
other words the societal polarization within countries (5) (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). Here 
one could cite the effect of “free trade”, instead of benefitting from this many poorer 
developing countries are unable to compete with heavily subsidized goods, from example the 
European Union and the US, which in turn leads to economic and social inequality (Murphy, 
2002:83), and leaves those countries lagging behind. In addition, this can lead to a widening 
gap between the rich and the poor, which may in turn serve as a source of anger and 
resentment against those who have and those who do not have (Helton & Zagorcheva, 
2002:92), which may encourage the have-nots to lash out in the form of terrorism. 
Globalization also leads to social and economic inequality indirectly via a weakened state 
that no longer has the ability to protect economically disadvantaged groups against the global 
economic challenges (6) (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). For example the state may be unable to 
provide goods with subsidies, as other countries are able to do, which in turn means that they 
are unable to protect citizens, especially those who are vulnerable. As previously mentioned, 
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Stern and Öjendal also make the argument that globalization undermines the authority of the 
state, in other words weakening it.
Freytag, Krüger, Meierrieks and Schneider (2011:S7) argue that poor (country-specific) 
socio-economic conditions, such as poverty, slow growth, and trade disadvantages amongst 
others may influence the cost-benefit considerations of terrorists, which may then serve as an 
incentive for terrorism. Thus the opportunity cost of non-violence is lower than the benefits 
that are to be gained from terrorism, in this case the mental rewards. Their research shows 
that poor socio-economic conditions need to be taken into account as they influence the 
decisions of terrorists as well as their supporters (Freytag et al., 2011:S14). Although Freytag 
et al. do not explicitly mention globalization as the cause of poor socio-economic conditions, 
their research does correlate with the fact that societal polarization may serve as an incentive 
for terrorist activity.
In the “middle axis” of the model, globalization promotes new information technologies13 (7), 
which leads to a further weakening of state power of control (8). These new information 
technologies facilitate the decentralization of terrorist groups, who could possibly emulate 
other terrorist organizations or work through a system of “franchising” under a distant 
command (9), which in turn makes a further contribution to the weakening of the state (10). 
A decentralized organizational structure such as this advances the links to political-criminal 
networks (11), which then in turn benefit from an enlarged means of funding deviant 
behaviour (12), which again is an effect of globalization (13) (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). 
Globalization also has the direct effect of fostering the growth of politico-criminal networks 
(14), which has multiplied the opportunities for international terrorist strategies (15). External 
state or group support makes a major contribution to opportunities for such terrorist activities 
(16). Increasing social and economic inequality is a crucial component of this model, through 
both the effects on incentives for international terrorism (17) and opportunities for 
international terrorism (18) (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). 
In the upper half of this model, globalization is a major contributor to the spreading of 
foreign “corrupt” cultures (19), which have an effect on the incentives for international 
terrorism (20). Globalization also leads to value changes (21), be it directly or indirectly, via 
new information technologies such as the Internet, mobile phones and digital cameras (22). 
Changes in values are also brought about by the spread of perceived “foreign corrupt 
                                               
13 Technology as aid to terrorism is explored in 2.6.1 Technology as Aid in Chapter 2.
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culture”14 (23). A special case of changes in values is the occurrence and spreading of 
supreme values (24), which has a major influence on increasing the incentives for 
international terrorism (25) (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). 
A further effect of globalization is the immigration of workers (26). Two forces are at work 
here, the push effect, which drives unemployed and underpaid individuals/groups to other 
countries and the pull effect for qualified workers elsewhere. This process of immigration has
the effect of creating new minorities (27) as well as contributing to changes in values (28). 
These new minorities can also assist in the weakening of the state (29). They may also 
increase the incentives for international terrorism (30) and contribute to increased social and 
economic inequality (31) (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). Before 9/11, immigration was not 
considered as being a threat to national security, however the events of 9/11 shifted the 
immigration debate to a vital security concern (Helton & Zagorcheva, 2002:92). The concern 
is that new immigrating or recently immigrated minorities are providing safe haven to 
international terrorist groups. Two positions have emerged regarding immigrated minorities,
the first, argues that successful integration and sufficient assimilation can take place. 
However, the second position that is in line with the causal model argues that integration is 
absent and that immigration will lead to a rising unqualified proletariat that not only lacks 
educational and tranining skills, but also affirms the “supreme values” of Islam 
(Zimmermann, 2011:S155–156), which in turn serves as an incentive for terrorism. 
Zimmermann (2011:S156) also identifies four levels of analysis to be pursued in order to 
determine if globalization indeed has an influence on terrorism, namely: the global level, that 
of the nation-state, the level of terrorist groups and organizations, and the individual level.15
He argues that multi-level analysis is imperative as it is theoretically richer and it also 
provides a more thorough understanding of terrorism. This becomes especially clear when 
one broadens the analysis from individual terrorists and brings groups into focus. The level of 
group analysis for example makes the understanding of strategic and tactical elements of 
terrorist behavior more clear (Zimmermann, 2011:S156;158). 
This model makes it clear that the globalization-terrorism nexus is quite complex, as there are 
numerous factors at play. At first glance the model seems overly complex and difficult to 
comprehend, but on closer analysis one can see how the different variables interact with one 
another. These variables are interlinked and have a major influence on one another. 
                                               
14 The perceived threat of foreign corrupt culture is explored in 2.6.5 Threat of Corrupt Culture in Chapter 2.
15 This research study will not explicitly refer to the level of analysis utilized.
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Zimmermann’s (2011:S159) final analysis, findings and theoretical arguments do not 
ultimately demonstrate a positive relationship between globalization and terrorism. 
Furthermore, trends have indicated that there has been a decline in transnational terrorist 
attacks since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, with only two statistical outliers 
namely Iraq and Afghanistan. It is however important to note that Zimmerman’s research 
precedes the current upsurge in terrorist activities, both domestic and international. Thus, 
what was true at the time of publishing has now changed significantly when looking at a 
number of specific areas, more particularly the two case studies that will follow in the 
subsequent chapters. Zimmermann (2011:S159) further argues that globalization can be 
understood as a background factor for international terrorism.  Globalization does indeed 
provide a new means of ideological competition and easier access to new financial resources 
and weapons for terrorists. However, political terrorism is a reaction to local circumstances 
even though these may be influenced by global developments in a manifold manner 
(Zimmermann, 2011:S159).  
3.5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to expand on the theoretical argument that globalization and 
terrorism are inextricably linked, and that globalization has essentially acted as a facilitator of 
terrorism. In order to develop a theoretical framework against which the subsequent chapters 
will be compared, this chapter examined the security-development nexus, Mittelman’s theory 
of hyperconflict and Zimmermann’s heuristic causal model of linkages between globalization 
and terrorism. In developing and expanding on the theoretical framework of the 
globalization-terrorism nexus, it will now be possible to apply this theory to real world 
situations – specifically Al Shabaab in Somalia, and Boko Haram in northern Nigeria. By 
applying the theoretical framework to these case studies it will be possible to determine 
whether a globalization-terrorism nexus actually exists. In addition, this will provide the 
framework necessary to compare the two case studies in Chapter 6 where it will also be 
possible to determine which facets of globalization influenced terrorist activities in Somalia 
and northern Nigeria specifically, and to what extent. Thus, one will be able to determine if 
the same facets of globalization facilitated/encouraged terrorism or whether completely 
different facets played a part in facilitating/encouraging terrorist activities. This framework 
therefore forms the foundation for a comparative research design. 
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Chapter 4: Al Shabaab: Proof of the Dark Side of 
Globalization 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will focus specifically on how globalization as a whole has impacted on the 
security environment and created an environment permissive to acts of terror, within the 
Somali state and the greater Horn of Africa region. The purpose of this chapter is to 
determine whether the Somali case serves as an example of hyperconflict as developed by 
Mittelman and discussed in the preceding chapter. It also seeks to determine how the 
different facets of globalization, for example technological advances, improved transportation 
networks and the lowering of barriers to trade and commerce,  have enabled Al Shabaab to 
more easily commit acts of terror. Furthermore, it will also examine whether the effects of 
globalization have encouraged the terrorist organization to commit acts of terror. It will refer 
back to Zimmermann’s causal model when exploring these sections.  In addition, it will also 
explore how globalization itself has served as a motivating factor in the rise of Al Shabaab, 
specifically relating to its anti-Western stance. 
4.2 Hyperconflict and Somalia 
The following section will examine the security environment of Somalia within the context of 
hyperconflict. The purpose of this section will be to determine whether a situation of 
hyperconflict has erupted or is in the process of erupting. In order to do so this section will 
start by examining the factors responsible for hyperconflict and determine whether these 
factors are present in the case of Somalia. The first factor that will be taken into consideration 
is a decline in legitimacy. Thereafter, the characteristics of hyperconflict in the case of the 
Somali state will be compared. 
4.2.1 Legitimacy and State Collapse
As argued by Mittelman (2010:23) in the previous chapter, hyperconflict can be seen to arise 
from a decline in legitimacy. The reason behind this is that the legitimacy of power holders is 
vital if they are to exercise power effectively. If there is a decline in legitimacy, it will 
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become more difficult for power holders to ensure that people obey the rules and orders set 
out. A decline and a lack of legitimacy can come about for a number of reasons. 
In the case of Somalia, Al Shabaab has exploited the condition of state collapse to gain 
legitimacy, which has in the process delegitimized the country’s former Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG). It has done so by setting itself up as an alternative to local-level 
governance in Somalia. Al Shabaab has gained legitimacy by exploiting Somali nationalism 
and xenophobia, and by the provision of social services (Mwangi, 2012:513). State collapse 
has played a major role in facilitating persistent and pervasive conflict; one could even argue 
that it has facilitated a condition of hyperconflict. The reason for this is that legitimacy is an 
unknown factor in a collapsed state since the state is unable to provide basic services. This 
ultimately creates a vacuum which can be filled by non-state actors in a bid to acquire 
legitimacy. In the case of Somalia, Al Shabaab exploited this vacuum.
As mentioned previously, Al Shabaab has employed various tactics to discredit/delegitimize 
the Transnational Federal Government, whilst simultaneously legitimizing itself. The first 
tactic employed is Somali nationalism and xenophobia. This was used extensively in the 2006 
Ethiopian military intervention (Mwangi, 2012:520). Since the intervention generated much 
radical national sentiment and was supported by the TFG, Al Shabaab used this as a means to 
delegitimize and discredit the government. Al Shabaab subsequently emerged as the main 
source of armed resistance to the occupation by Ethiopian troops which led to the group 
winning both passive and active support from numerous Somalis (Mwangi, 2012:520).  In the 
process, the group was able to attain some legitimacy as it was seen to resist and fight the 
foreign enemy. 
A further reason for the Somali state and hence the TFG losing legitimacy relates to its 
inability to perform the basic function of providing political and economic goods and services 
to citizens. The provision of these goods and services is vital if power holders want to 
maintain legitimacy. Mwangi (2012:524) mentions that the TFG, during its tenure from 2004 
to 2012, was never able to provide sufficient or meaningful civil services. This failure on the 
part of the TFG was exploited by Al Shabaab and they became the only organisation to 
provide these desperately needed, basic services to large areas of Somalia. By providing 
political and economic goods such as justice and security, education and training, food 
distribution (vital since drought and famine is rife), local-level administration and public 
works (for example building bridges and repairing roads), and employment, Al Shabaab has 
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gained legitimacy which has given them power over many areas of Somalia (Mwangi, 
2012:525). Al Shabaab’s provision of education is vital to their legitimacy as few Somali’s 
are able to access education and in many areas throughout Somalia, Al Shabaab is the only 
organization to provide education (albeit limited and fundamentalist). Their “legitimacy” is 
further cemented by employing the Somali populace (Mwangi, 2012:525). Furthermore, Al 
Shabaab was able to cement its legitimacy by paying its soldiers a US$300 per month loyalty 
fee in addition to free food, water, khat (a local drug) and weaponry; whereas the TFG was 
only paying it soldiers US$200 every two months and in 2011 there were reports that soldiers 
went without pay for four consecutive months (Sterley, 2014:56). 
Wise (2011:5) reiterates Mwangi’s arguments that inadequate governance (as a result of state 
collapse and declining legitimacy) over large portions of Somalia gave Al Shabaab a foothold. 
Since the collapse of Mohammed Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, the greater part of Somalia 
has remained largely ungoverned. This has enabled groups such as Al Shabaab to operate 
freely in these ungoverned areas. Thus, the inability of the TFG to provide basic services and 
the TFG’s support for the Ethiopian intervention led to a loss of legitimacy. This in turn led 
to a security and services vacuum in the country which led to a situation of hyperconflict 
since Al Shabaab was able to operate easily and without restraint. Furthermore, this vacuum 
was exploited by Al Shabaab as they started providing the goods and services for which 
government is usually responsible, and thus increased their legitimacy. One can also argue 
that since Al Shabaab is the provider of these basic goods and services, it is highly unlikely 
that the Somali populace will oppose the group’s activities for fear of losing out on these 
goods and services. Thus, an element of fear is present and allows Al Shabaab to continue its 
terror activities without much resistance. 
The establishment of a new federal govenrment marked a milestone for Somalia as well as a 
dream of moving away from the ineffectivness of past transitional governments. However, 
despite optimism and winning the support and recognition of many in the international 
community (it is viewed as Somalia’s first “post-transition” government), the Somali Federal 
Government (SFG) is weak and ineffective and wields very little power outside of 
Mogadishu (Bryden, 2013:1; Guled, 2014). Furthermore, in comparison to central and local 
authorites, which it opposes, Al Shabaab seems less corrupt which to an extent makes it more 
legitmate than these authorities. In addition, the group is able to obtain a degree of legitimacy, 
because unlike the SFG, Al Shabaab pays it soldiers and operatives well and regularly. It also 
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makes provision for its veterans as well as the families of its “martyrs” (International Crisis 
Group, 2014a:15). By taking better care of its people financially compared to the SFG, Al 
Shabaab is able to obtain legitmacy in this area. It also gives them a source of resilience. 
Moreover, Al Shabaab has also been seen to infiltrate some SFG agencies despite its loss of 
territory, specifically the loss of Mogadishu in August 2011. One small but significant 
example is that during the latter part of 2013, the group effectively controlled the Mogadishu 
Central Prison (Internatioanl Crisis Group, 2014a:12). This does not bode well for the 
legitimacy of the SFG if Al Shabaab has already infiltrated the SFG and its agencies, despite 
the fact that the group has suffered major territorial losses.  
It can then be argued that Al Shabaab was able to legitmitize itself by deligitmizing the TFG 
throughout its tenure in office, thus a situation of hyperfconflict was able to develop within 
this period. Furthermore, by being better able to provide for its people than the SFG, it 
delegitimizes the SFG in some way and gives Al Shabaab some power. Whether the situation 
of hyperconflict will continue with the establishment and continuation of the SFG is 
unknown. If the situation of hyperconflict is to come to an end the SFG must establish itself 
as the legimate and sovereign authority over all of Somalia, especially in the rural areas as 
these are the areas where Al Shabaab exercises the most control. In order to achieve this, the 
SFG will have to ensure the provision of basic services, an area which Al Shabaab has taken 
over and obtained much legitimacy. Furthermore, the SFG will need to ensure that Al 
Shabaab does not infiltrate more of its agencies. 
4.2.2 Characteristics of Hyperconflict 
The purpose of this section is to determine whether the Somali case fits the characteristics of 
hyperconflict as described by Mittelman. It will do so by briefly reminding the reader of the 
characteristics of hyperconflict before applying these to the case of Somalia and Al Shabaab. 
It will only discuss those characteristics which relate to the case study. 
4.2.2.1 Potential to Engulf
First, hyperconflict is at the present time in a nascent phase, in other words it is just 
beginning to come into existence and display signs of future “potential.” Thus, one could 
possibly argue that it has the potential to engulf the entire global populace, or at least a large 
section of the global populace, in a situation of hyperconflict (Mittelman, 2011:15). The 
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Somali case displays signs that indicate that Al Shabaab has the potential to engulf the entire 
Horn of Africa region, specifically Kenya in a situation of hyperconflict. 
Harper (2012:184) agrees that the crisis/conflict in Somalia has regional implications, as it 
has affected many countries in East Africa as well as the Horn of Africa. Al Shabaab’s 
violence has destabilized neighbouring states and it has dragged some directly into the 
conflict, as will be discussed in the following paragraphs. In effect what was initially a local 
form of militant Islam has metamorphosed into a regional, or even an international force 
(Harper, 2012:184). The fact that Al Shabaab’s targets extend beyond the borders of the 
Somalian state are indicative of this. Many of Al Shabaab’s targets are located in 
neighbouring Kenya. A series of kidnappings in Kenya in 2011, allegedly by Al Shabaab 
militants, including that of tourists (which dealt a serious blow to Kenya’s tourism) led to the 
launch of “Operation Protect the Nation” on 16 October 2011. Even though it had not been 
confirmed that Al Shabaab was responsible for the kidnappings, Kenya went ahead and 
launched a military incursion of approximately 2000 soldiers into Somalia (Abdulkadir, 
2012:6). This supports the argument that Al Shabaab has engulfed neighbouring states in its 
conflict. It is effectively encouraging neighbouring states to become involved in the conflict.  
Al Shabaab has launched many other attacks, for which it has claimed responsibility. Another 
example of this was the 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi which claimed the lives of 67 
individuals (mostly innocent civilians). During the aforementioned attack Al Shabaab 
tweeted that “[f]or long we [Al Shabaab] have waged war against Kenyans in our land, now it 
is time to shift the battleground and take the war to their land” (Agbiboa, 2014a). This tweet 
supports this characteristic of hyperconflict as it displays signs of engulfing further areas into 
conflict. It is no longer restricting itself to fighting within the borders of the Somali state. 
This is further supported by statistics from Kenya’s anti-terrorism police unit. According to 
this unit, since the incursion of Kenyan troops into Somalia in 2011, Kenya has suffered 
approxiamtely 133 terror-related attacks, which translates into one attack every eight days 
(Wafula, 2014). 
Additionally, the fact that Al Shabaab has warned tourists to stay clear of Kenya as it is now 
“officially” a war zone also gives support to the notion that Al Shabaab has engulfed Kenya 
in hyperconflict. This warning came in the wake of attacks along the Kenyan coastline that 
claimed the lives of at least 48 (Omar, Flood & Smith, 2014). The attacks were launched in 
retaliation against Kenya as a result of the “Kenyan government’s brutal oppression of 
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Muslims in Kenya through coercion, intimidation and extrajudicial killings of Muslim 
scholars” (Omar, Flood & Smith, 2014). Al Shabaab went further in stating that “[they] 
hereby warn the Kenyan government and its public that as long as [Kenyan soldiers] continue 
to invade our lands and oppress innocent Muslims, such attacks will continue and the 
prospect of peace and stability in Kenya will be but a distant mirage. Do not ever dream of 
living peacefully in your lands while your forces kill the innocent in our lands” (Omar, Flood 
& Smith, 2014). This statement makes it clear that Al Shabaab will continue to involve 
Kenya in its conflict, if Kenya continues to fight against it. This makes the prospect for the 
continuation of hyperconflict all the more likely. 
Al Shabaab’s attack on Garissa Univeristy college, in north-eastern Kenya, earlier this year is 
another example of the group retaliating against Kenya’s war against Somalia. This attack 
proved to be the group’s deadliest attack to date, claiming the lives of 147/148 people, mostly 
students (BBC, 2015a; Al Jazeera, 2015a). In the aftermath of the attack, Al Shabaab officials 
warned that Kenyan cities will "run red with blood" and that a "long, gruesome war" awaits 
Kenya, unless it withdraws its troops from Somalia (Al Jazeera, 2015a; Al Jazeera 2015b).
This foreshadows even more attacks against Kenyans, and in turn supports the notion of 
continuing hyperconflict. Kenya responded to the Garissa attack by launching airstrikes 
against several Al Shabaab bases in Somalia (Al Jazeera, 2015c). In May, the group 
ambushed police officers in Garissa county, allegedly killing 20 officers. Garissa police 
confirmed that 20 officers perished in the attack (Al Jazeera, 2015b). 
In addition, Ethiopian forces have also been heavily targeted by the organization, largely due 
to the enmity between Ethiopians and Somalis which is deeply rooted in centuries of conflict 
and which was further enflamed by the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 (Menkhaus, 2009:224). In 
October 2014, the U.S. embassy in Ethiopia issued a warning of a possible attack by Al 
Shabaab militants (Maasho, 2014). Furthermore, Al Shabaab’s regional ambitions have 
further threatened the internal security of Ethiopia through its support for the Ogaden 
National Liberation Front (ONLF), an ethnic Somali separatist group in the Ogaden region of 
the country (Abdulkadir, 2012:6). These attacks have the potential to further fuel the conflict, 
especially if these states were to retaliate against the attacks.  
Furthermore, the involvement of many African countries’ soldiers and peacekeepers in 
Somalia has effectively placed a target on those countries. Al Shabaab has often threatened to 
attack those who oppose them or support their enemies. This was clear, when on 11 July 2010, 
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Al Shabaab launched twin bombings on two groups of soccer fans wathching the World Cup 
games in Kampala, Uganda. The attacks killed 79 people, whilst injuring many others. This 
was Al Shabaab’s first attack in a foreign country; it was launched to punish Uganda for 
contributing the bulk of the African peacekeeping force in Somalia (Onuoha, 2013a:3; Harper, 
2012:184). 
Moreover, as will be discovered in a subsequent section, Al Shabaab has attracted many 
foreign fighters16, there are fears that foreign fighters from Kenya, Yemen, the US,  Britian, 
Australia and Scandinavia, who are mosly ethnic Somalis, might return to their host nations 
and plot terrorist attacks in these nations, after fighting alongside Al Shabaab (Harper, 
2012:181). If this is to happen, furhter areas are set to become part of this situation of 
hyperconflict.
4.2.2.2 Shift from Prior Patterns
Second, as globalization develops, hyperconflict is a shift rather than a total break from prior 
patterns. This shift is not merely the familiar turn from interstate to domestic violence as the 
major source of conflict. Many cases of political violence do not fit tidily in one category 
(Mittelman, 2010:14). In the case of the hyperconflict brought about by Al Shaabab it does 
not fit tidily in either category. It has elements of both interstate and domestic violence as can 
be seen in the preceding paragraphs. It has elements of interstate violence whereby Al 
Shabaab and the armies of the aforementioned African states attack one another or targets in 
the other’s “territory.” On the other hand it has elements of domestic terrorism whereby Al 
Shabaab has targeted areas and individuals/groups (Somali) within the borders of Somalia. Al 
Shabaab’s twin bombings in Kampala, Uganda, and the attack on the Westgate Mall in Kenya, 
as mentioned previously, are prominent examples of interstate terrorism. These attacks, 
amongst others also indicate that Al Shabaab has transformed itself from a domestic to a 
transnational terror organization, and even international. This transformation is a direct result 
of Al Shabaab’s partnership with Al Qaeda17 (Agbiboa, 2015: 185–186). 
                                               
16 See page 76.
17 On page 39 it is mentioned that since 2008 Al Shabaab has  worked to align it interest with the Al Qaeda core 
and in 2012 formally joined ranks with Al Qaeda.
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4.2.2.3 Boiling Over, with a Chance of Spillovers 
Third, hyperconflict is boiling over with the potential for spillovers. It is important to note 
that hyperconflict does not erupt automatically; in all instances where it does erupt, it 
“merges with the complexity of history.” When one considers Al Shabaab’s activities, one 
could argue that it has definitely led to spillovers. As mentioned previously, Al Shabaab’s 
targets are not confined to the borders of Somalia. The conflict has spilled over to 
neighbouring states inside the Horn of Africa, most prominently Ethiopia and Kenya. 
Furthermore, Somalia’s complex and tumultuous past certainly has some part in the eruption 
of conflict, or even hyperconflict. As was argued by Ibrahim (2010)18 in an earlier chapter, 
the numerous failed attempts at national reconciliation had created a vacuum which led to the 
rise of Islamists, like Al Shabaab. The activities of Al Shabaab could consequently engulf 
Somalia as well as neighbouring states in conflict as a result of spillovers. 
A further factor that led to the spillover of conflict to neighbouring states is the involvement 
of these states’ militaries within Somalia. The best example would be the Ethiopian invasion 
of Somalia in December 2006, as was mentioned earlier. This invasion played a major role in 
fuelling conflict between Ethiopians and Somalis. Further examples include the presence of 
Ethiopian troops alongside forces from Kenya, Djibouti, Burundi and Uganda who form part 
of an AU mission to fight Al Shabaab militants within the borders of Somalia (Maasho, 2014). 
As a result of the involvement of these troops in fighting and killing Al Shabaab militants, Al 
Shabaab has retaliated by targeting people and buildings within these states. This is clear 
when one looks at the examples mentioned with regard to the first characteristic of 
hyperconflict and has thus led to the conflict spilling over to the aforementioned states. 
4.2.2.4 Increased Violence is the Order of the Day
Fourth, in this era of hyperconflict a decrease in armed conflicts, whether domestic or 
international, does not necessarily mean less violence or even more security from the threat 
of political terror. In order to determine whether this in fact true of Al Shabaab in Somalia, it 
is imperative that one examines the number of attacks perpetrated by the group, the violence 
with which these attacks are carried out and whether there exists a situation of security. 
                                               
18 See page 35.
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According to data available on the Global Terrorism Database19 (National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015c) the average number of 
attacks perpetrated by Al Shabaab increased between 2008 and August 2014, therafter 
declining drastically, with a slight increase, before declining towards the end of 2014. The 
decline in the number of attacks is probably due to the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) seizing a number of villages and towns from Al Shabaab during the month of 
August. In addition, the loss of the coastal stronghold, Barawe, to the Somali National Army 
(SNA) and AMISOM forces in October dealt a severe blow to Al Shabaab; this loss most 
likely affected the number of attacks carried out by the group (International Crisis Group, 
2015b).  A total of 866 attacks were carried out in 2014 compared to a mere 26 attacks in 
2008 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 
2015d). The violence with which the Westgate Mall attack of 2013 was carried out is 
indicative of this surge of violence. The Garissa University College attack is yet another 
example of this surge in Al Shabaab’s violence and deadliness, claiming the lives of 147/148 
in their dealiest attack yet. 
4.2.2.5 Different Drivers, Different Catalysers
Fifth, hyperconflict is not a one-size-fits-all mould, but rather the product of a set of systemic 
drivers. These forces/drivers are contingent, in other words they are subject to “proximate” 
causes under a variety of conditions. The immediate cause often becomes “submerged” or 
“lost in an escalating conflict and engulfed in political violence” (Mittelman, 2010:15). The 
instances of hyperconflict differ in intensity, ranging from manifest to latent, and in addition 
there are numerous types of catalysing moments. Thus, there is not one specific catalyser that 
sparks hyperconflict. The forces/drivers that have led to the conflict in Somalia might be very 
different when compared to other contexts. The same can be said for the moments that have 
acted as a catalyser for conflict.  
There are a number of “drivers” that can be identified in this situation of hyperconflict. One 
can determine these drivers by looking at factors such as Al Shabaab’s motivation in 
                                               
19 For graph displaying Al Shabaab attacks from 2008 – 2014, see 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2008&end_yearonly=2014&start_year=&star
t_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=20036
&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max= (National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015c). Please note because of terms of the GTD graphs 
cannot be displayed in this thesis.
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launching jihad in the region. One of the major aims of Al Shabaab is the establishment of a 
Somali Caliphate and in order to do so the organization must rid the region of all elements 
that oppose this aim. It aims to do so by waging jihad against the enemies of Islam, which 
includes the removal of all forms of Western influence (linked to globalization. This is a 
possible reason for targeting individuals and properties linked to wersternizaton/globalization. 
In addition, they also wish to eliminate all other forms of Islam which are not in line with 
their Salafi-Wahhabist strand (Wise, 2011:6; Ali, 2008). 
One of the major catalysing moments that sparked the current conflict in Somalia relates to 
the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006, as well as the occurrences thereafter. This 
invasion gave Al Shabaab the necessary “tools” to convince Somalis, even those who did not 
fully agree with their doctrine, that the group was in fact fighting the enemy. They were able 
to draw on deep-rooted animosity. Furthermore, since the Ethiopian invasion was backed by 
the US and the US launched several bombs onto targets in Somalia, Al Shabaab was able to 
convince Somalis that this was a threat to Islam. This effectively bred a sense of anti-
westernism and anti-Americanism.  
In addition, the Kenyan invasion of Somalia in 2011 served as another catalyser of conflict. 
According to Anderson and McNight (2014:1) the invasion turned into an occupation of  
“attrition,” whilst the repercussions of the invasion have “consolidated” in a series of deadly 
Al Shabaab attacks in Kenya. 
On 1 September 2014,  Al Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane was killed in a US air strike 
in Somalia (Omar & Sheikh, 2014). Even though this was hailed as a “major symbolic and 
operational loss” for Al Shabaab by the Pentagon, the loss of a leader has the potential to 
catalyse further and possibly even more violent conflict. This sentiment has also been 
expressed by some alanalysts (Omar & Sheikh, 2014).  Samantha Lewthwaite, or the “White 
Widow”20, discussed in a subsequent section, was a devoted follower of Godane and counter-
terrorism police feared that Lewthwaite and her cohorts were planning reprisal attacks. The 
fear of reprisal attacks was realized when Al Shabaab militants launched an attack on the 
AU’s main base in Somalia on Christmas Day, claiming the lives of at least nine people
(Guled, 2014). According to Al Shabaab spokesperson, Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage, the 
attack was launched in retaliation for the US airstrike that was responsible for killing their 
                                               
20 See page 77.
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former leader Godane (Guled, 2014). Fortunately, there has not been any indication that more 
attacks have been launched for the purpose of revenge. 
4.2.2.6 Conflict spreads like Wildfire
Although hyperconflict does not necessarily entail a sudden outbreak of war, it may 
nevertheless spread like wildfire. Thus, if hyperconflict does not emerge as one big “blow-up,”
it will take shape as “multiple forms” aided by new technologies that enable its elements to 
spread swiftly from one state or region to another.
When one examines this situation of conflict/hyperconflict in Somalia, it is possible to argue 
that it did not “blow up” into one massive war and then engulf the region. However, it can be 
argued that the conflict has spread to other states in the region. This has been made possible 
by the spillovers of conflict in Somalia, as discussed earlier. New technologies have played a 
definitive role in the spread of Al Shabaab’s activities. The effect of new technologies will be 
examined and discussed in depth in the next section.  
4.3 Globalization as Facilitator of Acts of Terror 
The purpose of the following section is to determine how the different mechanisms of 
globalization have impacted the security environment of Somalia and whether and to what 
extent these mechanisms have facilitated acts of terror committed by Al Shabaab. In so doing 
it will be possible to determine whether globalization does facilitate terrorist activity within 
the region. The mechanisms that will be examined in the subsequent pages include: 
technology as facilitator of terrorism; the use of channels of business and commerce to 
facilitate terrorist activity, under the title of funding for terror; and migration and the 
“irrelevance” of boundaries,  in other words, how the permeability of borders facilitates Al 
Shabaab’s terrorist activities. Zimmermann’s causal model will be consulted when examining 
these aspects.21
4.3.1 Technology as Facilitator
Al Shabaab has exploited the growth of information and communication technologies, and 
ICT is employed for a number of reasons. According to Menkhaus (2014:324), Al Shabaab 
has exploited the internet and social media platforms to recruit, raise funds, issue threats, 
                                               
21 See page 55.
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monitor enemies, amplify its message and reinforce its narrative. He further states that Al 
Shabaab has been successful in its quest to harness social media in order to advance its 
radical narrative as a result of appropriation rather than creation. The reason for this is that 
the organization inherited a narrative of Somali grievance, which it in turn adapted, 
repackaged in a more radical Islamist garb, and then disseminated via social media back to an 
audience which had already “internalized the basic story line.” Furthermore, the group has 
made use of the remittance and telecommunication sectors to aid in the movement of money 
and to raise revenues (Menkhaus, 2014:324).
Mwangi (2012:522) adds that Al Shabaab’s internet strategy has three main aims: first, it is a 
response to the distrust it has for other media sources and outlets, including those located in 
Western and some Muslim countries. Second, it is proof of the group’s sophistication and 
success (it is able to show off successes through means of professional videos). Lastly, the 
internet is employed to interact with and gain support from the global terrorist community as 
well as the Somali Diaspora (Mwangi, 2012:522; Wise, 2011:8). Mwangi (2012:522) adds 
that the group has used the internet as a platform to disseminate its propaganda. 
Wise (2011:5) notes that in the period 2006 to 2008, Al Shabaab recruited “almost entirely” 
from the local Somali population who had volunteered to fight the invading Ethiopians. 
However, since 2008 (possibly due to increased access to and awareness of ICT) Al Shabaab
has increasingly employed the Internet as a method of recruitment, mainly to recruit 
ideologically motivated foreigners. Facebook and chatrooms have been especially powerful 
tools for recruitment (Menkhaus, 2014:324). ICT has also allowed the group to tap into and 
benefit from wealthy Salafi networks that are keen to support Al Qaeda’s global jihad 
campaign. For example, in August 2009 Al Shabaab launched an online fundraising forum 
that raised the impressive sum of 40 000 USD from members of the Somali diaspora for their 
transnational jihadist cause (Agbiboa, 2014a). 
The groups’s foundation for media productions, Al Kata’ib, started creating a series of 
“professionally” produced videos, such as “No Peace Without Islam” and “At Your Service, 
Oh Osama” (Wise, 2011:8). The purpose of these productions was to appeal directly to the 
foreign audience by highlighting Al Shabaab’s connection to the Al Qaeda core, portraying 
the conflict in Somalia as an important part of the global war against the West, and depicting 
their fighters as effective and successful (Wise, 2011:8). One can find numerous videos 
produced by Al Kata’ib on a variety of internet sites. The group has even produced videos in 
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English; this has enabled them to reach an international audience (Wise, 2011:8). According 
to Menkhaus (2014:324), some of the videos produced by Al Kata’ib have been quite 
powerful and have assisted Al Shabaab in building a brand which was especially popular at 
one point. One such video is “They are the Enemy so Beware of Them” (Al Kata’ib 
Foundation for Media Productions presents They are the Enemy so Beware of Them 2 in 
ENG, 2013).  This particular video (like many others) portrays the West, especially the CIA, 
as absolutely evil with the aim of murdering innocent Muslims. It can be viewed as a 
propaganda video that aims to turn those foreigners, with radical sympathies against the West. 
Mwangi (2012:522) adds that ordinary people believe the powerful rhetoric of these videos as 
a result of the politico-religious discourses that are ingrained in them. 
Early in August of 2014 a video was released on Radio Al-Furqaan,  allegedly showing how 
the residents in the town of Marko (Merca)22 were being harassed by the AMISOM troops. 
The purpose of this video was to build up anger and resentment towards AMISOM, by 
portraying them as the enemy. The video went further, stating that these troops had killed 
citizens of Marko and had raped their women. 23 In addition, the troops had allegedly 
destroyed the development in the city (pioneered by Al Shabaab) relating to Islamic 
governance, business and education (African troops invading Somalia kill, rape and torture in 
the city of Marko, 2014). The video thus portrays Al Shabaab in the light of a saviour, which 
had pioneered development, and on the other hand, put the troops in a bad light as they are 
seen to be the destroyers of development. The video further casts a bad light on AMISOM 
troops as it argues that when residents stood up against the activities of the troops, by 
chanting and burning tyres, they were met with violent action in the form of shelling (African 
troops invading Somalia kill, rape and torture in the city of Marko, 2014). Even though the 
group might have been correct in arguing that the troops terrorized citizens, their presentation 
was very one-sided. This video essentially attempts to discredit AMISOM and the nations 
that support it, whilst simultaneously legitimizing itself. One can further argue that by 
delegitimizing AMISOM, the Somali government is also discredited and delegitimized as the 
Somali government works alongside AMISOM to fight Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab have also 
uploaded photos of areas they had recently “captured,” as well as some grisly images of dead 
civilians, their bodies smashed to pieces purportedly by AMISOM peacekeepers and 
government troops (Harper, 2012:95). These images further led to the delegitimization of 
                                               
22 See Appendix A: Map of Somalia.  
23 Video was uploaded to TRAC Somalia’s YouTube account and English subtitles were added, see: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YN3UkrNEuf8
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AMISOM as well as the Somali government. This relates to Zimmermann’s (2011:S155)
causal model which showcases that globalization leads to the spread of new technologies and 
ICT which then in turn leads to a weakening of the state. The weakening of the state comes 
from a loss of legitimacy as the government supports a mission that allegedly harasses, 
murders, rapes and wreaks havoc on the Somali people.   
Early this year Al Shabaab released another video calling for attacks on shopping malls in the 
US, Canada and the United Kingdom. However, according to Jeh Johnson, Homeland 
Security Secretary, there is no credible or specific evidence which suggests that an attack on 
an American mall is being planned. Nevertheless, he warned Americans to be vigilant 
(Karimi, Fantz & Shoichet, 2015). The Department of Homeland Security and the FBI 
believe that the video was an attempt by Al Shabaab to compete for attention as well as to 
attract recruits from other terrorist organizations. One of the malls mentioned in the video, the 
Mall of America, is situated in Minnesota which “houses” the largest number of Somalis in 
the US (Karimi, Fantz & Shoichet, 2015). It would make sense as a way to recruit individuals, 
as a number of American Al Shabaab fighters are of Somali descent (Masters & Sergie, 2015). 
Al Shabaab has also made use of social networking technologies such as Twitter. The group 
has been a devoted user of Twitter since September 2011 (Alexander, 2013). Initially the 
move onto this social networking platform was an attempt to counter the tweets of Kenya’s 
military spokesman, Major Emmanuel Chirchir, which highlighted the successes of fighting 
Al Shabaab. The group’s Twitter account was shut down numerous times, only to resurface 
under a new Twitter handle (different name). This makes it clear that it is impossible to 
silence terrorists that choose to make use of this platform (Alexander, 2013). Al Shabaab has 
used Twitter as a means of reinforcing a narrative of Somali grievance by employing “shards 
of evidence and images” that conform to the values and beliefs of its target audience 
(Menkhaus, 2014:324).  
Al Shabaab has mainly employed Twitter as a means through which to make claims of enemy 
kills and to disseminate its views with regard to events in Somalia and the Horn of Africa 
(The Guardian, 2013). According to Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher and Sheehan (2012:31), 
Twitter aids in bolstering the group’s legitimacy as well as undermining competing sources 
of information about the group. Since Twitter can be used to report activities in real time it 
prevents governments or news organizations from framing actions in a light which is contrary 
to what the group wants. The employment of Twitter to instantaneously upload photos has 
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helped shape its media coverage. The group openly criticizes Western media outlets, 
proclaiming that only Al Shabaab has the real facts and that these outlets are not be trusted. It 
is also used as a means of communicating with the Somali Diaspora as well as English 
speaking Muslims (Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher & Sheehan, 2013:31). As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, Al Shabaab made use of Twitter as a running commentary on the Westgate Mall 
attack. The purpose of these tweets was to taunt Kenyan security forces, justify their actions, 
boast about their “military prowess” and instil fear in the public. 
One can thus argue that technology has played a decisive role in facilitating the spread of Al 
Shabaab’s message, which in turn has indirectly facilitated terrorist activity. It has also served 
as a means of delegitimizing the enemy and simultaneously legitimizing itself. Furthermore, 
since it has been employed as a recruitment tactic and has encouraged so many foreign 
fighters to join, one can argue that this led to a growth in the number of fighters and 
consequently an increase in the number of terror attacks. Al Shabaab’s use of technology 
does not wholly relate to Zimmermann’s causal model, specifically with regard to its use of 
technology as a means of recruitment. A new “channel” should therefore be added to 
Zimmermann’s existing model where technology leads to recruitment of fighters (especially 
foreign) which in turn leads to opportunities for terrorism. It does however relate to the model 
to the extent that Al Shabaab’s use of videos has delegitimized the Somalian government and 
has thus weakened the state.
4.3.2 Funding for Terror
As was briefly outlined in Chapter 2, some scholars have argued that terrorists frequently 
exploit international trade networks in order to market goods and services. The money that 
comes from these goods and services enables the terrorist organization to finance its terrorist 
operations. It can also be noted that many of the goods traded are illegal/smuggled (Li & 
Schaub, 2004:235). This section will examine the ways in which Al Shabaab has exploited 
networks of international trade in order to provide financing for operations. In addition, it will 
examine the other means that Al Shabaab has used in order to fund its terror activities.
According to a study conducted by Vilkko (2011:19), the port of Kismayo plays a major role 
in generating revenue within Somalia. Since there are many traders that seek to benefit from 
Somalia’s de facto duty free status, the ports are of both economic and strategic importance. 
Many of the individuals interviewed argued that the taxes and fees derived from the port of 
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Kismayo were the single largest source of revenue for Al Shabaab. Furthermore, since 
Kismayo is a major logistical hub, control of the port means control of strategic trade lines, 
some of which run to the Arabian Peninsula and the entire East African region. Of all the 
commodities traded, the export of charcoal can be identified as the one which generates the 
most income for Al Shabaab (Vilkko, 2011:19; Walker, 2014:41). The group has relied on 
charcoal revenues to finance and execute numerous plots against Somali, regional and 
international targets (Walker, 2014:42). The reason that Al Shabaab is able to make such 
large revenues from the sale of charcoal is linked to the demand for quality charcoal, 
particularly in the Gulf. The charcoal, made from Somali acacia trees, is prized as it burns for 
much longer when compared to charcoal from other states. Thus, the group is able to charge a 
much higher price for the charcoal and in turn generate large revenues (Charcoal and 
Terrorism in Somalia: A charred harvest, 2014:60). The continued trade of charcoal is thus 
vital to the operation of Al Shabaab as it plays a major part in financing the organization. 
Walker (2014:41) argues that Al Shabaab would be unable to conduct transnational terrorist 
attacks and rule important swathes of central and southern Somalia without the revenue from 
charcoal. Even though the port was lost by Al Shabaab to Kenyan Defence forces in 2012, it 
did not deal a blow to Al Shabaab’s revenue. In addition the UN, via UN Security Council 
Resolution 2036 of February 2012, issued a ban against the export of Somali charcoal, the 
main reason being that charcoal was used to finance terrorism (Walker, 2014:43). However, 
the ban has been observed to be mostly in breach. In actual fact since the “takeover” by 
Kenyan Defence Forces and the ban on Somali charcoal, Al Shabaab’s revenue from the port  
has increased. The revenues are derived from the taxes imposed on the transport of the 
charcoal as well as the “shares” in the smuggling business. Al Shabaab has been able to 
continue to finance, amongst other things, weapons imported from Yemen24 because of a 
profit-sharing agreement. According to a report presented to the UN Security Council, the 
profit generated through exports from Kismayo is divided between rebels, the region’s 
government and members of the Kenyan Defence Force (Charcoal and Terrorism in Somalia: 
A charred harvest, 2014:60). However, it is unlikely that a similar arrangement will be made 
with regard to the port of Barawe25, which Al Shabaab lost to SNA and AMISOM forces on 
the 3rd of October 2014 (Omar, 2014). The port was also used for the export of charcoal and 
                                               
24 Somalia’s geographical proximity to Yemen also aids in importing weapons. 
25 Thus far there have been no indications that AMISOM and SNA forces have colluded with Al Shabaab in a 
profit-sharing agreement.  
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the import of weapons and other goods (Omar, 2014). This is likely to affect Al Shabaab’s 
revenue negatively. 
Thus, through the above example one can clearly see that Al Shabaab has taken advantage of 
the channels of business and commerce, which have been created by the process of 
globalization. In this instance, globalization has indirectly facilitated the terrorist activities of 
Al Shabaab by allowing the group to generate revenue in order to finance operations. As was 
mentioned earlier it would be nearly impossible to conduct operations without the vital 
revenue generated through these channels. Thus, by being able to generate revenue Al 
Shabaab has been able to operate and conduct terrorist activity. Although the channels of 
business and commerce do not form part of Zimmermann’s model it should be added to the 
existing model as a means of funding terror, as the channel has served to create opportunities 
for terrorism.
In addition to exploiting the channels of business and commerce, there have been a number of 
reports that state that Al Shabaab has turned to piracy as a source of financing (Childress, 
2010; Keene, 2012; BBC, 2013a). According to Childress (2010) Al Shabaab has taxed the 
ransom extorted by Somali pirates and has also dispatched it own fighters to attack ships, 
especially American ships. The relationship between Al Shabaab and the pirates has been 
disputed, given diverging ideologies and motivations. However, Al Shabaab’s decline in 
popularity has led to a decline in external funding, including donations from the Somali 
diaspora (Keene, 2012). This decline in funding has thus made for some awkward bedfellows 
in Al Shabaab and the Somali pirates. It has been noted that Al Shabaab provides pirates with 
protection and allows them to move around in areas controlled by the group; in return Al 
Shabaab demands a commission on every ransom paid (Keene, 2012). In February 2011, Al 
Shabaab seized a number of pirate gang leaders and forced them to accept a multimillion-
dollar deal, which would have pirates paying a 20 percent commission on future ransoms to 
Al Shabaab (Lough, 2011). According to a Reuters investigation, a number of payments were 
made to Al Shabaab’s “marine office” in 2011. These include amongst others: on February 
25, $200 000 from the release of the Japanese owned MV Izumi after pirates received $4.5 
million in ransom; on March 9, $100 000 after the release of Singapore flagged MV York; 
and on April 13, $600 000 from the release of the German ship Beluga Nomination after the 
payment of a $5.5 million ransom. Pirates, Al Shabaab militants and residents of Haradhere26
                                               
26 Pirate haven north of Mogadishu. 
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verified the aforementioned amounts (Lough, 2011). 
4.3.3 Migration and “Irrelevance” of Boundaries
As was mentioned in Chapter 227, globalization has allowed for the “free” and easy flow of 
people across borders (Adamson, 2006:165). Globalization has effectively created a 
“migration channel” and this channel can be exploited by terrorist organizations. The 
following section will determine whether individuals have made use of these migration 
channels to join the ranks of Al Shabaab as fighters; whether Al Shabaab militants have made 
use of this migration channel in order to carry out terror attacks and in what way have they 
done so. Furthermore, it will also examine porous borders as an additional factor that has 
assisted the migration channel, especially concerning the launching of attacks. 
A number of sources confirm the presence of foreign fighters within the ranks of Al Shabaab. 
According to Terrance Ford, AFRICOM’s Director of Intelligence and Knowledge Develop-
ment, there were approximately 200 foreign fighters and another 1,000 ethnic Somalis from 
outside Somalia within Al Shabaab in September 2010 (Shinn, 2011:210). There were 
possibly between 200 and 300 non-Somali foreign jihadis fighting for the Al Shabaab cause. 
These non-Somali fighters were mainly from Saudi Arabia, Kenya’s Swahili coast, Sudan, 
Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Tanzania, Yemen, Uganda and Bangladesh (Shinn, 2011:210). 
One could argue that the presence of fighters from Yemen and Saudi Arabia is linked to 
Somalia’s  geographical proximity to the Middle East. Furthermore, proximity coupled with 
globalization’s channels of migration has facilitated and possibly even exacerbated the influx 
of jihadis into Somalia.28 In addition, the migration of these jihadis from their home nations 
into Somalia could possibly be attributed to the porous borders of many African states, 
especially those bordering Somalia. There are however fighters from what one would term 
Western states, such as the US, the United Kingdom, Canada and Denmark. The majority are 
of Somali descent (Harper, 2012:98-99). 
Shinn (2011:211) argues that though the foreign element of Al Shabaab is usually involved in 
planning activities such as suicide bombing, there are several who have acted as suicide 
bombers. For example in October 2008, the US’s first known suicide bomber, Shirwa 
Ahmed from Minneapolis, drove into a group of people with a vehicle loaded with explosives. 
                                               
27 See page 31.
28 The loss of the port of Barawe is likely to negatively impact the “migration” of foreign fighters as the port 
was used to bring in fighters from abroad (Omar, 2014).
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The attack killed thirty people in Puntland in the northern part of Somalia (Shinn, 2011:211). 
In the next year, a Somali-American from Seattle was one of two suicide bombers who drove 
into the AU force headquarters in Mogadishu, with vehicles bearing a UN logo. The suicide 
attack killed 21 peacekeepers. In another incident, a Dane of Somali descent blew himself up 
at a hotel in Mogadishu during a college graduation ceremony during December 2009 which 
resulted in the death of 24 people, 3 of whom were government ministers (Shinn, 2011:211). 
In September 2010, a Somali-American, Dahir Gurey Sheikh Ali Guled, died on the streets of 
Mogadishu following a battle with pro- government forces. An estimated twelve U.S. citizens 
have been killed fighting alongside Al Shabaab in Somalia (Shinn, 2011:211). 
The most prominent example of foreign jihadis fighting for Al Shabaab was in the Westgate 
Mall attack.  The Al Shabaab militants responsible for this attack comprise a number of 
nationalities. Following the attack, Al Shabaab released a list of those involved in the attack. 
According to the list, there were three Americans, one Canadian, one from the United 
Kingdom, one Finn, two Somalis and one Kenyan (Onuoha, 2013a:4). It is interesting to note 
that two-thirds of the militants hail from Western states, albeit from the Somali diaspora. This 
showcases the reach that Al Shabaab has across the globe. All of these militants were trained 
in Somalia, where the terrorist cell is situated (Karimi, Almasy & Leposo, 2013).
Samantha Lewthwaite, a British citizen, better known as the “White Widow” (she was 
married to one of the 7/7 London bombers) was allegedly involved in the Westgate attack 
(Van Zuijdewijn & Bakker, 2014:8; Crawford, 2014). According to Kenyan intelligence 
authorities, Lewthwaite and her husband, Salim, pose a major threat to security as they are 
working at a high level in Al Shabaab; and have been responsible for planning bombing raids 
within Somalia and Kenya. Furthermore, Lewthwaite is also considered to be an important 
banker/logistician to Al Shabaab, she is believed to be the logistician of a six-person terror 
cell (Tomlinson, 2014; Crawford, 2014). Interpol issued a Red Notice for her arrest in 
September 2013. However, Lewthwaite has evaded capture and is still wanted for prosecution 
by Kenyan authorities (INTERPOL, 2013). In comparison, to the majority of other foreign 
fighters in Al Shabaab, Lewthwaite was raised in what one could consider a Western family. 
She defies the norm of a typical foreign jihadist. 
The fact that the militants came from countries across the world showcases the ease with 
which individuals can “migrate” across international borders. Furthermore, one can cite 
porous borders as possibly facilitating the movement of militants from Somalia into Kenya, 
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in order to launch the attack. For example, Lewthwaite and her husband Salim have been 
known to cross the porous border between the two countries (Tomlinson, 2014). In addition, 
every year hundreds of millions of individuals, including terrorists are making use of 
international transport and crossing national/international borders without having the 
authenticity of their travel or identity documents checked. This makes it extremely difficult 
for organizations such as INTERPOL to effectively screen and identify suspected terrorists at 
airports and land crossings. For example, Lewthwaite used a fraudulently obtained South 
African passport (INTERPOL, 2013). It is highly unlikely that she is the only one to do so. 
It thus clear that foreign jihadis have taken up the banner for Al Shabaab and are willing to 
die for the cause. The reasons behind joining Al Shabaab may vary, but one could argue that 
the channels of migration have facilitated the movement of terrorists and thus facilitated 
terrorist activity. Again, the “migration” channel does not relate to Zimmermann’s causal 
model, as the model only refers to immigration of workers. In the case of Al Shabaab there 
has been an “immigration” of fighters. Thus, it should be considered that the concept of 
immigration be widened to include fighters as well. Thus, globalization would lead to the 
creation of a migration channel which facilitates the movement of fighters which in turn 
creates opportunities for terrorism. 
4.4 Globalization as Incentive for Acts of Terror 
According to the preceding chapters, globalization is often seen as a motivating factor for 
terrorist activity. The purpose of the following section is to examine whether the different 
facets of globalization have indeed led to increased terrorist activity, perpetrated by Al 
Shabaab, within Somalia and the surrounding area of the Horn of Africa. It will do this by 
consulting Zimmermann’s causal model and looking specifically at how the threat of corrupt 
culture, as well as increasing inequality and poverty have contributed to and encouraged 
terrorist activity. 
4.4.1 Threat of Corrupt Culture
According to Zimmermann’s causal model, globalization is believed to spread/export foreign 
“corrupt cultures.” It is also believed to lead to changes in values, which is arguably triggered 
by the infiltration of foreign “corrupt” cultures. The spread of foreign and perceived corrupt 
cultures then create incentives for terrorism (2011:S158). Globalization is seen as spreading 
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corrupt/foreign culture, because it is often associated with Westernization and 
Americanization. The culture associated with Westernization/Americanization is perceived to 
erode indigenous and “conservative” cultures. These changes in values are said to cause 
distortions in local communities. The purpose of this subsection is to determine whether 
Zimmermann’s causal model holds true in the Somalian environment and surrounding states 
in the Horn of Africa.
The continuous spread of globalization has been accompanied by a spread in consumerism. 
The extensive spread of consumerism is clearly visible in the large number of shopping 
centres spread throughout the globe. As consumerism is associated with Western and 
American values it is often dismissed and seen as distorting conservative values. The 
Westgate Mall attack in Kenya on 21 September 2013 (lasting until 24 September) could 
serve as an example of where consumerism, which is part of a foreign “corrupt” culture, 
served as an incentive for Al Shabaab to attack the centre. The Westgate Mall is essentially a 
symbol of Western culture, it cultivates and is associated with the abhorred notion of 
consumerism. The view that foreign/corrupt culture in the form of consumerism can be seen 
as a possible reason for the choice of target is shared by others. McConnell (2013) argues that 
the Westgate Mall is symbolic of everything that the group abhors. He characterizes it as a 
temple of Western consumerism, where one can buy expensive products such as iPhones, 
watch movies and drink cocktails – the consumption of alcohol is prohibited in Islam. 
Furthermore, the activities that malls offer attract individuals whom Al Shabaab perceives as 
being corrupted by the decadence of Western culture. Thus, by choosing this specific target 
the group struck at “the heart and soul of a society [it] despises” (McConnell, 2013). It is 
important to note that the threat of corrupt culture is only a possible reason for the choice in 
target, and is not necessarily the reason behind the attack.  
Furthermore, as much as 98 percent of respondents in a study (88 former Al Shabaab fighters 
were interviewed) perceived Islam to be under threat and that it needed to be defended by the 
actions of Al Shabaab (Botha & Abdile, 2014:6). This threat was often associated with non-
Muslim countries. In addition, many were told by “preachers” that the Christian crusaders 
(possibly Ethiopians, individuals/organizations) from the West had invaded their beloved 
country and were in the process of attempting to convert Somalis to Christianity (Botha & 
Abdile, 2014:6). This provides further proof that Al Shabaab perceives Somalia to be under 
threat of corrupt culture. 
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It is important to note that shortly after the incidents of 9/11, the US froze the assets of 
Somalia’s largest remittance agency, al-Barakat, an important pillar of Somalia’s economy. 
As the company’s bank accounts were frozen, it meant that Somalis in the diaspora were 
unable to send money home to their relatives who were dependent on the remittances for 
survival. This also meant that many Somalis lost money (Harper, 2012:168). Less than a year 
after freezing the assents, al-Barakat was removed from the US terror list, given that there 
was insuficient evidence to prove that it seved as a conduit for Al Qaeda finances. 
Unfortunately, this proved too late as the US had already alienated many Somalis by severing 
a lifeline for hundreds of thousands of people (Harper, 2012:168). As a result, many Somalis 
now perceive the US in a negative light, and arguably that which it represents, in other words, 
globalization. 
In addition, US action in the form assassination, interrogation and bombing, has led to the US 
being perceived as an enemy of Somalia. As a result of this Al Shabaab regards humanitarian 
aid as a tool of Western political strategy, which one can equate with globalization, and thus 
refuses to allow the majority of Western aid agencies access to the country (Bunting, 2011). 
In 2011, a severe famine hit two areas controlled by Al Shabaab. The UN worked carefully to 
discuss with Al Shabaab the delivery of aid to these areas and had made some progress. 
Unfortunately, the US then announced that they would also be channelling aid to the famine 
stricken areas.  As a result, Al Shabaab refused not only the US, but also other foreign aid 
agencies access to the areas. This was mostly as a result of Al Shabaab’s hatred of the US 
(Harper, 2012:182–183).  However, one could also argue that if Western aid agencies were 
allowed to deliver the much needed food to starving Somalis, these Somalis would possibly 
have seen the West as their saviours, which could have damaged the view that the West is an 
enemy – a view that Al Shabaab needed to keep in place in order to maintain their position of 
authority.  
Al Shabaab’s hatred of Westernization is clear when one examines its attacks on targets of 
Western origin or associated with Westernization. Since the US labelled Al Shabaab a 
Foreign Terrorist organization in October 2008, the organization has made clear its intent to 
target Western interests both within and outside the Somalian state. There are numerous 
examples of such attacks. For example in April 2009, the group fired mortar shells at the 
plane of a US congressman as the plane was lifting off from a Somalia airport (TRAC, 2014). 
Another example is the Christmas Day attacks, mentioned earlier, on the main AU base in 
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Somalia. The group was targeting a Christmas party (Western tradition) at the base; 
furthermore the base also houses Western embassies and UN offices. These are clearly 
Western targets. The group has also launched a limited number of attacks against educational 
institutions offering Western education; between 2011 and 2014 the group launched nine 
attacks (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START), 2015e). The most significant attack against an educational institution is that of the 
Garissa Univeristy College attack mentioned previously. As stated, the attack was launched 
in retaliation to Kenya’s war against Al Shabaab; therefore the university’s link to 
“Westernization” did not serve as an incentive; however, just like the Westgate Mall, its 
symbolism could have informed the choice of target.
One is therefore able to argue that the spread of “corrupt” Western culture (exported by 
globalization) into Somalia and other areas in the Horn of Africa, most prominently Kenya, 
has played a definitive role in the selection of targets by Al Shabaab. The spread of 
globalization, Westernization and those that are seen to embody it has in some sense led to an 
increase in terrorist activity in Somalia as well as in Kenya. 
4.4.2 Increasing Inequality and Poverty
Most scholars will agree that globalization has led to increasing inequality and has widened 
the gap between the rich and the poor. Zimmermann’s model links globalization to an 
increase in economic and social inequality, in other words, the societal polarization within 
countries. Furthermore, increasing economic and social inequality is also linked to a 
weakened state (the result of globalization), as the state no longer has the ability to protect the 
economically disadvantaged groups against the challenges of the global economy. The model 
links economic and social inequality to opportunities for terrorist activity (Zimmermann, 
2011:S155). The purpose of this section is to determine whether these links are present in the 
case of Somalia and the Horn of Africa region; in other words, whether increased inequality 
and poverty can be linked to globalization and a weakening of the state; and then 
subsequently create opportunities for terrorist activity in Somalia and neighbouring states. In 
order to determine the above stated aims it is important to examine the ways in which 
globalization (modernization) has changed and impacted the Somali state. 
According to Ukpere (2011:6072) the current form of globalization has aggravated the 
problem of unemployment, the repercussions of which translates to widespread income 
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inequality and mass poverty in Africa. In actual fact, the “trickle down economy pattern” has 
constantly failed African states and its citizens. Thus, what is good for Wall Street, in other 
words the West, is not necessarily good for Africa.  Furthermore, no matter the angle one 
views it from, its seems as if the African continent has been marginalized and left behind by 
globalization. Thus, it is for the most part a loser of globalization. One cannot deny that 
capitalist globalization has created wealth in Africa, but it has also led to an intensification of 
inequality and poverty (Ukpere, 2011:6072). Many African states boast incredibly high 
growth rates, however higer Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures do not translate into 
greater equality and employment. In addition, in many cases the wealth generated by these 
economies is held by a small group of elites, whilst a large portion of the  population remain 
desitute and never see any benefits from the so-called benefits of globalization (Ukpere, 
2011:6072). Ukpere’s argument ties in with the first part of one of the links in Zimmerman’s 
model, namely that globalization has led to increased economic inequality and 
marginalization. However, this relates to Africa as a whole rather than to Somalia and the 
Horn of Africa, specifically. Thus, it is vital to look at this in the context of Somalia and the 
Horn of Africa. 
Webersik (2004:517) argues that the process of modernization (globalization) played a major 
role in shaping violence in Somalia. The Somali state underwent drastic changes in its 
“transformation” from a pre-capitalist to a capitalist society, whereby the  modes of 
production changed. Ohanwe (2009:139) agrees that the transformation of Somali society as 
well as the integration of Somalia into the world economy, lies at the root of societal conflict. 
The inclusion of the Somali state into the world economy resulted in a capitalist order arising, 
which in turn gave rise to competition between pastoralists, an influx of people to cities 
(presumably in search of jobs), as well as increased opportunities for individuals or groups to 
make profits by engaging in transnational economic activities, thus using the channels of 
business and commerce, which were most likely illegal (Pettersson, 2011:75). Pettersson 
(2011:750) further argues that the changes brought about by the processes of modernization 
and globalization within traditional Somali society have increased social tensions and have 
made a contribtion to the outbreak of conflict.
According to Ross (2013), as well as a report by the United Nations Development 
Programme (2012), there are some social grievances present in Kenya, Somalia and the rest 
of the Horn of Africa region, such as marginalization, that will encourage individuals to 
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either join the ranks of Al Shabaab or other networks allied to Al Qaeda. These grievances 
can possibly be linked to the effects of globalization. 
This is especially true in the big cities, where there will always be individuals who feel that 
they are not being given a chance or that they are being left behind. In particular, younger 
men feel that they are often overlooked and are not being given the same opportunities they 
see others being given, in other words, inequality of opportunity arises (Ross, 2013). One 
could then argue that this marginalization serves as a push factor for individuals, especially 
for younger men, to join Al Shabaab as they are at least given an opportunity to do something 
with their lives. Abdulkadir (2012:4; 7) states that Al Shabaab recruits young men through 
promises of financial security. These men are often disillusioned and they tend to be 
encouraged by the group’s leadership. Al Shabaab thus gives these men the opportunity of  a 
“better” and more “comfortable” life. It offers them a chance to escape a life lived in poverty. 
Hassan (2012:18) cites unemployment as a major push factor in young Somalis joining the 
ranks of Al Shabaab. Carter (2012:70) adds that Al Shabaab has taken advantage of 
unemployment in Somalia by offering generous salaries with benefits to potential young 
fighters. According to the findings of a focus group of 15 former Al Shabaab members, 5 out 
of the 15 indicated that joining Al Shabaab provided them with a form of employment. In 
addition, Al Shabaab provided a decent monthly salary without requiring much effort – they 
merely had to carry around a gun and patrol streets. Thus, being able to provide for 
themselves and their families played a major part in the decision to join Al Shabaab. Hassan 
(2012:18) adds that poverty does not directly encourage the joining of Al Shabaab, but rather 
the low self-esteem and idleness that is caused by it. The fact that a large majority of Somali 
youth are unemployed and rely on relatives for provision, either in Somalia or in the diaspora, 
crushes their self-worth in such a way that when an opportunity to fend for themselves arises, 
they are quick to take advantage (Hassan, 2012:18).
A recent study by Botha and Abdile (2014:5) agrees that unemployment has been a major 
push factor in young Somalis joining Al Shabaab. In their study of 88 respondents (former Al 
Shabaab fighters) 27 percent indicated that they joined Al Shabaab for economic reasons. 
These individuals essentially saw Al Shabaab as a potential employer, as they were allegedly 
being paid between $150 and $500 per month. This is somewhat contradictory to Hassan’s 
argument that states that poverty (which can be caused by unemployment) does not directly 
encourage the joining of Al Shabaab.
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The above clearly supports the argument that social inequality creates opportunities for 
terrorism, as it encourages individuals to join the ranks of Al Shabaab in an effort to make 
something of their lives. However, there is no clear evidence that links globalization to social 
inequality, poverty, and unemployment in Somalia. The high level of social ineqaulity,
poverty, and unemployment is attributed to factors such as: a weak and distorted economy 
brought about by corruption and civil war, amongst others; uneven power and weak 
insitutions; inter-group inequalities, where some clans are favoured whilst others are 
marginalized; and the youth bulge, (where the number of youths entering the job market is 
too high) which is possibly the major contributor, causing the supply to far exceed the 
demand (United Nations Development Programme, 2012:18–40). One could therefore argue 
that the aforementioned factors are partly repsonsible for encouraging individuals to join 
groups such as Al Shabaab. However, the available evidence does not support the notion that 
globalization has exacerbated unemployment and poverty, which are considered to be driving 
factors of terrorism, in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.
4.5 Globalization as Motivating Factor in the Rise of Al Shabaab
If one considers globalization as a means of standardizing the world, and terrorism is a form 
of resistance to that, then terrorism can be viewed as a subset of the anti-globalization 
movement (Perry, 2008:20). This is the case when one looks at the fact that globalization 
played a prominent role in motivating the rise of Al Shabaab. “In Somalia, US-backed 
Ethiopian soldiers fought to crush an al-Qaeda offshoot [Al Shabaab] that espoused the most 
extreme end of Islamic exceptionalism” (Perry, 2008:21). These US-backed Ethiopian 
soldiers were globalizers whilst Al Shabaab could be viewed as anti-globalizers.  According 
to an Al Shabaab commander in Mogadishu, Mohammed Mahmood Ali, the US presence had 
“invigorated the resistance.”  America’s aggression aided the organization in gaining support
(Perry, 2008:213). This is supported by the fact that the US, in the flesh, was raining down 
death and destruction on Somalis and “muscling in on Africa as though it were part of a 
grand White House Scheme to preserve the US’s place at the top of an unfair world order” 
(Perry, 2008:214). Al Shabaab was of the opinion that the only reason for US soldiers to 
travel to Somalia was the hatred of Islam. Al Shabaab fighters essentially saw themselves as 
victims fighting the evil America, a bastion of globalization (Perry, 2008:214). 
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There are many others scholars who agree with Perry such as Agbiboa (2014a) who states 
that the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006 played a major role in the 
development and radicalization of Al Shabaab. The invasion unearthed major internal 
rivalries within the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), pitting the moderate leaders of the ICU 
against the more radical elements that would later emerge as Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab 
emerged victorious from the power struggle, effectively dismantling the leadership of the 
moderate leaders (Abdulkadir, 2012:3). 
Menkhaus (2009:226) adds that thousands of Somalis were radicalized by their inhumane 
treatment – by means of looting, assault and rape – at the hands of the TFG and Ethiopian 
forces (backed by the US). Their radicalization led them either to becoming active or passive 
supporters of the increasingly violent and radical Al Shabaab (Menkhaus, 2009:226). Thus, 
the radicalization of “normal” Somalis played a major part in the rise of Al Shabaab. 
Menkhaus (2009:231) goes further in stating that most Somalis are convinced that the 
Ethiopian invasion and occupation was authorized and directed by the US. They are not 
entirely wrong as the US played a major part in sourcing development and military assistance 
to Ethiopia; within the UN Security Council they shielded Ethiopia from criticism of its 
occupation of Somalia; collaborated with the Ethiopians as well as the TFG in multiple cases 
of interrogation (usually inhumane) of Somalis suspected of involvement in terrorismand 
engaged in gunship and missile attacks on suspected terrorist targets (Menkhaus, 2009:231).  
Harper (2012:172) supports the above notion in stating that in concert with the Ethiopian 
invasion, the US carried out a number of air strikes against senior Al Qaeda members and 
other Islamist suspects purportedly hiding in Somalia. However, the majority of these 
airstirkes did not hit the intended targets (if they were even in Somalia at the time), instead 
they killed civilians as well as livestock. This resulted in futher alienation of the Somali 
people and could have played a role in provoking more Somalis into joining radical and 
violent “religious” groups such as Al Shabaab (Harper, 2012:172).  Menkhaus and Harper are 
in agreement with Perry with regard to America raining down death and destruction on 
Somalis and in the process alienating them.  As a result of the aforementioned events, anti-
American and anti-Western sentiment rose and this posed the risk of more Somalis becoming 
passive or active supporters of Al Shabaab, which was the case. 
Thus, one can argue that globalization played a definite part, albeit not the only part, in the 
rise of Al Shabaab. It served as a means of radicalizing the group as well as radicalizing 
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ordinary Somalis, and encouraging them to support or even join the group. If it were not for 
the involvement of the West and its “pawns” in Somalia, it is possible that Al Shabaab would 
not have become the radical organization it is today. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to apply the theoretical frameworks, namely Mittelmann’s 
theory of hyperconflict and Zimmermann’s causal model to the case study of Somalia (and 
the Horn of Africa region) and Al Shabaab, and to determine whether this case study fits the 
aforementioned frameworks. In the case of Mittelman’s theory of hyperconflict, it seems 
clear that this case study corresponds to the the characteristics of hyperconflict. It is possible 
to argue that Al Shabaab has engulfed Somalia and parts of the Horn of Africa region in a 
condition of hyperconflict. With reference to Zimmermann’s causal model, the case study 
corresponds to some sections of the model, for example the threat of corrupt culture, the 
impact of technology, the impact of migration and channels of migration as well as the 
channels of business and commerce. However, there is insufficient evidence for the case 
study to correspond to globalization leading to social inequality and then perpetuating 
terrorism. The above findings will be analysed more in depth in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5: Boko Haram: The Scourge of 
Globalization
5.1 Introduction
This chapter will focus specifically on how globalization as a whole has impacted on the 
security environment and created a climate for acts of terror within the Nigerian state, 
especially in the northern region. This chapter will follow an outline similar to that in Chapter 
4. The purpose of this chapter is to determine whether the Nigerian case serves as an example 
of hyperconflict as developed by Mittelman and discussed in Chapter 3. It also seeks to 
determine how the different facets of globalization, for example technological advances, 
improved transportation networks and lowering of barriers to trade and commerce, have 
enabled Boko Haram to more easily commit acts of terror. It will also examine whether the 
effects of globalization have encouraged the terrorist organization to commit acts of terror. It 
will refer back to Zimmermann’s causal model when exploring these sections.  In addition, it 
will also explore if and how globalization itself has served as a motivating factor in the rise of 
Boko Haram, specifically relating to its anti-Western stance. 
5.2 Hyperconflict and Nigeria
The following section will examine the security environment of Nigeria within the context of 
hyperconflict. The purpose of this section is to determine whether hyperconflict has erupted 
or is in the process of erupting in Nigeria.29 In order to do so, it will begin by examining the 
factors responsible for hyperconflict and determine whether these factors are present in the 
case of Nigeria. The first factor that will be discussed is a decline in legitimacy which will be 
followed by a comparison of the characteristics of hyperconflict and the case of the Nigerian 
state.
5.2.1 Legitimacy and State Failure
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Mittelman (2010:23) argues that hyperconflict can be seen to 
arise from a decline in legitimacy. It is vital that power holders have legitimacy if they are to 
exercise their power effectively.  A decline in their legitimacy will make it problematic for 
                                               
29 See Map of Nigeria in Appendix C.
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power holders to ensure that people, in this case citizens, obey the rules and orders as set out 
by power holders. A decline in and a lack of legitimacy can arise for a number of reasons; 
these will be identified and discussed in the following paragraphs. 
One of the major contributors to declining legitimacy is corruption. According to Forest 
(2012:5), government corruption is often cited as a driver of collective political violence. In 
states where corruption is rampant, resources, privileges and advantages are reserved for a 
select group of people, the ruling elite. Corruption impedes the fair distribution of social 
goods and services, whilst simultaneously adding to the resentment caused by a lack of 
political participation by the rest of society, as they have no voice. Corruption then essentially 
erodes the legitimacy of government in the eyes of its people (Forest, 2012:6).  Nigeria has 
consistently been ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world.30 In Nigeria, as in 
much of West Africa, statist economic policies – “building on the early post-independence 
nationalization of former colonial private industries” – combined with patronage systems, 
created an environment in which the state no longer fulfilled its purpose of serving its people, 
but instead became a means to access wealth (Forest, 2012:6). Thus, the Nigerian state has to 
an extent failed to adhere to the social contract between government and the people. Boko 
Haram has often cited that corruption is one of the drivers behind its campaign of terror 
(Forest, 2012:6). 
Furthermore, the widely acknowledged levels of corruption among elites greatly detract from 
the effectiveness of the Nigerian government. Patronage and corruption fuel a perception
amongst citizens that government officials (including law enforcement) cannot be trusted. 
This distrust in turn further undermines the legitimacy of the government as well as its ability 
to positively influence the behavior of its citizens, “away from the [appeal] of radical 
extremist ideologies like that of Boko Haram” (Forest, 2012:16). The distrust of government 
has created a fragile relationship between the state and its citizens. This can arguably be 
traced back to decades of plundering of massive oil resources by kleptocratic leaders (Forest, 
2012:20). A report by International Crisis Group (2014b:2) adds that elites from all factions –
                                               
30 According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions index of 2014, Nigeria is ranked 136th out 
of 175 countries. Nigeria was given a score of 27 (where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean); it improved 
upon its 2013 ranking by 2 points; however it is still categorized amongst the world’s most corrupt countries 
(Transparency International, 2014). In addition, Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer of 
2013 found that 72 percent of respondents felt that corruption had increased in the last two years (Transparency 
International, 2013).
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political, economic, bureaucratic, traditional, and religious – have been lured into a political 
economy characterized by massive oil receipts.
It is important to note that corruption is not a new phenomenon, but rather a trait that has 
been present throughout Nigeria's history. For example, during the 1990s, the Sani Abacha 
regime set the standard for plundering the resources of the Nigerian state. Under this regime, 
money was stolen openly and with “impunity,” (some estimates place the money stolen at 
more than $8 billion). Furthermore, those responsible were never held accountable for their 
crimes. The system that enabled such robbery is still in place today; where resources are 
channeled through state entities that control access to jobs and wealth. This endemic 
corruption has denied millions opportunities. According to former World Bank Vice 
President for Africa Dr Obiageli Ezekwesili, Nigeria has lost over $400 billion to large-scale 
corruption since independence in 1960 (International Crisis Group, 2014b:2). In addition, 
often the only way to make money is to hold a position in government, as these officials have 
access to large amounts of resources. “A university professor’s salary is 400,000 naira 
(roughly $2,500) per month, while a local government chairman’s salary is 1.2 million naira 
(over $7,500) per month” (Forest, 2012:32). 
As mentioned earlier, the Nigerian people distrust the government, thus it is not strange that 
their views about the government are extremely negative. The Nigerian people have 
widespread grievances, which can be cited as drivers of not only distrust but also conflict and 
violence, which further exacerbates the challenges faced by the government (Forest, 2012:21). 
The distrust of government is supported by grievances such as corruption (mentioned earlier), 
cronyism, a lack of service delivery, including a lack of reliable electricity (which has led to a 
chronic energy shortage), and low quality education amongst others (Forest, 2012:30–31; 
International Crisis Group, 2014b). The aforementioned grievances, have, on the one hand, 
led many Nigerian citizens to place their trust in other forms of governance and economic 
systems.  One could argue that Nigerian people no longer view the Nigerian government as 
legitimate. On the other hand, many have done whatever they can to get what they can from 
the system of central governance that they ironically view as ineffective and untrustworthy 
(Forest, 2012:30–31). 
The rampant corruption in Nigeria could possibly see it becoming a failed state. According to 
Bamidele (2012:32) Nigeria seems to meet the criteria of a failed state such as Somalia. In 
failed states, as was seen in the previous chapter, terrorists are often able to operate without 
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restraint, plan sophisticated attacks and stockpile weapons; this is not because government 
officials support and sponsor these people, but merely because they lack the political will to 
bring the terrorists to justice (Bamidele, 2012: 32). Thus Adegbulu (2013:271) argues that 
Boko Haram is the product of a society presided over by incompetent and corrupt leadership 
in a system that deprives people of their means of livelihood and leads them to suffer despite 
living in a country with abundant natural resources. 
5.2.2 Characteristics of Hyperconflict
The purpose of this section is to determine whether the Somali case fits the characteristics of 
hyperconflict as described by Mittelman. It will do so by briefly reminding the reader of the 
characteristics of hyperconflict before applying these to the case of Nigeria and Boko Haram. 
It will only discuss those characteristics which relate to the case study. 
5.2.2.1 Potential to Engulf
First, hyperconflict is at the present time in a nascent phase, in other words it is just 
beginning to come into existence and display signs of future “potential.” Thus, one could 
possibly argue that it has the potential to engulf the entire global populace, or at least a large 
section of the global populace in a situation of hyperconflict (Mittelman, 2011:15). For the 
most part Boko Haram represented a threat to only the Nigerian state. In 2011, Cook 
(2014:22) predicted that one of the signs pointing to Boko Haram becoming a globalist 
Salafi-jihadi group, as opposed to having aspirations restricted to Nigeria only, would be that 
it would comence operations in the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Niger and Chad. 
Thus, with recent events involving Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin, Boko Haram has 
threatened regional security and it seems as though Cook’s prediction has held true. The 
AU’s approval of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), 31 consisting of 8700 
military police and civilian personnel (African Union, 2015) could add further fuel to the fire 
and engulf the aforementioned nations in hyperconflict. According to Pham (2012:1), Boko 
Haram may evolve into a transnational threat, given its links with other terrorist groups in 
North, West and East Africa (Al Shabaab). 
The state, apart from Nigeria, that has suffered the most at the hands of Boko Haram is 
Cameroon. For the most part of the 2011 to 2014 period, Boko Haram avoided launching a 
                                               
31 Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria.
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major operation in Cameroon, instead utilizing it as a cash cow (Cook, 2014:22). Thus, when 
the group was in need of funds, it kidnapped Westerners as well as other foreigners in 
northern Cameroon, who would then be held for ransom. According to reports all the 
kidnappings were allegedly coordinated by Boko Haram with the Ansaru32 (Cook, 2014:22).
However, for the past two years, Boko Haram has been carrying out cross-border attacks and 
raids on Cameroon, in the process slaughtering hundreds and torching enitre neighberhoods 
(Chimtom, 2015). Cameroon has come under increasing pressure since the beginning of 2014, 
with its elite Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) losing dozens of men in the fight against 
Boko Haram. Approxiamtely 1000 men from BIR, trained by US and Israeli forces, have 
been deployed along the porous 500 km border with Nigeria. This has been done in an 
attempt to protect the border and to keep it intact, as Boko Haram forces are advancing in the 
region (BBC, 2014b). In mid-2014, Boko Haram embarked on an increasingly aggressive 
strategy towards Cameroon. In an alleged response to growing Cameroonian resistance 
towards the group, Boko Haram carried out several attacks against the Cameroonian 
government and security forces between July and September (Waddington, 2014:49). On 27 
July, the group conducted a raid on the border town of Fotokol, resulting in the kidnapping of 
the vice-prime minister’s wife, even though the target was the prime minister himself. 
Analysts regard this as a direct response to Cameroon’s then recent agreement to support 
regional efforts to counteract the group. The vice-prime minister’s wife, along with other 
hostages, was released in October (Waddington, 2014:49). In late 2014 a further 2000 
soldiers were dispatched to the border region (BBC, 2014b). On 29 December 2014, Boko 
Haram militants attacked the Assighasia camp in northern Cameroon; Cameroonian forces 
had to withdraw after trying to defend the position. This was the first time that Boko Haram 
had successfully taken a military base in Cameroon. Shortly after the attack, Cameroonian 
President Paul Biya personally ordered an air strike on the base, after which Boko Haram 
fighters were forced to flee (Al Jazeera, 2014a). 
The Cameroonian military are also of the opinion that Boko Haram is determined to seize 
several of the border towns in Cameroon in order to expand its caliphate into the far north of 
Cameroon. Furthermore, there is also a belief that the group has recruited fighters in
                                               
32 Ansaru is a Boko Haram splinter group, which announced its breakaway from Boko Haram on 1 January 2012 
(International Crisis Group, 2014b:26).
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Cameroon (Al Jazeera, 2014a).  If this is true, Cameroon will be engulfed in even more 
violence and conflict.
In February, Boko Haram expanded its attacks to another neighbor, this time Niger. 
According to reports, the group attacked the border towns of Bossa and Diffa before being 
pushed back by Nigerien security forces. The fighting claimed the lives of four soldiers and 
one civilian, whilst Boko Haram suffered the loss of 109 fighters (Al Jazeera, 2015d). Since 
then, southern Niger has been attacked numerous times. In April, Boko Haram’s deadliest 
attack on Niger claimed the lives of 74 people, 46 of whom were soldiers. In June the group 
launched yet another deadly attack, which claimed the lives of 38 people (AFP, 2015). 
Earlier this year, Boko Haram carried out its first attack on Chadian soil, leaving 10 dead. 
This attack was without a doubt the result of Chad’s participation in the MNJTF, as well as 
its successes against Boko Haram. The Chadian military has conducted airstrikes against the 
group in both Nigeria and Niger and now they are paying the price (BBC, 2015b). On 15 
June 2015, Boko Haram carried out its most deadly attack on Chad, with twin suicide 
bombings in the capital city of N’Djamena. The attacks killed at least 34 people. The Chadian 
military responded with a series of airstrikes on Boko Haram bases in Nigeria33 (Nako, 2015). 
Thus, Chad has also been effectively embroiled in Boko Haram’s hyperconflict. 
When one takes the above into account it becomes clear that Boko Haram has engulfed 
neighbouring states in a situation of hyperconflict. The involvement of Cameroon, Niger and 
Chad in the MNJTF has undoubtedly contributed to the situation. Their involvement and 
successes against Boko Haram, sparked revenge attacks by the group that in turn led to 
retaliatory attacks by the respective militaries against Boko Haram. It is thus fair to argue that 
the Boko Haram case corresponds to Mittelmann’s first characteristic of hyperconflict. 
5.2.2.2 Shift from Prior Patterns
Second, the development of globalization leads to a shift rather than a complete break from 
prior patterns of conflict/violence. This does not merely constitute a simple shift from 
interstate to domestic violence as the major source of conflict. In addition many cases of 
political violence do not fit neatly in one category (Mittelman, 2012:14). The 
                                               
33 Nigerian authorities denied the Chadian military’s reports, suggesting that their airstrikes hit in neighbouring 
Niger instead.
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conflict/violence brought about by Boko Haram relates to this characteristic of hyperconflict 
in that it does not fit into one category. The Boko Haram case portrays characteristics of both 
interstate and domestic conflict as seen in the previous section. The characteristics of 
interstate violence/conflict can be seen in Boko Haram’s engagement with the militaries of 
the MNJTF and its attacks on targets in neighbouring countries while its attacks on areas and 
individuals/groups in Nigeria relate to domestic conflict/terrorism.
5.2.2.3 Boiling over, with a chance of spillovers 
Third, hyperconflict is seen to be boiling over with a potential for spillovers. It is important to 
note that hyperconflict does not erupt automatically; in all instances where it does erupt, it 
“merges with the complexity of history.” According to Pham (2012:1), the emergence of 
Boko Haram, and thus the conflict in Nigeria, cannot be understood without placing it in the 
context of the social, religious, economic and political background of nothern Nigeria. It is 
important to note that the context has been created by the past. Thus, it is key to examine the 
complexity of Nigeria’s history as it has a definite impact on the conflict seen today. 
Unemployment and illiteracy rates are highest in the northern areas of Nigeria, where 
Muslims are predominant and where Boko Haram mainly operates (Forest, 2012:5). One can 
trace these high levels of unemployment and illiteracy to colonial times, where the British 
had a policy of non-intervention in the north of Nigeria. During British colonial rule, 
Christian missionaries founded schools in the south, but not in the north. As a result of the 
British policy of non-intervention those in northern Nigeria did not receive the benefits of 
Western education. The outcome of this is a lasting and destabilizing North/South dichotomy 
(Hackket, 2003). Without a doubt, the inequality and poverty prevalent in Nigeria today, has 
links to past policies of the colonial period. Furthermore, inequality, unemployment and 
poverty, which can be linked to illiteracy in some cases, have fuelled conflict in northern 
Nigeria. 34 Thus, one can argue that the abovementioned factors correlate with this 
characteristic of Mittelman’s hyperconflict, in other words that hyperconflict does not just 
erupt automatically, but in all instances it “merges with the complexity of history”
(Mittelman, 2011:15). 
                                               
34 This will be discussed in greater detail in section 5.4.2 Inequality and Poverty.
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5.2.2.4 Increased Violence is the Order of the Day
Fourth, in this era of hyperconflict a decrease in armed conflicts, whether domestic or 
international, does not necessarily mean less violence or even more security from the threat 
of political terror. In the case of northern Nigeria, Boko Haram has launched an increasing 
number of deadly assaults against the Nigerian people as well as others. The conflict in 
Nigeria corresponds to one part of this characteristic of hyperconflict and that is that 
increased violence and less security are the order of the day. For example, since late 2010, 
Boko Haram has been the perpetrator of a brutal campaign of terror attacks against public 
officials and institutions, and increasingly, against ordinary men, women and children (Pham, 
2012:1). According to Pate (2015:18), Boko Haram’s violence greatly increased in terms of 
frequency of attacks, lethality and scope of target since Abubakar bin Muhammad Shekau 
assumed leadership of the group in 2010. In 2011 alone, at least 550 people were killed in 
115 separate attacks (Pham, 2012:1). 
According to statistics from the GTD35, there have been 1304 separate, confirmed attacks by 
Boko Haram from 2009 to 2014. The number of attacks increased dramatically until January 
2012, thereafter increasing and decreasing alternately. Even though there was decline in the 
number of attacks from 2012 to 2013, it is interesting to note that judging by the number of 
fatalities,  many of the attacks launched in 2013 were far more deadly than those launched 
previously. However, in 2014 the number of attacks increased dramatically up until June/July, 
thereafter decling sharply until October. Moreover, the attacks launched in 2014 resulted in 
even more fatalities than those in 2013 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015f). Thus, the attacks have grown more violent even 
though it seems that the number of attacks have in some cases decreased. 
The number of deaths attributed to Boko Haram has definitely increased over time. There are 
no exact figures for the number of casualties from Boko Haram attacks, but according to 
former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, the group has claimed more than 12000 lives, 
with an additional 8000 persons injured or maimed, “not to mention the displacement of 
                                               
35 For graph of Boko Haram attacks from 2009 – 2014 see 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?start_yearonly=2009&end_yearonly=2014&start_year=&star
t_month=&start_day=&end_year=&end_month=&end_day=&asmSelect0=&asmSelect1=&perpetrator=30101
&dtp2=all&success=yes&casualties_type=b&casualties_max= (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015f). Please note because of terms of the GTD graphs cannot be 
displayed in this thesis.
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thousands of innocent Nigerians” (Onuoha, 2014:2). The 2015 Baga Massacre, believed to 
have claimed the lives of 2000 people, is a testament to Boko Haram’s brutality (Abubakar & 
Karimi, 2015). This is in line with the fourth characteristic of hyperconflict. Agbiboa 
(2014b:413) adds that the increasing frequency of violent attacks carried out by the group, 
now almost on a weekly basis, suggests that the prospects for attaining peace and unity in 
Nigeria remain bleak which in turn poses major problems for the security and stability of the 
region. This futher supports the notion that hyperconflict will remain in the Nigerian state.
5.2.2.5 Different Drivers, Different Catalysers
Fifth, hyperconflict is not a one-size-fits-all mould, but rather the product of a set of systemic 
drivers. These forces/drivers are contingent, in other words they are subject to “proximate” 
causes under a variety of conditions. The immediate cause often becomes “submerged” or 
“lost in an escalating conflict and engulfed in political violence” (Mittelman, 2010:15). The 
instances of hyperconflict differ in intensity; they range from manifest to latent, and in 
addition, there are numerous types of catalysing moments. Thus, there is not one specific 
catalyser that sparks hyperconflict (Mittelman, 2010:15). 
A definite catalyser for hyperconflict in Nigeria, and the event that further ended the relative 
calm between the Nigerian state and Boko Haram, was a security raid on a Boko Haram 
hideout in Bauchi State on 26 July 2009. The raid led Boko Haram to launch reprisal attacks 
on police and resulted in five days of rioting which spread across the states of Bauchi, Kano, 
Yobe and Borno. The violence eventually came to an end when Mohammed Yusuf (Boko 
Haram leader) was captured, beaten, interrogated and finally shot – apparently after 
attempting to escape, but not before over 700 people were killed and numerous public 
buildings, which included government offices, churches, mosques, schools and police stations 
were destroyed (Forest, 2012:3). 
Bamidele (2012:36) and Agbiboa (2014b:404) add that the extrajudicial killing of Yusuf, 
which ignited the need for revenge, as well as the attempts by security forces to eliminate 
Boko Haram, marked a turning point for the group; it transformed Boko Haram into one of 
the continent’s most ferocious and deadly terrorist groups. The July “ordeal” acted as a 
catalyser from which the group emerged as stronger, bolder, more sophisticated and even 
more daring in its attacks (Bamidele, 2012:36; Agbiboa, 2014b:404). It effectively made the 
group more violent.  This can be seen as a potential driver for hyperconflict. The killing of 
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Yusuf was avenged well beyond his death; in 2012 the group launched numerous attacks 
against police offers, where they demanded the release of all prisoners linked to Boko Haram 
as well as the prosecution of those individuals responsible for the extrajudicial killing of 
former leader Mohammed Yusuf (Agbiboa, 2014b:405). 
One prominent driver for hyperconflict, which was seen to further fan the flames of Boko 
Haram’s campaign of violence, was the dispute of over the 2011 election results. This dispute 
led to the deaths of over 800 people (Agbiboa, 2014b:406). The reason that this can be seen 
as adding to the flames of hyperconflict in Nigeria, is the fact that many Nigerians in the 
north regard the former presidency of Goodluck Jonathan (a Christian from the south), as 
illegitimate, as he ignored an informal power-rotation agreement (there is a rotation between 
a Christian and Muslim president) that should have allowed a Muslim to be in the position of 
power. In actual fact, Boko Haram demanded that the former president either convert to Islam 
or step down as president of Nigeria, as Islam will not accept an ‘infidel’ as its leader 
(Agbiboa, 2014b:406). The election of Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim, in the 2015 elections 
is not likely to appease Boko Haram as the new president has vowed to defeat Boko Haram 
(McBain, 2015).
A further driver/catalyser for hyperconflict relates to the cumulative effect of a lethal mixture 
of grievances. The combination of bad governance, exacerbated by corruption, centralization 
of power and wealth, regional disparities, ethnic identity and decaying or nonexistent 
infrastructure, amongst others, have served as a driver of conflict in Nigeria. These conditions 
present an ideal breeding ground in which extremists are able to flourish. These conditions 
allow the extremesists to recruit members, especially those who have been marginalized, and 
it facilates the launch of violent movements (Forest, 2012:39). Agbiboa (2014b:406) makes 
the drivers of hyperconflict more clear, as he argues that the following factors have been cited 
to explain why Boko Haram “rebels” (in other words the factors that are responsible for 
driving hyperconflict): first, a sense of alienation from the more developed, “well-off” 
Christian south of the Nigerian state; second, the pervasive and relative poverty in northern 
Nigeria;36 third, the extensive corruption of the Nigerian government, as discussed earlier; 
fourth, the incompetence and brutality of the Nigerian state security services and fifth, the 
                                               
36 “[T]he economic disparities between the north and the rest of the country are particularly stark—in the north, 
72 percent of people live in poverty, compared to 27 percent in the south and 35 percent in the Niger Delta” 
(Agbiboa, 2014b:406). This will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section.
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profound belief that any relationship with the West will produce a corrupting influence.37
Furthermore, Boko Haram has also stated the desire to establish an Islamic Caliphate in 
Nigeria and beyond. In August 2014, Boko Haram claimed the establishment of an Islamic 
Caliphate38 in northeastern Gwoza; however the, Nigerian military rejected this claim (Al 
Jazeera, 2014b). Moreover, Boko Haram also changed their name to the Islamic State’s West 
Africa Province (ISWAP) (Withnall, 2015); this further supports the notion of establishing a 
Caliphate. 
5.2.2.6 Conflict spreads like Wildfire
Although hyperconflict does not necessarily entail a sudden outbreak of war, it may 
nevertheless spread like wildfire. Thus, if hyperconflict does not emerge as one big “blow-up,”
it will take shape as “multiple forms” aided by new technologies that enable its elements to 
spread swiftly from one state or region to another.
When one examines this situation of conflict/hyperconflict, it is possible to argue that it did 
not “blow-up” into one massive war and then engulf the region. However, it can be argued 
that the conflict has spread to other states in the region. In the case of Boko Haram and 
Nigeria, hyperconflict has not erupted into one big war, rather the conflict is spreading to 
other states in the region. For example, conflict has spread to neighbouring Cameroon, Chad 
and Niger as discussed earlier.
5.3 Globalization as Facilitator of Acts of Terror
The purpose of the subsequent section is to determine how the different facets of 
globalization have impacted the security environment of Nigeria. Furthermore, it will 
determine whether or not and to what extent these mechanisms have facilitated acts of terror 
committed by Boko Haram. In doing the aforementioned it will be possible to determine 
whether or not globalization facilitates terrorist activity within the region. The mechanisms 
that will be examined in the subsequent pages include: technology as facilitator of terrorism, 
the creation of politico-criminal networks under the heading funding for terror and migration 
and the “irrelevance” of boundaries, in other words how the permeability of borders 
                                               
37 This will be discussed in greater detail in section 5.4.1 Threat of Corrupt Culture. 
38 In March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS and ISIS accepted the pledge (Alkhshali & Almasy, 
2015). 
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facilitates Boko Haram’s terrorist activities. Zimmermann’s causal model39 will be consulted 
when examining these aspects.
5.3.1 Technology as Facilitator
The last 20 years have has seen a huge increase in the use of new media (Internet) in Nigeria. 
The Internet has had a major impact on Nigerians today as approximately 43 million people 
have access to the Internet. In addition, this is complemented by the growing popularity of 
mobile phones (Musa, 2012:116). 
Despite Boko Haram’s denunciation of Western culture and that which is associated with it, 
the group has shown that it is more than willing to exploit the “the fruits of Western 
education when it suits them” (Walker, 2012:7). For example, the group has made extensive 
use of mobile phones, video cameras, DVDs and YouTube in its operations. According to 
Musa (2012:116) the group has made use of the Internet and mobile phones in the 
coordination of its activities as well as to communicate messages to the world. The Internet 
enhances Boko Haram’s ability to reach out to people; their use of YouTube to upload 
propaganda videos is a case in point as YouTube is accessible to millions of people. The 
group also used to have an official webpage in the form of a blog, but it has been removed. 
Musa (2012:116) also noted that whilst the blog was active it was not quite functional as it 
was hardly updated.
On 18 January of this year, an Arabic-language Twitter account, @Alurwa_Alwuthqa was 
launched, claiming to be the official outlet for a new Boko Haram media group called Al-
Urwah al-Wuthqa (BBC Monitoring, 2015; Laing, 2015).40 Within a few days of the launch, 
the account had gained 4000 followers. Boko Haram has used the feed to publish a stream of 
propoganda, which includes several new videos. The Twitter feed revealed short statements 
about the group’s activities and claiming operations in a timely manner, for example on 25 
January the group tweeted that they had successfully captured Monguno, a strategic town 
close to Maiduguri (BBC Monitoring, 2015; Laing, 2015). There have however been several 
disruptions and inconsistencies in Boko Haram’s media operations; this suggests that there is 
a lack of professionalism amongst those responsible for publishing propaganda. For example, 
a video featuring Shekau giving a speech in Arabic appeared online on 9 February, but failed 
to be disseminated on the Twitter feed. In addition, the account has been suspended several 
                                               
39 See page 55.
40 Following this launch, many analysts have cited the influence of ISIS in Boko Haram’s media operations. 
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times, reappearing quickly but without the original tweets. The suspension of the original 
account has led to the feed becoming less prolific (BBC Monitoring, 2015).41
Even though Boko Haram has made some use of the Internet and technology, they have not 
exploited it to the extent that they could have. Boko Haram’s use of new technologies does 
not necessarily correspond with Zimmermann’s causal model, as he links these new 
technologies to value changes and a weakening of the state that eventually leads to creating 
incentives and opportunities for terrorism. However, Boko Haram’s use of technology should 
not be discounted; it would be better to add a new channel to Zimmermann’s model where 
new technologies lead to recruitment (indirectly in Boko Haram’s case) and thus 
opportunities for terrorism. 
5.3.2 Funding for Terror
As mentioned in both Chapters 2 and 4, there are some scholars who argue that terrorist 
groups often exploit international trade networks as a means through which to market goods 
and services. The money generated from these goods and services is then employed as a 
means of financing the terrorist operations of the respective groups. One must however take 
into account that many of the goods traded by terrorist groups are illegal/smuggled (Li & 
Schaub, 2004:235). In addition, Zimmermann’s causal model links globalization to directly 
fostering the growth of politico-criminal networks which in turn multiplies the opportunities 
for terrorism. Furthermore, external state or group support also makes a major contribution to 
opportunities for such terrorist activities (Zimmermann, 2011:S155). This section will 
examine whether, and if so how, Boko Haram has sourced its funding from the by-products 
of globalization.
Boko Haram’s sources of funding remain opaque, as it has proved immensely difficult to 
track their funding. This can be attributed to the group’s use of hard-to-track human couriers 
to move cash, their reliance on local sources of funding, as well as their engagement in 
limited financial partnerships with other terrorist/extremist groups. Boko Haram effectively 
operates outside the banking system (Stewart & Wroughton, 2014). There are however other 
sources of funding that have been identified; these include kidnapping for ransom;42 bank 
robbery and illicit trafficking (Pate, 2015:23–25; Campbell, 2014:3; Stewart & Wroughton, 
2014). There have also been indications that Boko Haram has sourced as much as 40 percent 
                                               
41 At the time of writing there was no evidence of a new Twitter Account.
42 As mentioned in 5.2.2.1 Potential to Engulf.
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of its income from the trading and trafficking of illegal ivory and rhino horn43 (Sterley, 
2014:56). 
When examining Boko Haram’s financial support and activities in Cameroon, it is possible to 
argue that a politico-criminal network has emerged. Financiers from Borno and the areas 
bordering Cameroon’s Extreme North region have provided Boko Haram with weapons as 
well as a route to negotiate with the Cameroonian government when it comes to kidnapping 
for ransom (Zenn, 2014:8). In addition, ties exist between Boko Haram and arms traffickers 
in Cameroon that could also form part of a politico-criminal network (Zenn, 2014:8). Thus, 
the existence of these politico-criminal networks can be said to enhance the effectiveness of 
Boko Haram’s operations. Furthermore, since these networks provide Boko Haram with 
either funding or weapons, it creates an opportunity for terrorism. If these networks were not 
in place one could argue that Boko Haram would not have access to the finances or weapons 
that it needs to carry out its activities. Thus, these networks have effectively facilitated Boko 
Haram’s terrorist activities. 
Furthermore, Boko Haram has allegedly received funding from external groups that include 
the Saudi Arabian Islamic World Society, the Al Muntada Trust Fund44 based in the United 
Kingdom and an unknown Algerian sect that has provided the group with training, as well as 
a 400 million naira donation. Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have 
also been linked to the provision of training (Anatomy of African Terrorism: Boko Haram: 
Nigeria’s Homegrown Terror Network, 2012:16–17). The aforementioned sources of funding 
and training, respectively, relate to Zimmermann’s causal model where support by an 
external state/group provides opportunities for terrorism. Thus, the support of the 
aforementioned groups has allowed Boko Haram to operate efficiently and to carry out 
terrorist attacks. These sources of support have in effect created an opportunity for Boko 
Haram to carry out terror attacks, whereas without the support Boko Haram may not have 
been as successful in their campaign of terror. It should however be noted that mainstream 
Salafist and Al Qaeda funding decreased as a result of Boko Haram’s massacres, the collapse 
of Ansaru’s shura in Kaduna in 2012, and the 2013 French-led military intervention in 
northern Mali, which in turn disrupted AQIM’s supply line to Boko Haram (Zenn, 2014:8).
                                               
43 Evidence suggests that Boko Haram is conducting poaching operations in neighbouring Cameroon (Sterley, 
2014:56).
44 The Al Muntada Trust strongly denied allegations that it had links with Boko Haram; however it should be 
noted that allegations about the trust’s connection to terrorism go back more than a decade and that it has a long 
history of promoting and supporting radical Islamic preachers (Stand for Peace, 2014). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
101
It is therefore possible to say that Boko Haram’s funding has in some ways been facilitated 
by globalization given that it fosters the growth of politico-criminal networks, which creates 
opportunities for terrorism. Furthermore, the support of external groups also facilitates Boko 
Haram’s terrorist activities.
5.3.3 Migration and “Irrelevance” of Boundaries 
As mentioned in preceding chapters, globalization has facilitated the “free” and easy 
movement of people across borders. Thus, it has created a channel of migration, which can be 
exploited by terrorist organizations. The purpose of the following section is to determine 
whether individuals have made use of these channels in order to join Boko Haram and 
whether Boko Haram has exploited these channels when carrying out attacks. 
There have been reports that foreign fighters have joined the ranks of Boko Haram; for 
example one informant reported involvement in the arrest of foreign fighters, however he 
could not disclose the nationalities of those arrested. Other informants reported that Boko 
Haram attack victims identified their attackers as non-Nigerian and non-Kanuri, but 
specifically Tauregs; and the Cameroonian government has identified two Taureg fighters 
amongst Boko Haram militants killed in a September 2014 clash (Pate, 2014:17). According 
to Cameroonian police Boko Haram also recruited along the border with Nigeria (Zenn, 
2014:8). However, since the nationalities of some of these foreign fighters have not been 
revealed it is difficult to determine if these fighters have indeed used the channels of 
migration. It is most likely that these foreign fighters have been recruited in Nigeria’s 
neighbouring countries. Since the borders are porous it is probable that fighters have 
exploited the porous borders instead of using the migration channel. Onuoha (2013b:2) cites 
Nigeria’s porous borders with Cameroon, Niger, Benin and Chad as worsening the Boko 
Haram insurgency. Furthermore, there is no indication that fighters from “Western” countries 
have joined Boko Haram. 
Thus, given the limited information available on the presence of foreign fighters in the ranks 
of Boko Haram it is not possible to argue that individuals have made use of the migration 
channel created by globalization to join Boko Haram. It is seems most likely that these 
individuals exploited the porosity of borders just as Boko Haram has used it to carry out 
cross-border attacks. 
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5.4 Globalization as Incentive for Acts of Terror
According to the preceding chapters, globalization has often been cited as a motivating factor 
for terrorist activity. The purpose of the following section is to examine whether the different 
facets of globalization have indeed led to increased terrorist activity perpetrated by Boko 
Haram in Nigeria and more specifically in northern Nigeria. It will do so by consulting 
Zimmermann’s causal model and looking specifically at how the threat of corrupt culture, as 
well as increasing inequality and poverty have contributed to and encouraged terrorist activity. 
5.4.1 Threat of Corrupt Culture
According to Zimmermann’s (2011:S158) causal model, globalization is believed to 
spread/export foreign “corrupt cultures.” It is also believed to lead to changes in values, 
which is arguably triggered by the infiltration of foreign “corrupt” cultures. The spread of 
foreign and perceived corrupt cultures then in turn create incentives for terrorism.
Globalization is seen as spreading corrupt/ foreign culture, because it is often associated with 
Westernization and Americanization. The culture associated with 
Westernization/Americanization is perceived to erode indigenous and “conservative” cultures. 
These changes in values are said to cause distortions in local communities. Furthermore, in 
the case of Boko Haram, the view of Western culture is even more extreme as it views 
Western education (as well as that which arises from it) to be sacrilege. The purpose of the 
following subsection is therefore to determine whether Zimmermann’s causal model holds 
true in the case of Nigeria and Boko Haram. 
According to Pham (2012:2), in Boko Haram’s denunciation of Western civilization, it has 
come to reject the legitimacy of the secular Nigerian state, which it sees as evil and unworthy 
of allegiance, and has ended up in waging war against the state in an effort to replace it with 
what it sees as a “purified” Islamic regime. In essence, Boko Haram is not just a name the 
group is known by, but also a slogan that “cries out” that Western education and that which 
results from it (such as Western values) is sacrilege (Pham, 2012:2).
In 2010, Shekau surfaced in a video, threatening attacks against the Nigerian state as well as 
“outposts of Western culture” (Pham, 2012:3).  A number of Boko Haram’s attacks showcase 
its hate for everything associated with the West. For example, in August 2011, Boko Haram 
claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing of the United Nations building in Abuja, which 
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killed more than 20 people and injured at least 80 (Agbiboa, 2014b:410; Pham, 2012:4). 
Since the UN is arguably a creation of the West, it is possible to argue that the UN is 
perpetuating a corrupt culture, in the eyes of Boko Haram. Thus, the choice of target is not 
surprising. The group released a statement following the attack, which read as follows: “All 
over the world, the UN [United Nations] is a global partner in the oppression of believers. We 
are at war against infidels. In Nigeria, the Federal Government tries to perpetuate the agenda 
of the United Nations. We have told everyone that the UN is the bastion of the global 
oppression of Muslims all over the world” (Agbiboa, 2014b:410). 
Boko Haram has also launched smaller-scale attacks on people engaging in a “corrupt” 
lifestyle (from a Muslim point of view) – this includes the consumption of alcohol, gambling 
and prostitution – as well as the establishments associated with the above. Boko Haram has 
also targeted marketplaces where non-halaal meat was sold (Cook, 2014:10; Elden, 
2014:416). 
Furthermore, as their colloquial name suggests they are opposed to Western educational 
norms, thus it comes as no surprise that the group has increasingly targeted “temples” of 
Western education. Boko Haram started targeting schools in 2012 on a regular basis, with a 
reported 47 attacks and 77 deaths in that year. Attacks on schools decreased the following 
year with only 14 attacks, but fatalities rose with 119 deaths (Simonelli, Jensen, Castro-Reina, 
Pate, Menner & Miller, 2014). According to Pate (2015:18) Boko Haram’s attacks on 
educational institutions constitute 7 percent of total attacks between 2009 and 2013; and the 
number of attacks until 2014 amount to 77 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2015g).  A notable attack was launched on 6 July 
2013 against the Government Secondary School in the Potiskum local government area of 
Yobe state. Boko Haram assailants set fire to the building, which resulted in school children 
and teachers fleeing the burning building only to be met, by gunfire.  The attack claimed the 
lives of 46 whilst injuring 4 others (Simonelli et al., 2014). Shortly after the attack, Shekau 
appeared in a video calling for more attacks against schools citing Western education as a 
“plot against Islam” (Mark, 2013). In September 2013, Boko Haram gunmen opened fire on 
sleeping students at the College of Agriculture in Yobe state. According to reports, 50 
students were killed in the attack (BBC, 2013b). 
According to Bagaji, Etila, Ogbadu and Sule (2012:37), Boko Haram believes that the Umma 
Mahammadiya (Muslim faithful) and Dar-ul-Islam (Islamic community) cannot be 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
104
compromised in the face of Western influence in the Nigerian secular society. According to 
Boko Haram rhetoric, a secular nation/society is responsible for the promotion of idolatry, in 
other words it amounts to state worship. It believes that the state is a “nest of corruption” 
responsible for exploiting the poor. In addition, Western values and education shape and 
sustain the state; both the aforementioned are against the will of Allah (Campbell, 2014:2). 
Therefore, in order to curb the “evil” which is brought about by moral decadence and the 
influence of Western civilization, it is imperative that an Islamic society is entrenched 
through the destruction of modern political institutions and infrastructures (Bagaji et al., 
2012:37). This, amongst other factors, explains why the majority of Boko Haram’s attacks 
are aimed at the police, military, government establishments and properties (Bagaji et al., 
2012:37). According to Pate (2015:18) in the 2009 – 2013 period, 22 percent of Boko 
Haram’s attacks were aimed at police, while 9 percent were aimed at the military and 11 
percent at government. The 20 January 2012 Kano attacks are notable in this case as Boko 
Haram insurgents targeted police stations; government buildings, such as passport offices and 
immigration centres as well as the State Security Service’s headquarters. According to reports 
more than 178 people died in the attacks; some locals put the figures much higher (Elden, 
2014:418; Oboh, 2012).
Another bastion of Western civilization, which has been denounced by Boko Haram, is 
elections. During the Nigerian elections this year, Boko Haram sent warnings discouraging 
citizens from supporting democracy by participating in voting (Associated Press, 2015). 
Elections are considered to be a forbidden innovation imposed by the West and democracy is 
considered as being a corrupt Western concept (Pham, 2012:4; Associated Press, 2015). 
According to Borno state Governor, Kashim Shettima, the group invaded the town of Miringa 
in the early morning hours of 28 March (the date of the election) torching houses and then 
shooting people as they tried to escape. A reported 25 people died in the attack. Two voters 
were killed at polling stations during another Boko Haram attack in the twin Gombe towns of 
Birin Bolawa and Birin Fulani (Associated Press, 2015). These attacks were clearly 
motivated by the group’s hatred of Western practices and encroaching corrupt culture. 
One of Boko Haram’s specific goals has been to expel northern Nigeria of corrupt and false 
Muslims. These corrupt and false Muslims are known as “yan boko,” which if literally 
translated means “child of the book.” It refers to the elites who were created by the British 
policy of indirect rule during the colonization of Nigeria – they have turned their heads away 
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from Allah as a result of easy money and corrupt Western values (Walker, 2012:7). This 
supports Zimmermann’s idea that foreign cultures, especially Western culture is perceived to 
erode conservative culture. Boko Haram has accused the Islamic “establishment” in Nigeria 
of corruption and the “perversion” of Islam. Thus, it is not too surprising that Boko Haram 
has often targeted the Islamic “establishment.”
According to Campbell (2014:2) Boko Haram presents a direct threat to the traditional 
Islamic establishment, which is led by the sultan of Sokoto and the Shehu of Borno, both of 
whom have been the targets of failed assassinations. Other members of the Islamic 
establishment have also been the targets of Boko Haram. In 2013 the then Emir of Kano, Al 
Haji Ado Bayero, was the target of an assassination attempt; his driver and bodyguards were 
killed in the process. Boko Haram has however successfully assassinated a number of senior 
Muslim political and religious figures, whom they deemed to be guilty of mixing Islam with 
“infidel” concepts such as democracy, Western education and secularism (Lister, 2015; Zenn, 
2014:5). In the period from 2009 to 2013, 10 percent of Boko Haram attacks were targeted at 
religious figures and institutions including Christian figures and institutions (Pate, 2015:18); 
however a greater percentage of Muslims have been targeted compared to Christians.  In 
order to rectify the “corrupt” Islamic establishment, Boko Haram has called for the 
replacement of the sultan of Sokoto with a shura (council) headed and dominated by it 
(Campbell, 2014:2). 
The targeting of the Islamic establishment along with Muslim political and religious elites 
satisfies the notion that Western culture “erodes” and “corrupts” conservative culture which 
in turn creates incentives for terrorist action by Boko Haram. It thus supports Zimmermann’s 
causal model.
5.4.2 Increasing Inequality and Poverty
In Chapter 2, it was argued that globalization has the tendency to leave people behind as the 
benefits of globalization are unequally distributed, thus creating winners and losers. The gap 
between rich and poor also widens.  Zimmermann’s model links globalization to an increase 
in economic and social inequality, in other words societal polarization within countries. 
Furthermore, increasing economic and social inequality is also linked to a weakened state 
(the result of globalization), as the state no longer has the ability to protect the economically 
disadvantaged groups against the challenges of the global economy. The model therefore 
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links economic and social inequality to opportunities for terrorist activity (Zimmermann, 
2011:S155). The purpose of this section is to determine whether these links are present in the 
case of Nigeria; in other words whether increased inequality and poverty can be linked to 
globalization and a weakening of the state and then subsequently create opportunities for 
terrorist activity in Nigeria. 
One of the most popular explanations for the rise of Boko Haram is the issue of poverty and 
underdevelopment which are characteristic of northern and northeastern Nigeria, in which 
Boko Haram operates (Cook, 2014:5). Previously, it was mentioned that British policies of 
non-intervention in northern Nigeria led to missionary schools being established only in the 
south. This gave an advantage to those Nigerians in the south as they were able to access 
proper education, which served as a stepping-stone later in life. The effects of this are still 
evident today, as northern Nigerians are lagging behind their southern counterparts. 
Furthermore, for the most part northern Muslims still associate Western education with 
attempts by evangelical Christians to convert Muslims (Waldek & Jayasekara, 2011:169). In 
addition, many view Western education as opening a door to corrupt Western culture. Thus 
Western education is largely rejected in northern Nigeria. This in turn negatively impacts 
access to proper education, which leads to illiteracy, which in turn leads to unemployment 
and poverty. The purpose of this section is to examine and prove the ways in which 
inequality and poverty have served as a driving factor of conflict. First, indirectly as a 
recruitment tool of Boko Haram, as without recruits Boko Haram would be unable to carry 
out its attacks. 
According to a study conducted by the CLEEN foundation in Nigeria, where factors which 
contribute to youth radicalization and recruitment into armed groups such as Boko Haram 
were examined, the main causative factors were of an economic, social, political and 
religious nature (Onuoha, 2014:3–4). This subsection will however only focus on the 
economic and social factors examined in the study. The CLEEN study argues that 
unemployment and poverty makes youths more vulnerable to radicalization, thus making it 
much easier for Boko Haram to recruit these individuals. It is interesting to note that Boko 
Haram draws a large majority of its members from disaffected youths, unemployed high 
school and university graduates, as well as destitute children – mostly, but not limited to, 
northern Nigeria (Onuoha, 2014:3). 
According to figures from Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the unemployment 
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rate averaged 14.60 percent until it skyrocketed to 23.90 percent in 2011 (Onuoha, 2014:6). 
Furthermore, despite favourable economic growth, the poverty rate rose from 54.7 percent in 
2004 to 60.90 percent in 2010. In 2011, it was estimated that 100 million Nigerians were 
living in absolute poverty, while a further 12.6 million were moderately poor. Young people, 
especially in northern Nigeria are the worst hit by unemployment and poverty (Onuoha, 
2014:6). This study supports Forest’s claim that unemployment and illiteracy rates are 
highest in northern Nigeria. 
The socio-economic challenges of poverty and unemployment are intricately connected and 
are most obvious in northern Nigeria as mentioned previously. The de-industrialization of the 
north is a major contributing factor to the aforementioned. The Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) of 1986 and the liberalization of the economy throughout the 1990s, led to 
a flood of cheap Asian textiles as well as other goods into the Nigerian economy (Hoffmann, 
2014:17). In addition, oil revenues constitute 85 percent of Nigeria’s total GDP, which has 
led to a flood of foreign currencies, which in turn makes imports cheaper for the newly rich 
(Thomson, 2012:49). The combination of the above has led to local industries closing down, 
as they were ill equipped to compete in this new environment. This was exacerbated by a 
poor supply of electricity45 and a deteriorating infrastructure, which led to a large number of 
factories shutting down and hundreds of thousands of workers losing their jobs (Hoffmann, 
2014:17). In the mid 1980s, there were 175 textile mills; over the next 25 years all but 25 
were shut down (Burgis, 2015). In addition, the collapse of the northern textile industry also 
destroyed cotton production in the region, a key agricultural good in 11 northern states. 
Approximately half of the million farmers involved in the growth of cotton for textile 
factories, no longer do so; some have however switched to other crops. Each person working 
in the textile industry is said to support about 6 relatives; thus it is possible to argue that the 
decimation of the Nigerian textile industry has destroyed millions of lives (Burgis, 2015). In 
addition, the collapse of agriculture and manufacturing has led to mass migration to the cities 
where there are already limited employment opportunities (Thomson, 2012:49). This has then 
led to further unemployment in the cities. 
Although one cannot directly link the decimation of the textile industry and the loss of jobs 
that accompanied it to the radicalization of youths and joining Boko Haram, there is a 
                                               
45 In 2014, South Africa produced 40 000 megawatts of electricity for a population of 50 million where Nigeria 
was only able to produce 4000 megawatts for a population that was three times larger (Hoffman, 2014:16).  
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possibility, even if small, that those youths who joined Boko Haram as a result of 
unemployment and poverty, could have been dragged into poverty as a result of a parent or 
parents losing their jobs in the textile industry (either through the growth of cotton or the 
manufacturing of textile). This argument may seem unfounded, however given that the 
farming of cotton and manufacturing of textiles used to be the backbone of the northern 
economy (Thomson, 2012:49) and thus employment, it could be a possibility. It would 
however require further research on the ground to determine whether individuals joining 
Boko Haram were indeed affected by the decimation of the textile industry. 
Furthermore, given that Nigeria’s oil wealth flows into the coffers of the powerful and elite, 
social services, public safety, and education are either of extremely low quality or non-
existent. In addition, Nigeria ranks amongst the poorest populations in the world, with 75 
percent of the population living on approximately US$ 1.25 per day (Thomson, 2012:49). 
This in addition to the collapse of cotton farming and textile manufacturing points towards 
the state being unable to protect the economically disadvantaged, which constitutes 75 
percent of the population, against the challenges of the global economy. If this is the case 
then it would be in line with Zimmermann’s causal model where globalization leads to shifts 
in relative prices and market relations (Asian textiles were/are cheaper than those produced in 
Nigeria, thus local manufacturers are unable to compete) and this in turn leads to a weakening 
of the state as the state is unable to protect it citizens against the effects of globalization (loss 
of livelihood). The inability to protect citizens leads to economic and social inequality as 
these citizens are in effect left behind, which then makes them vulnerable to radicalization 
and creates opportunities and possibly an incentive for terrorism.
However, in contrast Cook (2014:5) sees the “poverty created Boko Haram” argument as 
somewhat weak. The core of this argument states that in order to defeat the Boko Haram 
insurgency, there must be development in the region and economic opportunities need to be 
created. Although this is a creditable goal, there are a number of deficiencies when one uses it 
as the interpretive framework for the appearance of Boko Haram. Furthermore, the argument 
fails to explain why Boko Haram does not emphasize or even allude to economic issues in its 
videos and statements, nor does it explain why, given similar circumstances of poverty 
throughout Nigeria, such a violent group has not appeared elsewhere. In addition, when one 
broadly examines the context of West African societies that are impoverished, these societies 
have not produced violent groups as a means of channelling desperation (Cook, 2014:5).  
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Even though poverty and inequality cannot be identified as the reason behind the rise of Boko 
Haram, it would be unwise to dismiss it entirely as poverty and inequality have played a 
contributing role in making youths more vulnerable to radicalization. 
5.5 Globalization as Motivating Factor in Rise of Boko Haram
No explicit links exist between globalization and the rise of Boko Haram. However, one of 
the factors that have attributed to the rise of Boko Haram can be linked to globalization in 
some way. As mentioned previously in section 5.2.1 Legitimacy and State Failure, corruption 
has been a driver in Boko Haram’s campaign of terror. In addition, as mentioned in section 
5.4.1 Threat of Corrupt Culture, corruption not only served as a driving factor, but it has also 
served to influence Boko Haram’s choice in targets. It is important to note though that 
corruption is not the product of globalization alone; rather globalization has played a part in it, 
even if only a small one. This can be said given that Boko Haram firmly believes that the 
corruption entrenched in the Nigerian state and within society is the result of the infiltration 
of corrupt Western values, which are spread by globalization. 
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter set out to apply two theoretical frameworks, namely Mittelmann’s theory of 
hyperconflict and Zimmermann’s causal model, to the case study of Boko Haram and Nigeria, 
and to determine whether this case study corresponds to the aforementioned theoretical 
frameworks. The characteristics of the Boko Haram conflict correspond to Mittelmann’s 
theory of hyperconflict. By examining these characteristics it is possible to argue that over 
the course of the last six years Boko Haram has engulfed Nigeria and a significant portion of 
West Africa, as well as other neighbouring states in a situation of hyperconflict. With 
reference to Zimmermann’s causal model, the case study corresponds to some sections of the 
model, including: the growth of politico-criminal networks and the support of external groups 
who create opportunities for terrorism via funding and training respectively; the spread/threat 
of corrupt culture which leads to an incentive for terrorism and increasing inequality and 
poverty (as a result of shifts in relative prices which leads to a weakening of government as 
they are unable to protect citizens against the effects of globalization) that create 
opportunities and incentives for terrorism. Other facets of globalization that should be added 
to the model relate to new technologies being used as a possible recruitment tool which 
would then create opportunities for terrorism and the concept of immigration which should be 
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expanded to include the migration of fighters across borders leading to opportunities for 
terrorism. The above findings will be compared to the findings in Chapter 4 and analysed in 
the following chapter.
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Chapter 6: Comparison, Analysis and Conclusion
6.1. Introduction
The aim of this research study was to explore the extent to which globalization has fuelled 
insecurity and has contributed to the creation of a permissive environment in which acts of 
national/international terrorism flourish. It aimed to do so by examining the effects of 
globalization on two terrorist organizations in two regional contexts, namely Al Shabaab in 
Somalia (Horn of Africa) and Boko Haram in Nigeria (West Africa). The effects of 
globalization on the aforementioned terrorist organizations within the respective regions was 
analysed within the framework of Mittelman’s theory of hyperconflict and Zimmermann’s 
causal links between globalization and terrorism within Chapters 4 and 5. Although there 
have been a number of studies on the link between globalization and terrorism, none of these 
studies have examined the aforementioned links specifically relating to the regional contexts 
of the Horn of Africa and West Africa. In addition, although there is extensive scholarship on 
both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram none of these studies actively link globalization to the 
terrorist activity of these two groups. This study took specific notice of this and assisted in 
filling the gap by actively examining the link between globalization and the terrorist activity 
of Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and Boko Haram in West Africa. 
This chapter will serve as a comparison of the two case studies examined in Chapters 4 and 5 
respectively. The purpose is to determine whether or not both case studies correspond to the 
characteristics of hyperconflict, and to establish in which ways they are different or similar. 
Furthermore, this chapter will seek to determine the ways in and extent to which 
globalization has facilitated and/or served as an incentive for terrorism in Somalia (the Horn 
of Africa) and Nigeria (West Africa). This analysis will make it possible to evaluate the 
research question and sub-questions stated in Chapter 1 and determine whether these 
questions have been answered satisfactorily. Furthermore, the chapter will make 
recommendations for future research. 
6.2 Hyperconflict
Both case studies, Al Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria, signal a situation of 
hyperconflict that has already erupted, and that has the potential to become even greater. This 
can be deduced as both case studies are seen to correspond to the characteristics of 
hyperconflict as set out by Mittelman (2010). 
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6.2.1 Legitimacy and State Collapse/Failure
According to Mittelman (2010:23), hyperconflict arises from a decline in legitimacy and 
there is a lack of legitimacy present in both case studies, albeit to a different degree and for 
different reasons. Legitimacy is lowest in the case of Somalia and this is not surprising given 
that legitimacy is an unknown commodity in a collapsed state. The lack of legitimacy present 
in the Somali state created a vacuum in which a situation of hyperconflict could erupt.  Al 
Shabaab has exploited this situation, and in the process further delegitimized the TFG and to 
a lesser extent the SFG. By exploiting Somali nationalism, xenophobia, and the lack of 
service delivery, Al Shabaab was able to delegitimize the TFG throughout its tenure in office. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Al Shabaab was able to legitimize itself in the eyes of some 
Somalis by virtue of supplying basic services to large areas of Somalia. Al Shabaab was also 
able to delegitimize the SFG to a certain extent and this can be seen as being due to their 
ability to provide for their soldiers, something that could not be done by the SFG. Currently, 
it is unknown whether the situation of hyperconflict will in fact continue due to the Somali 
government’s lack of legitimacy. Thus, if the SFG should desire to impede the continuation 
of hyperconflict, they would need to ensure that they established themselves as the legitimate 
authority in the eyes of the Somali populace, especially those in rural areas, as these are the 
areas where Al Shabaab still maintains a degree of influence.
In comparison, Nigeria depicts a state that is experiencing a decline in legitimacy, which is 
due to a situation of rampant corruption, rather than state collapse, as is the case in Somalia. 
Moreover, it has been argued amongst analysts that Nigeria is fast on its way to becoming a 
failed state, similar to that seen in the case of Somalia. However, Nigeria has not reached 
such a point yet, and thus has not failed or collapsed as a state. Nonetheless, Nigeria is still 
failing in crucial areas that have caused tremendous instability. Corruption has eroded the 
legitimacy of the Nigerian government and its apparatuses, which has led to a major distrust 
of government officials, and which in turn negatively affects government’s ability to draw its 
citizens away from the appeal of groups such as Boko Haram. The group has also cited 
corruption as a driver in its campaign of terror, thus it is possible to argue that the declining 
legitimacy of the Nigerian government has precipitated conflict in Nigeria, and most likely 
hyperconflict.
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6.2.2 Characteristics of Hyperconflict 
6.2.2.1 Potential to Engulf
Both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram have showcased their ability to engulf their countries and 
regions in a situation of hyperconflict. Al Shabaab has engulfed Kenya, as well as other states 
within the Horn of Africa in a situation of hyperconflict, whilst on the other hand; Boko 
Haram has engulfed Nigeria and a number of West African, and other neighbouring states in 
a situation of hyperconflict. Thus, despite the fact that both terrorist groups have faced 
setbacks in the last year, they have remained dangerous and have continued to engulf 
neighbouring countries in hyperconflict. A vicious cycle has therefore been established, 
whereby any attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram or Al Shabaab, have been met with 
warranted retaliations from the respective militaries. This in turn has exacerbated the 
situation and has led to further retaliations by Boko Haram and Al Shabaab. Thus, the 
situation of hyperconflict has decidedly increased, resulting in more and more people 
suffering the consequences thereof. 
6.2.2.2 Shift from Prior Patterns
Globalization has led to a shift, rather than a break from prior patterns of violence. In addition 
many cases of political violence do not fit tidily into one category. This is the case with 
regard to both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram; both have elements of interstate and domestic 
terrorism. Both terrorist groups attack targets in their countries of origin as well as targets in 
neighbouring states. For example, Al Shabaab has targeted soldiers in Somalia as well as in 
Kenya, whereas Boko Haram’s targets have been in Nigeria, as well as across the border in 
neighbouring Cameroon, Niger and Chad. It should however be noted that Al Shabaab has 
officially transformed into a transnational terror organization and even international, much 
more so than in the case of the Boko Haram. This is the direct result of Al Shabaab’s 
partnership with Al Qaeda.
6.2.2.3 Boiling Over, with a Chance of Spillovers
In both cases, history has played a major part in shaping and informing conflict. In the case of 
Boko Haram, Nigeria’s colonial history comes into play; this relates specifically to the North-
South dichotomy. The consequences of the British colonial policy of non-intervention in the 
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north are still visible today, where the north lags behind the south in terms of greater 
unemployment and poverty. These factors play some part in fuelling the Boko Haram 
(hyper)conflict. In the case of Al Shabaab, the numerous failed attempts of Somalia at 
national reconciliation created a vacuum, which Al Shabaab later exploited. Thus, in both 
cases conflict merged with the complexity of history, and this relates to the third 
characteristic of hyperconflict.
6.2.2.4 Increased Violence is the Order of the Day
A decrease in armed conflicts, either domestic or international, does not necessarily guarantee 
less violence or more security from the threat of political terror. The activities of Al Shabaab 
in the Horn of Africa and Boko Haram in Nigeria, as well as neighbouring countries, serve as 
examples where increased violence in conflict can be seen as the norm. In both cases, the 
number of attacks perpetrated by the groups, respectively, has increased from 2009. The 
number of attacks perpetrated by Al Shabaab rose dramatically (with dips in between) until 
August 2014, thereafter declining. The decline can possibly be attributed to AMISOM seizing 
a number of villages and towns held by Al Shabaab, and the loss of the port of Barawe to 
AMISOM and SNA forces. In effect, Al Shabaab is being pushed back. In comparison, Boko 
Haram’s attacks rose drastically until January 2012, experiencing a dip in 2013, and 
increasing again in 2014. Despite a decline in attacks from 2012 to 2013, these attacks were 
far more deadly than those previously launched. This supports the notion that fewer 
attacks/conflicts do not necessarily mean less violence. In addition, Boko Haram’s attacks in 
2015 have grown more deadly; the Baga massacre is a case in point. 
The brutality and violence with which Al Shabaab undertook the Westgate Mall attack (2013) 
and the Garissa University College attack (2015) and Boko Haram the Baga massacre (2015) 
serve as proof that both cases correspond to the fourth characteristic of hyperconflict. 
6.2.2.5 Different Drivers, Different Catalysers 
When one examines the drivers and catalysers of conflict one is able to identify a number of 
similarities between Al Shabaab and Boko Haram. In both the case of Al Shabaab and Boko 
Haram the death of a leader sparked some form of retaliatory attack. However, the 
extrajudicial killing of Yusuf affected Boko Haram’s trajectory to a greater extent in 
comparison to the effect of Godane’s death (through airstrike) on Al Shabaab. Yusuf’s death 
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marked a turning point for Boko Haram as his death transformed Boko Haram into the 
violent, deadly group known today. His death served as a catalyser, but also a driver of 
conflict since he was avenged well beyond his death. On the other hand, Godane’s death led 
to reprisal attacks on the AU’s main base in Somalia. However, following the attacks on the 
AU base there was no indication that other attacks were launched for the purpose of revenge. 
Furthermore, the establishment of an Islamic Calipahte, in their respective areas of operation, 
is another driver that Al Shabaab and Boko Haram share. Al Shabaab’s aim to establish a 
Somali Caliphate has led the group to wage war against the perceived enemies of Islam, 
including those associated with Westernization/globalization. Likewise, Boko Haram has also 
expressed the aim of establishing a Caliphate, and this aim becomes even clearer when taking 
into account that Boko Haram has pledged allegiance to ISIS and changed its name to 
ISWAP.
6.2.2.6 Conflict Spreads like Wildfire 
As Mittelman (2010) explains, conflict does not necessarily erupt into one massive war, 
however over time it has the potential to transform into a war – this is the case with both Al 
Shabaab and Boko Haram. In both cases, conflict began as something small: in the case of 
Boko Haram – an insurgency, and in the case of Al Shabaab – resistance to invasion, but as 
time passed these “conflicts” morphed into war. At first only the “home” countries of the two 
terrorist groups were affected, but with time more countries became involved in the conflict, 
either by being directly targeted by Al Shabaab/Boko Haram, or by assisting the “home” 
countries with military support. In the case of Al Shabaab, Kenya and Ethiopia were involved. 
However, recently Al Shabaab’s attacks have been focussed on Somalia and Kenya. On the 
other hand, Boko Haram’s violence spread to neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The 
involvement of these countries in the MNJTF surely added fuel to the fire. Thus, despite not 
erupting into hyperconflict from the start, both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram have managed 
to cause a situation of hyperconflict in their respective regions. It can be said that conflict has 
spread like wildfire in both the case of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram.
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6.3 Globalization as Facilitator of Acts of Terror
6.3.1 Technology as Facilitator 
Both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram have made use of technology, specifically information and 
communication technologies, albeit to a different extent and with varying degrees of success. 
When examining the use of these technologies by both groups, it becomes clear that Al 
Shabaab is more tech savvy when compared to Boko Haram. Furthermore, Al Shabaab has 
used these technologies for a number of different reasons, whereas Boko Haram has mainly 
employed them as a propaganda tool and a source of information. 
Both groups have made use of Twitter; however, Al Shabaab’s use of Twitter is much more 
sophisticated and the group has employed it for a longer period of time. Boko Haram only 
started using Twitter recently, which seems to be the result of the influence of ISIS. In 
addition, the account was suspended several times, reappearing swiftly but without the 
original tweets; the account has since been shut down and no new account has appeared. In 
comparison, Al Shabaab’s account has been shut down multiple times only to reappear at a 
later stage. Both groups have employed Twitter as a means of informing about activities as 
well as claiming responsibility for attacks; the running commentary of Al Shabaab’s 
Westgate Mall attack and Boko Haram’s claiming the capture of Monguno serve as an 
example. In addition, Al Shabaab’s tweets were published in English, whereas Boko Haram’s 
tweets were in Arabic. Al Shabaab’s use of the lingua franca makes its reach far wider than 
that of Boko Haram. Furthermore, Boko Haram has also used Twitter as a means of 
publishing a feed of propaganda which includes videos. 
Moreover, Boko Haram has also used technology as a means of coordinating attacks. This 
does not relate to Zimmermann’s causal model; however, since it has been used as a means of 
coordinating attacks it has facilitated terrorist activity.
Al Shabaab’s use of ICT is more in line with Zimmermann’s causal model as it has used 
YouTube videos to discredit AMISOM and those who support them. Thus, by discrediting 
AMISOM the Somali government is delegitimized, as it works alongside AMISOM. In doing 
so the Somali government is weakened as suggested by Zimmermann’s model.  
In addition, Al Shabaab has also effectively used Facebook and online chatrooms as a 
recruitment tool; and it has made use of ICT to launch fundraising campaigns. This does not 
relate to Zimmermann’s causal model; however, as suggested, a new channel should be 
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added to the existing model, where technology is employed as a tool for recruiting fighters, 
which in turn leads to opportunities for terrorism. Although there is no specific mention of 
Boko Haram using ICT to recruit individuals, the impact that, for example Boko Haram’s 
YouTube propaganda videos can have on individuals, should not be discounted. As YouTube 
is accessible to millions of people there is a possibility that these videos could inspire 
individuals to join Boko Haram. This would then indirectly relate to this added channel.  
It is possible to argue that technology has facilitated the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab, as 
it has been used as a tool for recruitment and financing, delegitimizing the Somali state 
(weakening it) and facilitating the spread of Al Shabaab’s message. Similarly, Boko Haram’s 
terrorist activities have been facilitated by the use of technology as a means of 
communicating and coordinating attacks. 
6.3.2 Funding for Terror
Unlike Boko Haram, Al Shabaab has exploited the channels of business and commerce, in 
other words international trade networks to fund its terror activities. Although business and 
commerce does not form part of Zimmermann’s causal model, it was suggested that it be 
added to the model as a means of funding terror, which in turn creates opportunities for 
terrorism. Al Shabaab has exploited this network through its use of the port of Kismayo to 
export (illegal) charcoal. Even after losing the port to Kenyan Defence Forces in 2012, Al 
Shabaab has been able to finance its operations through charcoal revenues. This is as a result 
of a profit-sharing agreement between Al Shabaab, the region’s government and members of 
the Kenyan Defence Force. It has been suggested that Al Shabaab would be unable to 
conduct its terrorist activities without the revenue from charcoal. Therefore, it is possible to 
argue that the export of charcoal has created an opportunity for terrorism as it has facilitated 
Al Shabaab’s terror activites through funding. 
In addition, criminal activity has played a part in raising funds for both Al Shabaab and Boko 
Haram: in the case of Al Shabaab – piracy, and in Boko Haram’s case – kidnapping for 
ransom, bank robbery and illicit trafficking. However, Boko Haram has made far greater use 
of criminal activities in sourcing funds for terror operations in comparison to Al Shabaab. 
Zimmermann’s causal model suggests that globalization fosters the growth of politico-
criminal networks, which then creates opportunities for terrorism. Boko Haram’s financial 
support and activities in Cameroon suggest that of a politico criminal network(s). This can be 
assumed as Boko Haram’s financiers have provided weapons in addition to supplying a route 
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to negotiating with the Cameroonian government in cases of kidnapping for ransom. The 
existence of a politico-criminal network is further suggested as a result of links between Boko 
Haram and arms traffickers in Cameroon. The existence of these politico-criminal networks 
have enhanced the effectiveness of Boko Haram’s operations as they have provided Boko 
Haram with the funding, channels and weapons necessary for conducting terror operations; in 
other words these networks have facilitated terrorism. 
Furthermore, Zimmermann’s causal model suggests that the support of an external 
state/group creates opportunities for terrorism. The financial support allegedly given by the 
Islamic World Society, the Al Muntada Trust Fund and an unknown Algerian sect, and the 
training provided by the latter as well as Al Shabaab and AQIM have provided Boko Haram 
with the means to conduct terror activities. Therefore, the support of these groups has 
facilitated terrorism in that it provided Boko Haram with opportunities to conduct terror 
attacks, be it nationally or internationally.
Both Boko Haram and Al Shabaab have been able to source funding in some way relating to 
globalization whether through politico-criminal networks or channels of business and 
commerce.
6.3.3 Migration and “Irrelevance” of Boundaries
Globalization has allowed for the “free” and easy flow of people across borders, thus it has 
essentially created a migration channel and terrorist groups or individuals wanting to join the 
ranks of terrorist groups have exploited this channel. This is more the case for Al Shabaab 
compared to Boko Haram. The use of the migration channel becomes clear when taking into 
account that a large number of foreign fighters and ethnic Somalis, outside of Somalia, have 
joined Al Shabaab. These fighters come from a number of geographical areas, including: the 
Horn of Africa, the Middle East, North America, Scandinavia, Western Europe and the 
Indian subcontinent. The geographical diversity present in Al Shabaab’s foreign element 
showcases the reach that the group has as well as the ease with which individuals, including 
terrorists, can migrate across international borders. The migration channels do not correspond 
to Zimmermann’s causal model; however it was suggested that “immigration,” which forms 
part of the model, be expanded to include the “immigration” of fighters. Globalization would 
then create a migration channel, which facilitates the movement of terrorists, which in turn 
creates opportunities for terrorism. In addition to the migration channel, the proximity to the 
Middle East, and the porosity of many African borders has contributed to the migration of 
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fighters. Porous borders have also enabled Al Shabaab to carry out attacks in neighbouring 
Kenya. Therefore, one is able to argue that migration through means of globalization, and the 
irrelevance of boundaries has facilitated Al Shabaab’s terror activities.
On the other hand, it is not possible to argue that foreign fighters have made use of the 
migration channel to join the ranks of Boko Haram, given that there is limited information 
available. It is more likely that these foreign fighters have made use of Nigeria’s porous 
borders to join Boko Haram. Thus, in this case, boundaries have become irrelevant, but not as 
a result of globalization as in the case of Al Shabaab. 
6.4 Globalization as Incentive for Acts of Terror
6.4.1 Threat of Corrupt Culture
Globalization leads to the spread of foreign cultures, which are often perceived as being 
corrupt. These corrupt foreign cultures are often associated with 
Westernization/Americanization. Both terrorist groups have expressed a hatred for Western 
culture, and in the case of both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram the threat of corrupt culture has 
informed their activities, specifically with regard to the choice of target. 
Both of these terrorist groups have launched attacks against individuals and buildings that are 
perceived as symbols of a corrupt Western culture. For example, the Westgate Mall, Al 
Shabaab’s most prominent attack, is in effect a temple of Western consumerism. However, as 
noted in Chapter 4, the threat of corrupt culture informed the choice of target, but is not 
necessarily the reason behind the attack.  This attack corresponds to Mittelmann’s causal 
model as the Westgate Mall and those who visit it are representative of a change in values 
and this provides an incentive for terrorism with regard to the selection of target. Other 
notable attacks against symbols of Westernization or targets of Western origin include the 
firing of mortar shells at a US congressman’s plane taking off from a Somali airport in 2009; 
and the Christmas Day attacks on the main AU base in Somalia in 2014. It is important to 
note that Somalia’s negative experience with the US could have informed some attacks. On 
the other hand, Boko Haram’s attack on the UN buildings in Abuja in 2011 is possibly its 
most prominent attack against an outpost of Western culture. Boko Haram perceives the UN 
as perpetuating the oppression of Muslim believers and since the UN was the brainchild of 
the West it is not surprising that they chose it as a target. 
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Al Shabaab and Boko Haram have also been seen to target institutions offering Western 
education. However, thus far Al Shabaab has launched only nine attacks between 2011 and 
2014, the most prominent attack being in 2015, namely the Garissa University College in 
April this year. However, Al Shabaab has promised similar attacks. On the other hand, Boko 
Haram is well known for its attacks on educational institutions against which the group 
launched 77 attacks between 2009 and 2014. Given the meaning of the group’s colloquial 
name, “Western education is forbidden,” it is not surprising that Boko Haram has targeted 
educational institutions. 
However, it does appear as though the threat of corrupt culture has influenced Boko Haram to 
a greater extent when compared to Al Shabaab; the reason being that Boko Haram believes, 
and has often stated, that the Nigerian state has become corrupt as a result of moral 
decadence and the influence of Western values. This explains the large number of attacks 
against the police, military and the government. In addition, Boko Haram has attacked and 
denounced Western “inventions” such as elections, whereas Al Shabaab has not. Furthermore, 
unlike Al Shabaab, Boko Haram has launched attacks against Muslims and the Islamic 
establishment in Nigeria, which it views as being corrupted by Western values. 46 This 
corresponds to Zimmermann’s causal model, which states that foreign cultures are perceived 
to erode conservative culture, which in turn creates an incentive for terrorism. There is 
however support for the argument that Al Shabaab perceives Somalia and Islam to be under 
threat from corrupt culture, as former Al Shabaab members believed that Islam had to be 
defended by the actions of Al Shabaab. 
Therefore, it can then be said that the spread of foreign cultures through globalization has 
served as an incentive for the terrorist activities of both Al Shabaab and Boko Haram, 
especially with regard to the selection of targets. It does however seem as though Boko 
Haram has been affected by threat of corrupt culture to a greater extent. 
6.4.2 Increasing Inequality and Poverty
Globalization has a tendency to create winners and losers and it has widened the gap between 
rich and poor. This appears to be the case in Nigeria, as severe inequality reigns between the 
north and south with the north lagging behind in terms of literacy and employment. This 
situation can be traced back to British colonial policies of non-intervention, which established 
                                               
46 Boko Haram has launched attacks against Christians, but the number of attacks against Muslims far outweighs 
the attacks against Christians.
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schools in the south, but not the north. The effects of this policy are still visible today. In 
addition, Western education is still largely rejected in the north, as it is believed to open a 
door to corrupt Western culture. This negatively impacts on the employment opportunities of 
those in the north.
Unemployment and poverty have served as a push factor for many young Somalis and 
Nigerians to join the ranks of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram, respectively. Furthermore, it has 
created opportunities for both groups to recruit marginalized youths and young men who are 
vulnerable to radicalization. The integration of both the Somali and Nigerian economy into 
the world economy has negatively affected both countries. In Somalia it led to an influx of 
people to cities in search for jobs. Given the existence of a youth bulge and the fact that 
unemployment is a major problem in Somalia, the problem of unemployment was further 
exacerbated. Often individuals feel as though they are not given the same opportunities as 
those around them and this leads to sense of marginalization as these individuals are left 
behind. However, in the case of Somalia, unemployment, inequality, and poverty cannot be 
clearly linked to the effects of globalization, as they can be attributed to factors such as 
corruption and civil war amongst others. Thus, it cannot be said that inequality and poverty as 
by-product of globalization has served as an incentive for terrorism in Somalia and the Horn 
of Africa. 
Similarly, Nigeria was negatively impacted by the liberalization of the economy; shifts in 
relative prices meant that Nigerian textile factories were unable to compete with the cheap 
Asian textiles flooding the market. This led to the decimation of the textile industry and in 
turn the cotton industry, which in the process led to the destruction of the lives of millions of 
Nigerians. The result was mass migration to cities which then led to greater unemployment. 
In addition, social services, public safety and education are either non-existent or are of an 
extremely low quality. The aforementioned suggests that the Nigerian state is incapable of 
protecting its economically disadvantaged citizens against the challenges brought about by 
the global economy. This is in line with Zimmermann’s causal model where shifts in relative 
prices lead to a weakening of the state (as the state is unable to provide) which in turn leads 
to economic and social inequality and serves as an incentive for terrorism. However, it is not 
possible to link the decimation of the cotton and textile industries to the individuals who have 
joined Boko Haram. It would require further research in the field to determine this. Therefore, 
the notion that inequality and poverty as by-product of globalization has served as an 
incentive for globalization appears weak.
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In both case studies, there is a weak link between globalization causing inequality and 
poverty, which in turn serves as an incentive/opportunity for the terrorist activities of Al 
Shabaab and Boko Haram respectively.
6.5 Globalization as Incentive in the Rise of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram 
In the case of Al Shabaab, globalization served as a means through which the group, as well 
as ordinary Somalis, was radicalized. The involvement of the US – through airstrikes – and 
their support for Ethiopian forces and the TFG (known for inhumane treatment) alienated 
Somalis and encouraged them to either join or support Al Shabaab. Thus, the involvement of 
the US as a bastion of globalization played a major role in the radicalization of Al Shabaab 
and many Somalis, which arguably attributed to their rise. On the other hand, there are no 
direct links between globalization and the rise of Boko Haram. However, one of the reasons 
that relates to the rise of Boko Haram is that of corruption within the Nigerian state. Even 
though this has not necessarily been caused by globalization, Boko Haram believes that the 
corruption visible in Nigerian society is the result of the infiltration of corrupt Western values, 
which are spread by globalization. 
6.6 Evaluating the Research Question
This study aimed to answer the following question: How and to what extent has globalization 
contributed towards the creation of a permissive environment in which terrorism has thrived 
in Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively? It is possible to answer this question with the 
assistance of the sub-questions set out in Chapter 1:
1. Has globalization acted as a facilitator or a deterrent of national/international 
terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively?
When taking into account the above findings, it is possible to argue that globalization has 
acted as a facilitator of national/international terrorism in both the case of Somalia (Horn of 
Africa) and northern Nigeria. There are no indications that globalization has deterred terrorist 
activity both nationally and internationally in Somalia or Nigeria.
2. How has globalization aided and facilitated national/international terrorism in, and 
emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria?
This question was addressed in section 4.3 of Chapter 4 and section 5.3 of Chapter 5, and 
section 6.3 of this chapter. The analysis undertaken in section 6.3 Globalization as Facilitator 
of Acts of Terror established that globalization has aided and facilitated national/international 
terrorism in and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria in a number of different ways. 
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3. How has globalization served as an incentive for national/international terrorism in, 
and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria?
This question was answered in section 4.4 of Chapter 4 and section 5.4 of Chapter 5. These
sections, along with the comparison in section 6.4. Globalization as Incentive for Acts of 
Terror of this chapter revealed that globalization has served as an incentive for 
national/international terrorism in, and emanating from, Somalia and northern Nigeria in two 
different ways and to varying degrees. 
4. Which other factors have aided globalization in facilitating national/international 
terrorism in, and emanating from Somalia and northern Nigeria respectively?
Subsection 4.3.3 in Chapter 4, subsection 5.3.3 in Chapter 5 and the analysis in subsection 
6.3.3 Migration and “Irrelevance” of Boundaries of this chapter found that in both cases, 
porous borders have aided the terrorist activity of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram. 
When taking the above into account it is possible to answer the main research question in the 
positive; the case studies in Chapters 4 and 5 support the notion that globalization has indeed 
created a permissive environment in which terrorism has thrived in both Somalia and 
northern Nigeria. Furthermore, as was seen in the above the different facets of globalization 
facilitated and/or encouraged the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab and Boko Haram to 
different extents.
6.7 Theoretical Implications
According to Zimmermann’s (2011:S159) findings there does not appear to be a positive 
relationship between globalization and terrorism, rather globalization is a background factor 
and political terrorism is a reaction to local grievances. As the study revealed in subsections 
5.2.1 and 5.4.1, and section 5.5 in Chapter 5, corruption in the Nigerian state has served as a 
major driver of Boko Haram’s campaign of terror. Although this can be perceived as a local 
grievance, Boko Haram firmly believes that the prevailing corruption present in the Nigerian 
state is the result of the infiltration of corrupt Western culture and values. Therefore, in this 
case, globalization is not merely a background factor, but has informed local grievances and 
the terrorist activity of Boko Haram. This then points to a positive link between globalization 
and terrorism. In the case of Al Shabaab and Somalia, globalization can also not be dismissed 
as being a mere background factor. As revealed in section 4.5 in Chapter 4, globalization 
played a prominent role in motivating the rise of Al Shabaab, 47 as it was through US 
                                               
47 It should be noted that it did not play the only part.
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aggression (in the form of airstrikes) and US support of the Ethiopian invasion and the TFG 
(known for inhumane treatment) which served to radicalize Somalis to either join Al Shabaab 
or to support the group. In this case, globalization combined with a local grievance and 
served as an incentive for terrorist activity. Furthermore, as revealed in section 7.2 of this 
chapter, globalization has played a definite role in facilitating terrorist activity and to some 
extent serving as an incentive. Therefore, it is possible to argue that there is indeed a positive 
relationship between globalization and terrorism. This should however be tested in other case 
studies. 
In addition, this study revealed that both case studies correspond to the characteristics of 
hyperconflict as set out by Mittelman. This finding provides support for Mittelman’s 
argument that the world is moving towards a new type of conflict, namely hyperconflict. 
6.8 Recommendations for Future Research
Further research is warranted, given that the scope of the study was limited to two regions on 
the African continent. Since this study only examined the impact of globalization in the 
regions of the Horn of Africa and West Africa, it is not possible to state that globalization has 
unequivocally created permissive environments in which terrorism can flourish. Therefore, 
further case studies analyses should be done in order to determine whether or not 
globalization has indeed created a permissive environment in which terrorism can flourish in 
other regional contexts, for example South Asia. Further case study analysis would do one of 
two things; either strengthen the claim that globalization creates permissive environments in 
which terrorism can flourish, or, it would support the notion, that these effects of 
globalization are limited to certain geographical and cultural contexts. 
In addition, the correlation between inequality/poverty, as a by-product of globalization, and 
terrorist activity is somewhat weak48 as it was impossible to determine whether or not the 
decimation of the cotton and textile industries in northern Nigeria (the result of the 
liberalization of the economy and the flooding of the local market with cheap Asian textiles) 
directly or indirectly resulted in individuals joining Boko Haram. Consequently it is 
recommended that field research be conducted so as to determine whether or not the 
decimation of the aforementioned industries either directly (the individual losing their 
livelihood) or indirectly (a parent or family member losing their livelihood) encouraged 
individuals to join Boko Haram.
                                               
48 As indicated in Chapter 5. 
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6.9 Conclusion
When taking into account the findings of this research study it is possible to conclude that a 
situation of hyperconflict has erupted in the regional contexts of both Al Shabaab and Boko 
Haram. This can be argued, since both case studies correspond to the characteristics of 
hyperconflict as set out by Mittelman. Furthermore, globalization has facilitated the terrorist 
activities of both terrorist groups, albeit to different extents, through the use of technology, 
sourcing of funds, and through migration and the “irrelevance of boundaries”. In addition, 
globalization has served as an incentive for the terrorist activities of Al Shabaab and Boko 
Haram through the spread of corrupt foreign culture, which presents a threat. On the other 
hand it is not possible to argue that inequality and poverty brought about by globalization 
have served as an incentive for the terrorist activities of these two groups, as there is not 
enough evidence to support it. In this way this study has made a contribution towards 
understanding the ways in which globalization can facilitate and encourage terrorism both 
nationally and internationally. Moreover, it has provided insight as to how globalization 
affects different regions and groups.
Thus one can argue that the link between globalization and terrorism appears to be positive. 
The study has revealed that in certain countries, and under specific circumstances, 
globalization has led to and/or provided a permissive environment in which 
national/international terrorism has thrived. This was revealed through the aforementioned 
case studies of Al Shabaab in Somalia (Horn of Africa) and Boko Haram in Nigeria (West 
Africa).
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